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Abstract 
 
Fideism, or basing one’s religious belief on faith, is popular especially amongst modern 
Protestant Christians. For the fideist, religious belief-systems are not subject to rational 
evaluation, and faith as the act of belief forms the essence of truth and the ultimate criterion for 
embracing a religion. Critics of fideism say that epistemologically, a hierarchy of methods can be 
used to derive the truth, and each method gives us varying confidence levels. These methods 
include mathematics and logic, science, personal experience, history, expert testimony, inference 
and Faith. Among these, the critic says, pure faith in something is the least successful in getting at 
the truth. Radical fideists like Kierkegaard do not cite logical reasons for defending their belief 
that God exists. Personal reasons are instead offered for their decision to believe. In this thesis I 
seek to demonstrate that the radical fideism advocated by Kierkegaard constitutes good 
justification for belief in the Christian God. I will begin with a discussion on fideism and some of 
its proponents, followed by a discussion on the place of faith (as a non-rational belief in God’s 
existence) in religion. I will then appeal to Kierkegaard’s philosophy in defending my view that 
religious belief in God is a matter of faith and personal commitment, feeling and passion, and this 
is an inner process not grounded in arguments. References will be drawn from Kierkegaard’s 
themes of faith, subjectivity and inwardness. I conclude by saying that even if no objective 
grounds exist to justify our belief, Kierkegaard standpoint remains right in two ways: Firstly, the 
fideist rejection of the attempt to justify his belief through offering reasons for it is precisely what 
makes his decision to believe deeply meaningful in his life. Secondly, those who ‘try to judge faith 
by objective, critical reflection will go on forever that way, and will never reach the point of 
having faith and of being religious’. (Peterson et al, 2003:53) 
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Introduction: The Problem of Faith 
 
‘To believe in God is to realise that life has a meaning.’                        Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
‘It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with, and it is only in subjectivity that its truth 
exists, if it exists at all; objectively, Christianity has no existence.’ 
     Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.116 
 
Theism is the belief that there is a Creator, God, who may be encountered within, but 
who is not limited to the material world. It engenders a balance of immanence and 
transcendence. (Thompson, 2007:62) The theistic view of God has over the centuries yielded a 
rich legacy of dialogue and debate, and for close to twenty five hundred years in Western culture, 
the theistic Deity has been thought of as a transcendent Spiritual Being that is omnipotent, 
omniscient, and perfectly good. (Peterson et al, 2003:10) This conventional view of theism forms 
an important belief framework for three living religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. (ibid, p.9) 
The word ‘God’ itself is used in a various senses, from referring to a transcendent, infinite Being 
who is Creator and Lord of the universe to any finite entity or experience with special 
significance or inspiring special gratitude. (Hinnells, ed., 1984:81) Other uses of the word ‘God’ 
between these extremes include those referring to God as the object of an experience that bears 
special significance, but which is not an actual experience. Given the wide variety of senses the 
word ‘God’ has, I hereby state that my aim is to focus on the God of Christianity. In the course 
of my writing, the pronoun ‘He’ will be used to refer to God as this is familiar practice in 
philosophical enquiry, theology and Christianity. In descriptions of God, we need to appreciate 
the self-transcending quality of religious experience and language. God is said to be in and outside 
of our ordinary experience and the words we use. The transcendence of God means He is 
beyond any concept, language or experience, and cannot be limited or contained. When we say 
that God is infinite, we mean He is present everywhere. Hence there is no way to experience 
Him without experiencing something else at the same time as well. It is in His being found within 
everything that God is therefore described as immanent. (Thompson, 2007:62) 7 
 
Theists in present times often find it futile proving God’s existence, and clearly some 
philosophical developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have led many to believe 
that we simply cannot prove anything metaphysical, or that which concerns supposed realities 
beyond what we can immediately perceive. (Hill, 2007:38) This essentially rules out any proof for 
or against God. Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein held this view. I feel that when we 
consider the arguments about the existence of God, we need to remind ourselves that God is 
not the kind of ‘thing’ which might or might not happen to exist. (Thompson, 2007:105) 
Theologian Paul Tillich, who argued that religion is a matter of our ‘ultimate concern’ as it 
challenges the very meaning and significance of our lives, said, in Systematic Theology (Vol.1): 
 
‘..The question of the existence of God can be neither asked nor answered. If 
asked, it is a question about that which by its very nature is above existence, and 
therefore, the answer, whether negative or affirmative, implicitly denies the 
nature of God. It is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny it. God 
is being itself, not a being.’ (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004: 258) 
 
Among Christians, a popular objection to proving God’s existence is that there appears 
to be something morally wrong about searching for such proof. For example, Karl Barth, one of 
the most influential Christian theologians of the twentieth century, argued that beyond 
revelation, God cannot be known. For him, to claim that God’s existence could be proven simply 
placed human abilities above God. All knowledge of God must instead emerge from God Himself 
and not from human reason. (Hill, 2007:38) Kant argued that reason can prove only things within 
the world of sense perception and given this, we err if we venture beyond this. Wittgenstein’s 
argument was that language cannot talk about anything outside our perception. All talk about 
God is consequently meaningless, and even if God and religion are of the greatest importance, 
they simply transcend language. Eighteenth century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid claimed 
that belief in God is natural and that there is no need to prove God’s existence, any more than 
we need to prove the existence of the physical world around us. (Hill, 2007:38) The key 
questions for us to ask at this point would be these: If we cannot argue for God’s existence, can 
we still say God can be believed? Can such a belief ever be rational? Christians who object to the 8 
 
idea that God can be proved like a mathematical theorem will nevertheless say that we have 
good reasons for supposing that God does exist, or can be believed. (ibid) 
 
Extensive discussions on religious knowledge are often couched as the contrast between 
faith and reason, and the relationship between faith and reason has historically been dogged by 
controversy and conflict. Christians are usually in agreement that we have good grounds to 
suppose that God exists, and that non-Christians have access to many of these reasons too. 
Their point of disagreement lies more with deciding which arguments are the soundest and the 
degree that these effectively prove God’s existence in the manner that a mathematical theorem 
can be proven. In fact, as Hill (2007) says, a most significant task of Christian thinkers today 
would be that of coming up with a good account of the relation between faith and reason that 
‘takes the good points of both extreme views but avoids the problems associated with them’. 
(p.89) Some religious thinkers advocate that faith and reason are incompatible and that they must 
exist in a relationship of mutual rejection. Descartes and Spinoza believed, however, that faith 
and reason are compatible, claiming that while they may have separate sources, one could 
supplement the other. Pascal believed that one avenue to God is through personal conversion 
and acceptance of God beyond reason’s persuasions, but ironically, it is rational arguments that 
he offered to convince his readers to embark on this journey. In Pensees (1660) Pascal wrote 
that ‘the heart has its reasons which reason does not know’, suggesting that some people might 
turn to suppressing their faculties of reason so that they are able to believe. (Peterson et al, 
2003:40) 
 
Reason is the natural ability of the human mind to discover truth. Some philosophers 
argue that it is necessary for any thinking person to use reason in order to have enduring 
conviction for a belief. For these philosophers, it is when ‘warrant’ is provided for our beliefs that 
we avoid irrational or irresponsible belief. (ibid, p.121) Rationalism is the belief that knowledge of 
what exists is obtainable through reason alone. Put another way, rationalism entails that we 
justify beliefs according to reason. In rationalism, we deductively justify beliefs by beginning with 
one or more necessary (indubitable) premises that through clear, logical steps are expounded on 
progressively until we derive the desired conclusion. Hence reason has a pre-eminent 9 
 
epistemological status due to its potential for objectivity and testability. In much the same way, 
reason plays an important negative role in belief justification. The reasons one has for holding a 
belief has a bearing on the degree of certainty that belief constitutes knowledge. Some types of 
belief are subject to verification but not falsification, an example being beliefs about existence. 
Others, such as universal claims, are potentially falsifiable rather than verifiable, and falsifiable 
beliefs are not justifiable and do not constitute knowledge as they are not true.  
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the widespread opinion was that religious claims 
could not be proved or disproved, and that there was no meaningful way of thinking about these 
claims at all. (Hill, 2007:87) Kant, who came to be associated with this particular outlook, argued 
in Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that reason is reliable only when we are talking about the 
content of experience, and since objects like God are outside of the realm of experience, these 
could not be reasoned about. (King, 2004:113) Seen in this light, all the arguments for and against 
God, and indeed most metaphysics, are just pointless. Kant’s arguments and fundamental view 
that religious matters intrinsically cannot be reasoned about found steady support from many 
quarters, even though in the eyes of some, this view spelled ill for Christianity. For others, this 
signalled clearly that the time had come for Christianity to rethink particularly the ways in which 
its followers know or believe its doctrines. (ibid) Friedrich Schleiermacher argued in On Religion 
– Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799) that Christianity was based on ‘feeling’ or a direct 
experience of our dependence upon the Divine at all times; it is not really about making the kind 
of metaphysical claims that its ‘cultured despisers’ now ridiculed. For him, reason plays no role in 
establishing Christian doctrines. Instead, reason’s function lies with building doctrines for the 
expression of the basic, non-rational ‘feeling’. (ibid, p.88) 
 
A definition of faith is more challenging in contrast. ‘Faith’ as used in religious contexts, 
is rather complex in its meaning. Faith usually involves a cognitive aspect and believing that the 
religious doctrines are true. A volitional aspect is also involved or implied, ‘expressed in 
commitment to the object of faith and obedience to what is commanded and there may also be 
an affective aspect of trust or love’. (Peterson et al, 2003:54) Whereas philosophy (in relying on 
human reason) proceeds by analysis and argument, the religious believer, in contrast, through a 10 
 
reliance on faith, reaches a supernatural certainty about truths, some of which are accessible to 
reason, while others are not. As Geisler (1976) points out, even if we have certainty that God 
exists, natural reason will not be able to help us go a step deeper towards comprehending such 
issues as the existence of a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead. Faith is needed for 
this. Religious faith thus involves a belief that is beyond what could be made reasonable by 
evidence at hand; a belief that draws a type of implicit or explicit reference to a source that is 
transcendent. In this thesis we focus primarily on the ‘belief’ aspect of faith.  
 
Voltaire defined faith in two ways - first, as a belief in things which he personally believed 
and secondly, as a belief in things he deemed incredible. Faith, said Voltaire (1901), consists in 
believing not what seems true, but what seems false to our understanding. He also added that 
‘the faith which they have for things which they do not understand is founded upon that which 
they do understand; they have grounds of credibility’. (p.210) Kierkegaard pointed out that while 
in general, having faith means believing certain things to be true, there is a further crucial, more 
significant aspect of adopting an existential attitude and existing in ‘fear and trembling’. Another 
philosopher, Robert Audi, distinguishes between propositional faith (belief in the truth of certain 
things) and attitudinal faith (trust in a person). It is important that I highlight two components of 
religious faith as a complex thing that influences a person in every aspect of life – the ‘assurance’ 
and ‘hope’ that it offers the believer. Hebrews 11:1 defines faith as ‘the assurance of things hoped 
for, the conviction of things not seen’, suggesting that having faith is partly to believe in something 
beyond available evidence. As Hill (2007) notes, it is also ‘more than that, for it is to hope as well. 
This is something we can choose to have’. (p.94) 
 
The dichotomy in definitions above highlights the tension inherent in the contrast 
between faith and reason. There are uses of reason that need not be debated. For certain, all 
religious communities use reason in the process of teaching to children and new converts the 
belief system of the respective religions. Reason also plays a key role in assisting the faithful to 
understand and appreciate the nature of their faith. The controversial question is more of what 
role (if any) reason should play in the validation (and invalidation) of religious belief systems. 
While we may have to use reason in understanding faith, might it also be true that having faith at 11 
 
all rests on our having good reasons to believe that one’s faith is true? This forms the crux of the 
problem of faith and reason. This tension itself stems from an important question regarding 
religious knowledge: Is it possible to obtain knowledge of the metaphysical without the use of 
reason? As Thompson (2007) says, ‘Whereas for science, there is trust in the rational process by 
which views of the world are formed, evaluated and modified, for religion, trust is placed in a 
particular view of the world, regardless of whether reason supports it.’ (p.201) When religious 
thinkers encounter the challenge of the scientific method, they either seek to minimise the factual 
content of belief claims or claim that religion is an issue of faith, one where human reason and 
empirical facts do not count for much. This latter approach, implying that human reason is ‘fallen’ 
and incapable of helping us know God, was adopted by Kierkegaard and in the twentieth century 
by Karl Barth. (ibid) 
 
Concerning the role of faith in religion, a wide range of views exists. As we have seen, 
some claim that the fundamental truths of religion, particularly Christianity, cannot be established 
by empirical investigation or by argument from first principles. Statements like ‘There is a God 
who exists’ or ‘Jesus has risen from the dead’ simply have to be embraced by a mental and 
emotional leap beyond what reason attempts to establish. However, when the believer says he 
has faith that God exists, is his belief a reasonable one and is his confidence justified? In this 
connection, some people hold the view that purely intellectual interest in God misses the heart 
of true religion. They also say that abstract analysis of religious concepts and the logical 
examination of theological beliefs are plainly not helpful to the believer when it comes to 
appreciating the intimate, personal involvement typical of religious faith. (Peterson et al, 2003:9) 
As Peterson et al (2003) point out, ‘intellectual interest or philosophical interest in religion is not 
the same thing as passionate religious commitment’. (ibid) In other words, however rigorous the 
intellectual investigation is, this helps no one gain devout faith. The God of Philosophers is simply 
not the God of Faith, believers further argue, and authentic religious faith comes not as the 
culmination of philosophical inquiry. In fact, the latter seems to go against the spirit and intent of 
religious faith.  
 12 
 
Fideism is the position that Ultimate Truth is based upon faith rather than reason. Its 
fundamental thesis is that essential religious doctrines cannot be rationally verified and thus can 
only be believed on faith alone. When the fideist says he has faith that God exists and that He 
loves us, he is saying firstly that he accepts this independently of and in opposition to any 
reasoning or evidence, and secondly that proving or disproving God’s love for us is 
inconsequential. (Peterson et al, 2003:45) More than this, accepting doctrines on faith is a valid 
and reasonable action to take, according to the fideist. Christian belief, on this account, seeks no 
justification for itself through any appeal to universal categories of reason, but instead relies on its 
own internal and self-consistent logic as revealed by God. In all matters of theology, ‘truth is thus 
apprehended by faith’. (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004:280) Fideism is thus the opposite of 
evidentialism, but it is also the way which people since Kierkegaard’s time have typically come to 
think of faith. When religious people refer to ‘faith’ they ‘must necessarily mean believing 
something for which there is no evidence, or at least not evidence that most people would 
accept as sufficient for belief’. (Hill, 2007:89) All Christians are thus fideists in that respect. 
Sometimes fideism is seen as Protestant ‘irrationalism’. It also claims that Christianity is not to be 
defended as a religion but instead should be seen as a call to a relationship with God. Also 
common among fideists would be the view that faith is in part an emotion or passion that guides 
or constitutes an entire way of life. Pascal, Tertullian, Kierkegaard and Brunner are advocates of 
this apologetic. Kierkegaard’s philosophy appears to me to best exemplify this orientation. 
Whereas various Christian theologians have adopted more moderate forms of fideism as part of 
their position that salvation is solely through faith, Kierkegaard adopted a more radical form of 
fideism, arguing that religious faith calls for accepting beliefs that are rationally unverifiable, non-
rational and even absurd or contradictory.  
  
Evans (2006) describes Kierkegaard as possibly the greatest Christian thinker since the 
Middle Ages. (p.9)  Kierkegaard’s deepest concerns are seen as twofold – an ‘emphasis on the 
ways that sinfulness and finitude limit human thinking, and on the ways that certain human 
emotions and passions are necessary in order to get at religious truth’. (Evans, 1998, 112) Often 
seen as the archetypical fideist, Kierkegaard’s overall position does not accommodate any rational 
evaluation of faith perspectives. (Peterson et al, 2003:56) He is seen by many to be the precursor 13 
 
of the existentialist school of philosophy. Existentialists raise questions like: Why am I here? How 
can I deal with the fact of my own death? How do I approach the meaninglessness of my life? 
These fundamental problems of human existence can result in despair, or existential angst. 
However, unlike some existentialist philosophers who came after him, Kierkegaard believed 
Christianity’s promise of eternal life offers the believer a kind of hope. His chief impact on 
theology was through the neo-orthodox theology of Karl Barth and Rudolph Bultmann, the 
former of whose commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (1919) was drew much inspiration 
from Kierkegaard.  
 
While Kierkegaard was concerned with a belief in God, it is not in the mere existence of 
God but also with how we can believe that God will keep the promise of eternal life or life after 
death. In this sense, the problem of faith thus became the central problem of religion for 
Kierkegaard. As he saw it, faith is a reasonable enterprise based on the human predicament; it 
definitely entails risk and requires a leap. As Peterson et al (2003) says, for Kierkegaard, ‘religious 
faith always involves a commitment, a ‘stepping out’ and entrusting ourselves to something that 
goes beyond what we have conclusive proof of’. (p.53) This commitment is the single most 
important decision of the believer’s life, and is never tentative, partial and proportionate to the 
amount of rational evidence at hand for a particular conclusion. A ‘believer’s commitment to God 
is supposed to be total commitment, even when one does not have total proof that one’s belief 
in God is correct’. (ibid) A radical trust is called for, and this radical trust of faith, according to 
Kierkegaard, is the highest virtue one can reach. All arguments that reason derives as proofs of 
God are circular because we can only reason about the existence of an object that we already 
assume is in existence. 
 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy is not in the form of a rational, systematic argument as what he 
presented was not a doctrine or ready-made truth. Instead, he wrote as an attempt to show the 
reader the truth about himself. Instead of coming across as a religious authority, he utilised 
textual devices, pseudonyms, situations and metaphors for the dramatisation of his ideas, 
demonstrating how these are apparent in everyday life. The reader is then left to choose 
between the different possibilities within the text. In this sense, the reader is made to assume 14 
 
personal responsibility for the existential significance to be derived from Kierkegaard’s insights. 
Rather than add more knowledge, Kierkegaard aimed to tear away the false knowledge that he 
saw as having pervaded or poisoned society. Rather than seeking to make God and the Christian 
faith perfectly intelligible he emphasised God’s absolute transcendence of all human categories. 
Christian dogma, according to him, embodies paradoxes offensive to reason. The central paradox 
of Christianity is that of the eternal, infinite, transcendent God whose incarnation is a temporal, 
finite, human being (Jesus). When encountering this paradox one can choose to have faith or 
simply take offense, but one simply cannot believe by virtue of reason. This view hence directly 
counters the Hegelian claim that faith could have the status of objective certainty. For 
Kierkegaard, the quest for such certainty presents no more than a snare. Kierkegaard's sought to 
invert the Hegelian dialectic that says that anyone with the capacity to follow the dialectical 
progression of the ‘transparent’ concepts of his logic would have access to the mind of God 
(which to Hegel is equivalent to the logical structure of the universe). (Carlisle, 2006:51) To 
Kierkegaard, scientific knowledge is the greatest impediment, rather than the means, to 
redemption.  
 
Kierkegaard argued that in Christ one can realise complete freedom and selfhood. 
Christ, by His Incarnation, bridged time and eternity. Christ said He would manifest Himself to 
those who love Him, and the manifested Christ would transform the lover into the likeness of 
the thing that is beloved. (ibid, p.65) This fundamental truth does not have its basis anchored on 
human reason though we recognise its truth through our minds. For Kierkegaard, there is an 
immense burden of responsibility that lies with the individual chiefly because his existential 
choices determine the fate of his soul – either it lives forever or is damned. Anxiety or dread is 
the ‘presentiment of this terrible responsibility when the individual stands at the threshold of 
momentous existential choice’. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kierkegaard/) It is a dreadful 
burden indeed that anxiety exerts upon us as we seek to choose for all eternity. However, there 
is at the same time exhilaration of freedom as one exercises his own choice. Through this 
temporal choice made by the individual at the very instant that time and eternity cross paths, the 
individual creates a self that will be judged for eternity. (ibid) However, for Kierkegaard, this 
choice of faith is not made just once. Rather, through constant avowals of faith, it has to be 15 
 
renewed, and according to Kierkegaard in The Sickness Unto Death, one's very selfhood depends 
on this repetition.  
 
In sum, Kierkegaard’s fundamental concern lies with the individual who engages himself 
in a personal struggle for faith and personal meaning in life. He does not blindly advocate faith’s 
absurdity even though his interest is in the dynamics of Christian faith. For him, God is 
incomprehensible and non-rational, and what is of prime importance is not our conception of 
Him but the degree of passion with which we believe in Him. In speaking of God’s existence, 
Kierkegaard is referring to the paradox of the Incarnation, of God becoming Man in a temporal 
instant. This is to him an existential truth, with reference to a historical instance of existence as a 
temporal event. It is not a matter of demonstration but of faith and decisive significance. (Carlisle, 
2006:139) According to Kierkegaard, God’s existence is grasped only by being wholly believed, 
and His existence is assured to us only when we abandon proof and take the leap of faith. Such 
questions as ‘Believe in what?’ go against the grain of religious feeling and are accordingly 
irrelevant when it comes to our choosing for eternity.  
 
Chapter One in my discussion focuses on fideism and some of its proponents, the place 
of faith (as a non-rational belief in God’s existence) in religion and how it is contrasted with 
reason. It also considers whether it is possible for the faith believer to maintain that far from 
being deplorable that we have no objective grounds for theistic belief, this is precisely what 
makes the fideist’s inner decision to believe in God deeply meaningful to him. Chapter Two 
focuses on the Kierkegaardian view that genuine religious knowledge is grounded in faith beyond 
reason. Chapter Three is an exposition of faith in the eyes of Kierkegaard, with the discussion 
focusing on the place of faith, subjectivity and inwardness in his existentialist philosophy. 
References will be made to his works, including his Christian discourses. Chapter Four defends 
Kierkegaard’s radical fideism as a justification for belief in God. The idea of faith as non-rational 
belief that is contrary to the sum of evidence for that belief will be explored in the broad context 
of showing that belief in God is a matter of personal commitment and not really a matter of 
defending certain arguments. I conclude this thesis in Chapter Five by reaffirming that belief in 
God is a matter of faith and personal commitment, existing outside of the enterprise of 16 
 
rationalisation. The overall point emphasised throughout this thesis would be that nobody comes 
to believe in God because of arguments. Religious faith is a matter of our feelings and passion 
more than our reason; it gives us hope, assurance, meaning or purpose in life and involves the 
whole person. The belief or non-belief in God is undoubtedly one of the most important 
concepts in our existence mainly because a belief in God’s existence offers some guarantee to 
the theist’s conception of the meaning of life. And when it comes down to a choice that must be 
made between despair and the God of the Bible, my argument is that a Kierkegaardian leap into 
the non-rational realm ought to be one's choice. Kierkegaard’s works remind us of the important 
role intuition and risk play in religion. From these, subsequent new understanding of life and 
serious commitment follow. Even if no objective grounds exist to support our belief, Kierkegaard 
remains right in saying that this is exactly what makes the fideist’s inner decision to believe in 
God deeply meaningful to him.  
 
For any theistic inquiry, subjecting all religious beliefs to rigorous philosophical 
examination will result in either ‘a modification of one’s views, the acceptance or rejection of 
theism, or deeper commitment’. (Peterson et al, 2003:12) It has been said that those 
philosophers who adopt an atheistic standpoint find it futile with arguing with believers. They are 
of the opinion that whatever arguments they put forward, believers will persist in believing just as 
before. For them, it is just that ‘the basic belief lies below the level of logical argument and 
touches an experience that is independent of subsequent interpretation’. (Thompson, 2007:67) A 
philosopher’s antecedent beliefs determine what grounds he will try to defend and how he will 
try to defend them. It is fitting therefore that at the outset I make a personal profession of faith. 
In the Judaeo-Christian faith, whose teachings centre on good intention, justice and the loving 
kindness of God, the topic of faith triggers many key questions that have no straightforward 
answers. And critical inquiry into matters like faith is often perceived as nurturing unhealthy 
skepticism. This thesis is intended as a plausible defense of radical faith as good and satisfactory 
justification for belief in God. Since success is a relative term, it seems to me that insofar as 
radical faith of the type that Kierkegaard adopts comes close enough to being a persuasive 
justification for belief, then it counts as a successful apologetic. There is no need to insist on its 
being impeccably foolproof, given the infinite disproportion between what as humans we can 17 
 
think and say about God and what God really is. If someone’s philosophical integrity is considered 
questionable because of an affirmation of faith, then I feel no less questionable would be the 
integrity of those who wholly reject religious faith (whether this is explicitly stated or not). My 
view is that someone who considers theism unreasonable, irrational, or even delusional will 
refuse to accept any of its implications, and will accordingly deny its validity. This refusal amounts 
to a keenness to deny the theist’s basic beliefs any credibility in the first place. 
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Chapter One: Fideism and Believing Because I Want to Believe 
 
Many religious people deem it a virtue to believe things ‘on faith’, citing the importance 
of taking a leap of faith instead of allowing oneself to over-rationalise things and getting mired in a 
plethora of confusing arguments. Non-religious people view this kind of attitude as suggesting 
that someone who believes things ‘on faith’ is unwilling to be open to rational discussion, to 
modify their views in the face of contrary evidence, or to offer any reason why anyone else 
should share those beliefs. (Hill, 2007:81) This chapter examines fideism, some of its proponents 
and the place of faith (as a non-rational belief in God’s existence) in religion. It discusses firstly 
the fideist’s reasons for saying that religious beliefs cannot be rationally evaluated and secondly 
(and more importantly), whether the faith believer can justifiably maintain that far from being 
deplorable that we have no objective grounds for theistic belief, this is precisely what makes the 
inner decision to believe in God a deeply meaningful one. A defense of radical fideism will be 
attempted only in Chapter Four. Besides defending the fideist view that religious doctrines must 
be accepted on the basis of faith and not rational justification, this chapter maintains that faith is 
not a form of irrational but non-rational belief formation. By non-rational, we mean that faith, as an 
expression of a type of assent and passion, has no bearing on the standards of reason. This is as 
opposed to ‘irrational’, which I take to mean being counter to the standards of reason.  
 
Fideism as a philosophical term refers to a system of philosophy that denies the ability of 
human reason to reach certitude about God. It affirms through this denial that the act of human 
knowledge lies in an act of faith, with authority being the key criterion of certitude. (Peterson et 
al, 2003:45) Put another way, believing on faith means believing in defiance of rational guidelines. 
In Kierkegaard, Schleiermacher and many other religious thinkers, there are varying forms of the 
distinction between the God of faith from the God of metaphysics, the rejection of reason and 
the appeal to religious experience. Reason is commonly understood as the principles for a 
methodological inquiry, whether intellectual, moral, aesthetic, or religious. Religions like 
Christianity depend on some authoritative document that is seen as a product of Divine 
inspiration. The fideist says that one should simply have faith that God exists, with faith itself 19 
 
being good reason to believe in God. Fideism certainly has a long tradition in Christianity, and in 
1 Corinthians, what Paul says may be deemed an interpretation of fideism: 
 
‘For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, 
it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe . . 
. For the foolishness of God is wiser than (the wisdom of) men.’ (1 Corinthians 
1:21, 25)  
 
Fideism is one of the most influential arguments for a type of approach to knowledge 
and to the means by which we choose our direction in life. Fideism’s foundations in the distrust 
in human reason led to the logical consequence of skepticism, and in order to avert this 
conclusion, some philosophers have argued to the effect that Man must have faith, either 
maintaining the importance of faith over reason or advocating a clear and radical separation 
between reason and faith. In other words, they advocate that there must be a separation 
between science and philosophy on the one hand, and religion, on the other. From fideism, 
agnosticism, positivism, pragmatism and other modern forms of anti-intellectualism have arisen.  
 
Fideists are in agreement that faith is, in part, an emotion or passion, and see it as 
guiding an entire way of life. Faith is personal, involving the inner person and calling for personal 
commitment. Involving our emotions more than our reason, it helps us become involved in a 
whole way of life. When the theist appeals to faith, he is saying that those beliefs that have not 
fulfilled the minimum requirements of knowledge do constitute knowledge. Although this is the 
only context in which the appeal to faith makes any sense, it would seem  contradictory, even 
strange, to some that we should label as knowledge that which has not been rationally 
demonstrated, and all the more so when reason cannot accept as knowledge anything that does 
not fulfill its fundamental requirements. But the essence of faith is firstly that of considering an 
idea as having a referent in reality while rejecting the process by which reality comes to be 
known, and secondly, accepting the truth of an idea even though this idea is unable to meet the 
test of truth. The theist effectively renders the concept of faith inapplicable if he were to claim 
that the articles of faith can also meet the requirements of reason.  20 
 
At the core of religious faith lies eternal significance. According to the New Testament, 
‘Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.’ (Hebrews 11:1) 
Faith as a justification for religious belief, is accordingly non-rational and wish-driven, employed 
when supporting evidence is lacking. ‘Faith’ in a statement like ‘My belief that God (or the soul or 
immortality) exists is based on faith’ is an act of commitment – one is willing to bet his life on the 
truth of his belief. To have faith means to have trust or belief in God (or the gods of one's 
religion) and to have the belief that one's religious tenets are true. In this sense, faith is 
contrasted with reason because believers simply say that they have taken the leap of faith, and do 
not lean on reasons or intellectual arguments for demonstrating the truth of their beliefs. The 
leap is taken by the believer without any intellectual assurance that he is leaping in the right 
direction, but the risk is worth it as without God, one's life is without hope and meaning. It is in 
this respect that the language of faith is a language of commitment and self-involvement, one in 
which a person expresses a new self-understanding that is in relation to the presence of the 
Divine. Since a person finds true fulfilment through faith, faith is perceived by some to be a higher 
virtue than reason. Kierkegaard certainly saw it as such.  
 
So far I have said that in philosophy, conviction is recommended only when there is 
sufficient reason, whereas in religion there is a reliance on faith. The Incarnation, for example, 
either fulfills the requirements of knowledge or it does not. It is either evidence-based, internally 
consistent as a belief, and capable of being integrated with one's previous knowledge, or it is not. 
The belief in the Incarnation should be accepted as true if it can fulfill these standards, in which 
case it then becomes a proposition of reason and cannot be accepted on faith. Conversely, if the 
belief in the Incarnation fails to meet the requirements of reason, then even if it is accepted on 
faith, it cannot be deemed rational. Given that faith entails belief in the absence of rational 
demonstration, all propositions of faith are non-rational, no matter what their specific content is. 
This mode of belief was argued for by Kierkegaard. Radical fideism of the Kierkegaardian variety 
is widely embraced at present among Protestant theologians. William James, in ‘The Will to 
Believe’ (1896) argued that Man has a psychological need for commitment and belief despite the 
lack of evidence, but religious fideists prefer instead Kierkegaard’s radical fideism, seeing James' 
account of faith as being too mild. 21 
 
Apologetics as a discipline is a defense of two kinds of assertions, and therefore two 
distinct methods are required. The philosophical apologetic defends the assertions of theism 
against atheism and other non-theisms. The theological apologetic defends the assertions of 
evangelical Christian theism against Islam, Judaism, and non-evangelical Christian theism. 
Philosophical apologetics does not presume the existence of a theistic God, and its aim is to 
verify or falsify God’s existence. In theological apologetics there is the presumption that God 
exists. Here, the paradoxical nature of the God revealed in Jesus is proof that it was not of 
human invention but of Divine revelation. The Christian apologist, in a way that accounts for faith 
and reason, seeks to advance a reasonable defense of Christianity’s truth claims. For many 
apologists, a key question is how one could persuade non-Christians to believe in God. Classical 
and evidentialist apologists generally favour deductive and inductive proofs for God’s existence, 
while reformed apologists and fideists tend to reject such proofs. However, in place of these 
proofs the latter two use indirect arguments for God’s existence.  
 
Reformed apologists argue that belief in God, like the principles of logic, is properly 
basic and the presupposition of God’s existence is necessary for making sense of the world. 
Fideists, in contrast, argue that God can only be known through an existential or personal 
encounter in Jesus Christ. For the fideist, finite Man cannot come to know God with his unaided 
reason. Belief and unbelief are intellectually equal, and it is pointless to seek certainty or even a 
guide that affords us no more than mere reasonable probabilities. Faith and reason are simply 
two completely different spheres of thought representing antithetical philosophies. A true fideist 
revels in the absence of proof and for a sincere religious believer, the most primary assumptions 
are contained in the religious belief-system itself. Since religious faith itself is the foundation of 
one’s life, one’s ‘ultimate concern’, in the words of contemporary theologian Paul Tillich, the 
fideist argues that testing one’s faith by an external, rational measure is reflective of an absence of 
true faith. Hence it is sometimes said that ‘if we test God’s word by logic or science, we are 
really worshipping science or logic rather than God’.  (Peterson et al, 2003:45)  
 
Rationalisation as a psychological defense mechanism involves our justifying some belief 
or action after the adoption of that belief or action. Thus we can state the problem of faith as 22 
 
follows: insofar as faith is possible, it is non-rational, and insofar as faith is rational, it is 
impossible. This central dilemma is a consequence of the fact that reason and faith cannot both 
be deemed as grounds for belief. The Christian cannot maintain faith’s rationality, because once a 
belief is rationally demonstrated, it is no longer an article of faith. A rational person is one who 
accepts or rejects a belief because it is either supported or not supported by reason respectively. 
He only believes to the degree that evidence and support allow, and doubts a belief when the 
support turns out to be less reliable than previously thought. Once a person realises that a belief 
is clearly supported by the facts, there is no further step or ‘choice’ required for a person to 
have that belief. On the other hand, a very drastic epistemological step is taken when someone 
claims that he bases his belief in God on faith. Does this person not violate norms of rational 
belief formation? Is faith not therefore a form of irrational belief formation? Does the fideist not 
exemplify irrationality when he separates belief from the providing of reason?  
 
If rationality in a belief entails that one must have reasons for the belief, then faith by 
definition, would seem not rational. In that case, might fideism be recommending that one not be 
rational? We consider first an example of a belief which is rational but for which one has no 
reasons. Suppose you are staring at the sunset, and you say, ‘I believe the sun will set in the west 
again tomorrow’. I ask, ‘What are your reasons for believing that?’ You reply, ‘Well, I just think 
so.’ In demanding to know what reasons you have for thinking that the sun would set in the west 
tomorrow, you reply, ‘Reasons for thinking the sun will set in the west tomorrow? I have no 
reasons. I simply see it happening every day!’ Suppose I say, in response, ‘That's irrational.’ Hume 
would probably say that the ‘reason’ for the belief that the sun will rise in the east and set in the 
west tomorrow is the inductive argument that the sun has risen every morning in the past 
without exception. If someone were to say that it is a logical impossibility that it will not rise, 
Hume’s response is that the ‘reasonable’ person will prefer the claim for which there is 
overwhelming evidence over the claim for which there is no evidence at all, even if it is not 
completely conclusive. But surely one can believe, without reasons, that the sun would set in the 
west tomorrow and be totally rational in this belief. It is possible, in some cases (an example 
being the belief in God) to be entirely rational in holding a belief even if one does not have 
reasons for that belief. More will be said on this in due course. 23 
 
 
We now consider some theories of faith. The faith theory of Thomas Aquinas 
exemplifies the traditional understanding of faith. Aquinas did not see faith as opposed to reason, 
but rather as being guided by reason in some ways. (Martin, 1991:22) For him, religious truths 
may be grouped under those of reason and those of faith. The truths of reason include the 
proposition that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God. Reason, however, cannot 
help us know certain Christian doctrines such as there are three persons in one God. Aquinas 
maintained nevertheless that such truths can be known since they are revealed by God to human 
beings through the Bible or the Church. On Aquinas’s argument, even though a truth of faith, p, 
cannot be rationally demonstrated, the proposition q (that God has revealed p) can nevertheless 
be believed on rational grounds. Three kinds of arguments are employed to show that q is true: 
we see the ‘fulfilment of scriptural prophesies, the flourishing of the Christian church has without 
any promise of say, carnal pleasure in an afterlife or without any resort to violence in this life; and 
the occurrence of miracles within the Christian tradition’. (ibid) This theory of faith assumes 
God’s existence, for otherwise to suppose that God revealed truths through the Bible or 
through the Church would make no sense at all. Therefore, the basis of belief in God is not faith, 
but a precondition of faith in such Christian doctrines such as there are three persons in one 
God. According to Aquinas, a Christian who believes, for example, in the virgin birth, has very 
good reason for supposing his belief is true. Because Aquinas’s view of faith involves its being 
guided by reason, his theory has clear advantages over some recent ones.  
 
There are, however, perceived problems with Aquinas’ theory of faith. When he justifies 
his belief in the rationality of Christian revelation by appealing to the success of the Christian 
Church, he ‘faces the problem that many different churches or similar institutions outside the 
Christian tradition have been successful in the way he specifies’. (ibid) As Martin (1991) says: 
 
‘If this sort of success demonstrates that God revealed truths in the religious 
traditions dominated by these different churches or their equivalents, then 
conflicting truths were revealed, but conflicting propositions cannot both be 
true’. (ibid) 24 
 
 
Another problem with Aquinas’ theory has to do with the view that the truths of faith are certain 
and can be indubitably believed. We cannot know with total certainty all historical events that 
supposedly provide the evidence for God’s revelation, and indeed there is inadequate evidence 
for some of Christianity’s historical assumptions. It is difficult to claim certainty for revelations 
that are based on historical events that we cannot know with certainty. Consequently, for us to 
accord such a high level of belief seems irrational in the light of historical evidence. (ibid)  
 
We can also approach religious faith from the vantage point of the philosophy of 
language. (ibid, p.25) On this view, religious faith is understood in terms of the function of 
religious language. Wittgensteinian fideism has stemmed from the perspectives of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, facilitated by his followers such as Norman Malcolm, DZ Phillips, and Peter Winch. 
On his theory, religious discourse has its own rules and logic and is embedded in a form of life. 
Given that we can understand and evaluate this discourse only on its own terms, it seems 
inappropriate to impose standards on such discourse from the perspective of science, for 
example. (ibid) Since religious discourse is a separate, unique language game different from that of 
science, religious statements, being empirically untestable, are unlike scientific ones. For us to 
demand that religious statements be empirically testable is to gravely misunderstand the kind of 
discourse that it is. Hence in the language game of religion, religious discourse is rational and 
intelligible when we judge it on its own terms. Because a term’s meaning can vary from one 
language game to another, for us to understand religious language we have to view it from within 
the religious language game itself. The task of the philosopher hence involves describing rather 
than criticising a form of life or its language and where necessary, he should eliminate 
philosophical doubt over how the language operates. The philosopher of religion, in particular, 
has to describe the use of religious discourse and remove any perplexity that originates from it. 
(ibid) 
 
There appears to be problems with Wittgenstein’s theory of faith. Firstly, there seems 
no fundamental basis for our distinguishing one form of life from another or one language game 
from another. One can also ask whether in religion, there are one or many religious language 25 
 
games or forms of life. For certain, Buddhism and Christianity are vastly different, and this alone 
might compel the Wittgensteinian fideist to say that these constitute different forms of life 
involving different language games. If so, then he would likewise have to concede that the 
practices of different Christian denominations differ in fundamental ways. And since for the 
Wittgensteinian fideist, the same terms in different language games have different meanings, we 
have an absurd consequence where members of one Baptist sect and members of another would 
not even be able to understand each other. (ibid, p.26) As Martin (1991) points out, there seems 
no ground for our believing that the meaning of language is so radically contextual as to render it 
impossible for us to communicate across practices or ways of life, for otherwise it would 
certainly be inconceivable that there could be any debate between Christians and non-Christians, 
and between followers of different Christian denominations. Hence the Wittgensteinian theory of 
faith leads us to the conclusion that perhaps there is really no disagreement between the 
debating parties – they are simply on different tracks talking past one another. Such a view is 
highly unlikely at best, impossible at worst. (ibid, p.27) 
 
In contrast to Aquinas or Wittgenstein, some religious thinkers have maintained that 
faith requires no rational guidance. Kierkegaard argued that there is great merit in Christian belief 
that not only goes beyond the evidence but even against it. Kierkegaard adhered to the position 
that people with this faith totally disregard any doubts they may have. Maintaining that religious 
faith is of far greater importance than reason in the achieving of human happiness, he interpreted 
religious faith as a total and passionate commitment to God. Whereas Aquinas believes that the 
Truth (namely that an eternal happiness is available) can be known, for Kierkegaard it is only in 
faith that this Truth is ‘known’. For Kierkegaard, indeed, what makes it true and how it can be 
true at all, is completely beyond all human grasp – it defies understanding and runs counter to all 
possible understanding;  from the perspective of reason it is absurd. (Hannay, 2003:144) In spirit 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard are clearly similar, sharing a suspicion of using the intellect to 
devise solutions to problems of the spirit, and the view of traditional philosophical justifications of 
religious belief as irrelevant or misleading. Gouwens (1996) writes: 
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‘In place of philosophy or theology providing general structures of meaning (in the 
style of Bultmann or Tillich), or philosophy providing foundational accounts of 
religious or Christian belief, whether metaphysical, historical, rational or 
experiential (in the tradition of philosophy of religion), both thinkers recognised 
the limits of philosophy with regard to ethics and religious belief. Yet both also 
saw philosophy as having another role to play in clarifying the logic of concepts, in 
particular locating the point and sense of religious concepts, not in a philosophical 
justification, but in the practices and concerns of religious belief and faith. 
Philosophy, in other words, has an instrumental value; it does not ‘deliver 
meanings’, but assists a person to clarity of thought.’ (p.17)  
  
Instead of basing Christian doctrines on faith, one could argue that they are basic beliefs, 
or beliefs that form the foundation of other beliefs. (Martin 1991:27) Foundationalism was once 
widely accepted as a view in epistemology, and although it has since undergone modifications, it 
still has many advocates. Such an approach to Christian doctrine has its genesis in a critique of 
the foundational approach to epistemology. Foundationalism asserts that not all our beliefs can be 
justified in terms of other beliefs without the justification process leading to an infinite regress or 
vicious circularity. Put another way, there must be some beliefs that do not need to be justified 
by other beliefs. As these beliefs constitute the foundation of all knowledge, they are ‘basic’, with 
the statements expressing them being ‘basic statements’. (ibid, p.28) Evidentialism is based on the 
tenability of Foundationalism. Evidentialism poses facts and events as a test for the truth of 
theism. It implies that it is not justifiable to have full religious belief unless there is conclusive 
evidence for it. William Paley, Joseph Butler, CH Dodd, John Hick, and JW Montgomery are 
evidentialists. If the known arguments for God’s existence (including arguments from religious 
experience) are merely probable, then no one would be justified in having full belief that there is 
a God, says the evidentialist. The same holds for other religious beliefs, including the doctrine of 
the Incarnation. Hence it would be unjustifiable for one to believe with full confidence unless 
there is sufficient evidence. This evidence may be in the form of a deductive argument that seeks 
to decisively prove Divine existence (such as the Ontological argument), an inductive one that 
leads to a probable conclusion concerning Divine existence (such as arguments from history), an 27 
 
attempt to employ pure reason to build a case starting from a basic first premise, or through 
rational empiricism in building its case upon non-basic beliefs.  
 
Evidentialism and fideism both regard Jesus Christ as the authority and Scripture as the 
story of Christ. The evidentialist sees the story of Christ as factually verifiable whereas the fideist 
sees it as self-attesting. The difference between them thus parallels that between classical and 
reformed apologetics, with a common criticism lobbied against evidentialist arguments for God 
being that they merely conclude that God probably exists. Evidentialism is contentious for two 
reasons. Firstly, it maintains that it would be wrong for a person to accept Christianity, or any 
form of theism, unless it is rational for him to do so. Secondly, it is not rational for a person to 
do so unless he holds his religious convictions based on other beliefs that offer sufficient 
evidential support to those convictions. Put simply, no religion is acceptable unless rational, and 
no religion is rational unless backed by evidence. Evidentialism implicitly assumes the tenability of 
Classical Foundationalism, on which it is primarily based. The foundationalist holds the view that 
the possibility of knowledge rests ultimately on a set of beliefs, which on their own do not need 
justification in terms of further beliefs - such foundational beliefs may be a priori or a posteriori. 
(King, 2004:186) 
 
There are two traditional theistic responses to the challenge posed by evidentialism. 
One approach grants that the evidentialist challenge could be or has already been met. Hence for 
the theist to deem religious beliefs rational, he must demonstrate that the Christianity’s central 
claims are either self-evident, evident to the senses or directly or indirectly derivable from the 
evident beliefs. Descartes said that the belief in God is rational because it is self-evident, or could 
be made so through careful meditation on the concept of God. For Aquinas, the belief in God is 
rational as the existence of God follows deductively from propositions that are evident to the 
senses, such as ‘some things move’. Some foundationalists have included in the class of 
statements that are evident to the senses those involving observed physical objects like ‘There is 
a blue bird in the tree’. (Martin 1991:28) In modern times it is ‘now more common to limit 
statements that are evident to the senses to ones about the author’s immediate sense 
impressions, for example, ‘I seem to see a blue bird in the tree’, or ‘I am being appeared to 28 
 
bluely’, or ‘Here now blue sense datum’. (ibid) Another type of response to evidentialism is 
offered by philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, of the Calvinist tradition, who argue that religious 
belief does not have to meet the evidentialist criteria in order to be deemed rational. These 
philosophers dismiss the evidential challenge as invalid by rejecting Classical Foundationalism on 
the grounds that it is self-refuting.  
 
Modern philosophers who accept Foundationalism often dispute over which beliefs are 
properly basic and hence need no further justification. Beliefs based on perception might be 
properly basic in that if I see someone talking to me, I can believe that there is someone talking 
to me – there is no need for me to question this belief. Mathematical beliefs are also properly 
basic since if we understand what 4+4=8 means, then we believe it to be obviously true. (ibid) 
Classical Foundationalism as a theory of rationality says that if anyone is to believe anything 
rationally, he has to satisfy the demands of Classical Foundationalism. The other type of belief 
many modern philosophers distinguish from basic beliefs would be those that are based upon 
other beliefs. For example, my belief that Paris is in France is neither basic nor self-evident, but 
based upon the belief that the atlas is reliable, and ‘these beliefs are themselves based upon 
others, until we go back to the fundamental beliefs that are so obvious that further justification is 
unnecessary’. (Hill, 2007:92) 
 
Thinkers such as Plantinga argue that some fundamental beliefs are held without being 
based on evidence or experience, with examples being the experience of other minds or the 
reality of the external world, which we simply know to be true. Hence there may be some 
religious beliefs that form an unquestioned basis for our thinking, and are based on faith and not 
evidence. Plantinga argues that traditional arguments for the existence of God are not needed for 
rational belief, maintaining that belief in God should be considered a basic belief that requires no 
further justification beyond itself. Although Plantinga does not hold that all the fundamental 
Christian doctrines are basic beliefs, this idea would certainly be in keeping with his general 
approach. (Martin, 1991:28) Plantinga, in Warranted Christian Belief (2000) argues that Christian 
faith is not irrational. On Christian faith, Plantinga grants that there are two kinds of objections, 
the first he dubs as de facto claims: claims that Christianity has no truth. (Hill, 2007:89) For 29 
 
example, someone can cite evil’s existence as attributable to the fact that there is no all-powerful, 
all-loving God. The second kind of objection Plantinga terms the de jure objection. This objection 
does not focus on the truth and falsity of any beliefs at all. Instead, those who use such objections 
insist that ‘irrespective of whether Christianity is true or false, it is irrational to believe it’. (ibid) 
For example, if one were to say that we cannot really tell whether or not God exists, then one is 
irrational to have faith that He does. 
 
Through examining the nature of knowledge, Plantinga seeks to undermine the de jure 
objections. For Plato, knowledge is a kind of belief. Beliefs can be false (one can believe that 
something is the case when it is not), but knowledge cannot be false (if what one thinks he knows 
turns out to be untrue, it means he was mistaken and never really had knowledge, just a false 
belief). In this sense knowledge is a kind of true belief. As Hill (2007) says, a sports fan may 
passionately believe that his team will emerge as victors in a game. When victory comes, ‘he was 
merely lucky that he was right, for he could just as likely have had exactly the same belief, only to 
see them lose…(h)ence something more to knowledge exists than just true belief’. (p.90) 
 
Plantinga’s reply to this is that the difference between true belief and knowledge is 
‘warrant’. For him, a warranted true belief is knowledge. Plantinga argues that a warranted belief 
is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly whose purpose is to yield true belief. (ibid) 
The memory is an example of such cognitive faculty. As I remember what I had for lunch I have 
knowledge of it. This is not simply belief, and it is (presumably) working properly right now. 
Given this, Plantinga thinks that faith in the Christian God can be warranted, simply because 
Christianity teaches that God exists and also that God has revealed Himself to human beings 
through the Holy Spirit who enlightens the believers’ minds. (ibid) Belief in God is warranted if 
this is actually true, because the Holy Spirit’s presence is a sort of faculty, like memory, that 
yields true beliefs. (ibid, p.91) Plantinga says further that if beliefs that come from memory are 
warranted, then beliefs that come from the Holy Spirit are likewise warranted. Such beliefs, in 
fact, are knowledge. What this suggests is that those who believe in God through the power of 
the Holy Spirit actually know that God exists and do not simply believe that to be so. And if, in 
fact, God does not exist, then Plantinga accepts that belief in God is not warranted. But, as Hill 30 
 
(2007) points out, whether belief in God is warranted is contingent on whether God actually 
exists. If He does exist, we have warranted belief in God, and if he does not, belief in God is not 
warranted. To Plantinga (2000) this is an important conclusion:  
 
‘Atheologians who wish to attack theistic belief will have to restrict themselves 
to objections like the argument from evil, the claim that theism is incoherent, 
or the idea that in some other way there is strong evidence against theistic 
belief. They can’t any longer adopt the following stance: ‘Well, I certainly don’t 
know whether theistic belief is true – who could know a thing like that? But I 
do know this: it is irrational, or unjustified, or not rationally justified, or 
contrary to reason or intellectually irresponsible or …’There isn’t a sensible 
de jure question or criticism that is independent of the de facto question.’ (Hill, 
2007:91) 
 
Hence on Plantinga’s view, to believe in God is perfectly rational if He actually exists, 
and only irrational if in fact He does not. For theists to be accused of irrationality, very good 
reasons must first be offered to show that God does not exist, and Plantinga does not think that 
it is possible to show either that God exists or He does not, though he opines that arguments for 
God’s existence are more persuasive than those against. (ibid) Hence it seems likely that the faith 
of theists is indeed warranted and constitutes knowledge. Plantinga argues that Christians actually 
know that God exists, based on their conviction through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. They 
‘do not need to have it proven to them any more than we need to have it proven that we are 
really seeing what we think we are seeing with our eyes’. (ibid) 
 
If we grant that Plantinga is right, then belief in God is properly basic and believers can 
simply believe it without the need to offer further arguments. Plantinga is quick to point out that 
this is not a kind of blind faith where we can believe what we like in the absence of proof. He 
acknowledges that blind faith is a leap in the dark, since it is ‘what happens when you choose to 
believe something (or act as though you believe it) when it is not at all clear to you that it is not 
true’. (ibid) Plantinga has us imagine a desperate mountaineer caught in fog who attempts to leap 31 
 
a chasm without any knowledge of its dimensions. In a moment of confidence he believes that he 
will jump it safely, but there is no justification or warrant for this belief. (ibid, p.93) Plantinga 
draws this conclusion: 
 
‘The case of faith…is very different. For the person with faith (at least in the 
paradigmatic instances), the great things of the gospel seem clearly true, 
obvious, compelling…Phenomenologically, therefore, from the inside there is 
no similarity at all to a leap in the dark…This is no leap in the dark, not merely 
because the person with faith is wholly convinced but also because, as a matter 
of fact, the belief in question meets the conditions for rationality and warrant.’ 
(Hill, 2007:93) 
 
There are problems with Plantinga’s defense of the thesis that belief in God is basic. 
Firstly, for us to consider the belief in God as a basic belief seems to go against the spirit and 
intention of foundationalism (Martin, 1991:30) Foundationalism aims to provide critical tools for 
objectively assessing knowledge claims and to give knowledge a non-relativistic basis. Plantinga’s 
foundationalism is, paradoxically, radically relativistic and casts any belief beyond rational appraisal 
once it is declared basic. Secondly, there is something misleading about Plantinga’s claim that his 
proposal would not allow any belief to become a basic belief from the perspective of reformed 
epistemologists. However, we note that it would seem to consider any belief basic from the point 
of view of some community. (ibid) Martin (1991) offers this example: 
 
‘Although reformed epistemologists would not have to accept voodoo beliefs 
as rational, voodoo followers would be able to claim that insofar as they are 
basic in the voodoo community, they are rational, and moreover, that 
Reformed thought was irrational in this community.’ (p.30) 
 
Thirdly, on this view one notes how easy it is for any belief to be rational. If a group has 
a cherished belief that is held without reason, this belief could be deemed properly basic by the 
group’s members, rendering it impossible to critically evaluate any beliefs so considered. The 32 
 
community’s members might well also end up uncritically and recklessly embracing its most 
cherished beliefs (and the conditions that correctly triggered such beliefs) as basic beliefs and 
justifying conditions. (ibid) Fourthly, Plantinga assumes the Christian community is in agreement 
about what beliefs are basic and what justifying conditions there are. However, we know this is 
not the case as some Christians’ belief in God is based either on traditional arguments or 
religious experiences; hence their belief in God is not basic. Besides, more significantly, there is 
no agreement on whether certain doctrinal beliefs are true, let alone, basic. Such examples 
include those ‘concerning the Pope’s authority, the composition of the Trinity, the nature of 
Christ, or the means of salvation’. (ibid, p.31)  
 
Plantinga’s account of Christian faith is termed ‘reformed epistemology’. Epistemology is 
the philosophical enquiry into the nature of knowledge and belief, and what we can properly 
claim to know. (Hill, 2007:94) On reformed epistemology, we can say that faith is only in part 
about belief. Plantinga thinks that faith steps in when we cannot help believing what we believe, 
and faith is therefore rational since it is rational to believe what we cannot help believing. William 
Alston is another key advocate of this movement. Philosophers like Alston opine that belief in 
God is a basic belief, and faith can be rational even though not supported by reasons. Alston says 
that some people have certain religious experiences in which they can perceive God's presence, 
and one does not need reasons to believe that one is experiencing God's existence when he feels 
His presence. Suppose one thinks he can come into a kind of immediate contact with God, (that 
is, he thinks he feels God's presence), then this individual does require reasons to believe that he 
feels God's presence. This belief that one does indeed feel God's presence is, according to 
Alston, a rational one.  
 
While I share the view of Plantinga and Alston that belief in God does not require 
support from arguments in order for it to be rational, our divergence in view would be that the 
concept of religious faith, even if it is not irrational given its transcending the enterprise of 
reason-giving, is simply non-rational. Blind faith, for example, that a robber will return to me what 
he has willfully taken from me, is irrational. But while I say I want to be rational when it comes to 
my career, my family, and so on, the standard must differ where it pertains to the sphere of one’s 33 
 
religious life, one’s devotion to God and one’s salvation. The critic might say that the religious 
believer is allowing himself to be irrational in religious matters, or even allowing himself to deny 
the importance of rationality. But normally people do care about the rationality of their beliefs. 
What I maintain is instead that when it comes to religion, embracing one’s belief in the absence 
of reasons does not make that belief irrational. In fact, I would go a step further and suggest that 
insofar as faith is more a matter of passion than cognition, perhaps rationality does not enter the 
picture at all. 
 
Hill (2007) argues along the same lines by having us consider the parallel analogy in 
marriage. He says that when we have ‘faith’ in a spouse, this trust and emotional dependence is 
different from belief in facts about them even though it may be based, in some way, upon such 
beliefs as he or she being sincere when pledging love to us. We do have a kind of control over 
this type of faith and trust. To trust someone wholeheartedly, is in a way to make a choice. Hill 
has us further see that doing so is equivalent to an act rather than a belief, and opines that we 
need not bring to bear the issue of rationality, saying that only cynics would argue that it is always 
irrational to get married, perhaps because no one can be trusted: 
 
‘We don’t decide to put our faith in someone in such a way on the basis of 
arguments or evidence – but that doesn’t make this trust irrational, because it 
would be pretty bizarre to behave like that. Of course, someone may place his 
trust in an irrational way. We can imagine someone becoming infatuated with a 
highly unsuitable partner and rushing into an unwise wedding. This suggests 
that in matters of love, it’s possible to be irrational, but the whole business 
clearly goes beyond rationality, because there is more to it than just the 
strictly cognitive aspect.’ (p.94) 
 
The believer can say that even if religious faith were irrational, it does not follow that all 
religious faith is irrational. On matters of religion, there is nothing intrinsically irrational with the 
believer placing his trust in a God who seems to exist and to care, even when this has no proof. 
(ibid) Hence, the theist, however he characterises his version of faith, cannot avoid its non-34 
 
rational slant. Paul Tillich spoke of religion as an encounter with the eternal and the absolute 
dimension of life before which all else pales in significance. This is because here our focus is on 
choosing our commitments, our hopes, and our direction in life, not on abstract and theoretical 
questions. The fundamental truths of Christianity cannot be established by empirical investigation 
or argued from first principles. They are not a priori true. Such assertions as God exists or that 
Jesus rose from the dead simply have to be accepted through a mental and emotional leap that 
transcends what reason on its own can establish.  
 
Religious faith is thus a complex subject matter, and the dimension of its rationality (or 
otherwise) is but one of its less distinctive dimensions. For some Christians, faith is simply about 
adopting a certain attitude and embracing certain values and it accordingly affects the way we live. 
Hence it need not really involve belief at all. To add, religion and faith give the believer meaning 
or assurance in life. Some view faith as a gift of God that is supernatural in character. For the 
religious person, his leap of faith is far from trivial or frivolous, but the necessary first step to 
bridging the gulf between the finite and infinite, Man and God. Given the eternal significance of 
such a leap, which comes about not from haphazardness, it seems counter-intuitive to suggest 
that it is an irrational move on the religious believer’s part. Hence the importance of 
distinguishing between irrationality and non-rationality earlier, the former of which suggests 
delusion on the believer’s part; his being foolish, unthinking, and possibly even delusional. For the 
religious believer, his leap of faith, even though it falls outside of the whole enterprise of 
providing justification, is for him, passionately weighted and real, calling for an act of will, 
commitment and preparedness. Therefore, given that religious belief is an expression of a certain 
passion, and is not a matter of cognition, it is open to the theist to say that perhaps faith is at 
best a non-rational entity and not a matter of rationality at all.  
 
We close this chapter with a summary of claims made so far. The relationship between 
Man and God, the finite and the infinite, continues to be as important to us today as it has been 
through the ages. For Christian believers, there is a far reaching and life-altering quality in the 
statement, ‘There is a God, who has a Son, and the Bible is His Word’. Someone who claims, ‘My 
belief that God exists is founded on faith’, is saying something distinctive about the manner by 35 
 
which he is ready to defend his belief. If by faith one holds the belief that God exists, then he is 
not claiming to have any other beliefs that render it more probably true that God exists. 
Philosophers who accord faith with greater importance than they do to reason usually concede 
that we cannot meet the challenge posed by evidentialism. These philosophers, in granting that 
there is insufficient evidence for religious beliefs, cite faith as the proper attitude where it 
concerns a belief in God. Reason requires the objectivity and detachment seemingly useful in 
science, but which, for believers, is unsuited to the passionate involvement needed for attaining 
salvation. Some might even say that the intellectual objectivity found in philosophical argument 
amounts to a form of intellectual arrogance. Faith, believers argue, requires passion, rebirth and 
submission. This is ardently advocated by Kierkegaard, as we shall see in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Two: Kierkegaard as Thinker 
 
In Chapter One, we saw that fideism regards reason as incapable of helping the 
individual achieve knowledge of things divine. Since believing is not a reasonable act, and what is 
believed can neither be established nor disestablished by what is known, fideists advocate acts of 
faith, saying that one ought to believe that God exists, but that belief must not be based on any 
other beliefs. Most fideists view faith as being in part an emotion or passion. A more radical 
departure from past attitudes towards reason was made by Kierkegaard, who believed that faith 
must involve deliberately going beyond reason, and faith, at its core, is based on sincerity as its 
basis of believing. (Hill, 2007:88) Kierkegaard’s radical fideism involves a separation of faith and 
reason, with faith being viewed as a purely personal and subjective attitude. This chapter is 
devoted to a very brief exposition of some of this complex thinker’s key strands of thought. A 
detailed consideration of the central tenets of his philosophy is reserved for Chapter Three.  
 
Kierkegaard can be deemed a counter-Enlightenment writer who wrote at a very 
important time in the history of philosophy. Enlightenment thinkers emphasised the use of reason 
for achieving a better understanding of life. He wrote as a reaction to what he perceived as 
problems generated by the Enlightenment movement in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, which sought a combination of the concepts of God, nature, knowledge, and Man into 
one cohesive worldview. (O’Hara, 2004:9) Kierkegaard’s prime concern was about what it means 
to be alive, with the subject being the individual and his existence. In his view, while this purely 
subjective entity is the genesis of all reason, logic, philosophical systems, theology or even 
psychology, it is outside their reach. Through his writings, among them being Fear and Trembling 
(1843), Either/Or (1843) Philosophical Fragments (1844), Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
(1846) and Training in Christianity (1850), Kierkegaard advanced a highly original and eccentric 
critique and reaffirmation of Christian faith. Not keen to convince his readers simply on an 
intellectual level, he made the central focus of his work that of addressing the problem of how to 
be a Christian in Christendom. (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004:169) Christendom, on his terms, was 
largely a contradiction of the gospel. 
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Kierkegaard’s Christian convictions guided his philosophical concerns. To him, religious 
experience is about personal commitment and value, and this experience is personally 
challenging, demanding serious choice and taking a risk with the person one desires to become. 
(Thompson, 2007:15) He aimed his philosophy at leading his readers to Christianity and guiding 
them towards an acute awareness of the poverty of a life without faith.
 Any attempt to label him 
as irrationalist par excellence would not be fair, because he definitely had a meticulously thought 
out theory of the role of logic with regard to philosophy and theology. Although Kierkegaard was 
greatly influenced by Hegelian philosophy, a major part of his own work sought to overthrow this 
philosophy. His criticism of Hegel’s philosophy was that through the introduction of movement 
into logic, Hegel seemed to muddle good and evil, God and Man, time and eternity. Kierkegaard’s 
emphasis ‘on the Cross, sin, despair, and the Christ’s humanity, makes him similar to Luther in 
fearlessly following truth as it leads him’. (McEnHill & Newlands, 2004:172) 
 
Kierkegaard’s works presented solutions and approaches to the problem of how to be a 
Christian, and his later works made this topic a focal point. (O’Hara, 2004:15) Employing a unique 
writing style, he challenged his readers to spend time thinking for themselves and their future. 
Kierkegaard used ‘indirect discourse’ to describe his own method of writing. Many of his 
philosophical and theological works were pseudonymously written, and he certainly published his 
popular works through the use of a variety of pseudonyms as well as his own name. As Taylor 
(1975) notes, Kierkegaard ‘deliberately withdraws behind the pseudonymous authors he creates’. 
(p.29) There is uniqueness in this sustained and clever dialectical use of pseudonyms on his part. 
Like Plato who wrote dialogues without ever addressing his readers directly, Kierkegaard in his 
dialectic adopted a variety of narrative viewpoints, and through the use of pseudonyms, each 
name writes from a particular point of view. His indirect method of composition sees him 
employing philosophical viewpoints within a work (characters in a dialogue) and expanding them to 
include portions of works, or full works. It is therefore perfectly conceivable how a superficial 
reading of Kierkegaard can lead to mistaken interpretations (and conclusions) of all kinds. 
 
It is noteworthy that Kierkegaard modelled his indirect approach on Socrates and God, 
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into personal reflection. It is in this respect that Climacus notes that Socrates’ ugly appearance 
was an asset to his work as a teacher of ethics. This appearance helped ‘to place the learner at a 
distance so that he would not be caught in a direct relation to the teacher’. (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, p.247-249) And it is precisely Socrates’ repulsive appearance that 
promoted the inwardness of the learner. (Sands, 2004:28). God as an indirect communicator is 
not directly present, and cannot be seen or heard. ‘Is not God like an illusive author’, Climacus 
asks, ‘who nowhere sets forth his result in block letters or provides it beforehand in a 
preface?’(Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.243-244)  As Sands (2004) says, ‘By communicating 
indirectly, God lures individuals into an inner, volitional response to the truth….(H)e wants to 
lead individuals out of untruth by helping them to become true. God can accomplish this only by 
breaking the direct relation so as to promote the actual breakthrough of inwardness, the act of 
self-activity.’ (p.28) Hence it would appear that Climacus (and his other pseudonyms) are created 
by Kierkegaard to emulate the divine and Socratic examples.  
In Kierkegaardian corpus, a particular pseudonym may be the author of several works, 
writing from a consistent and defensible position. His method of communication has perplexed 
many a reader, who has to ascertain if a particular ‘author’ is either speaking with Kierkegaard's 
own voice, articulating a particular viewpoint or exposing the fallacy in an argument. Each 
Kierkegaardian pseudonym identifies the work thematically, and besides placing it in a dialectical 
scheme, anchors the work in a literary and philosophical framework. The pseudonym ‘Vigilius 
Haufniensis’ speaks on the psychological aspects of sin and anxiety. ‘Johannes Climacus’ addresses 
the dilemma of faith versus doubt. ‘Johannes de Silentio’ and ‘Constantin Constantius’ discuss the 
ethical sphere in poetic relation to Kierkegaard's own relationship with Regine Olsen. ‘Anti-
Climacus’ stands for idealized Christianity, and so on. 
In Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), Kierkegaard said of Either/Or, ‘The 
absence of an author is a means of distancing’ (p.252). He added:  
‘My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my 
person...but an essential basis in the production itself, which, for the sake of the 
lines and of the psychologically varied differences of the individualities, poetically 39 
 
required an indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil, brokenheartedness 
and gaiety, despair and overconfidence, suffering and elation, etc.... What has 
been written, then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have 
placed the life-view of the creating, poetically actual individuality in his mouth, for 
my relation is even more remote than that of a poet, who poetises characters and 
yet in the preface is himself the author. That is, I am impersonally or personally in 
the third person as a souffleur [prompter] who has poetically produced the 
authors, whose prefaces in turn are their productions, as their names are also. 
Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no 
opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning 
except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since it is 
impossible to have that to a doubly reflected communication.... My role is the 
joint role of being the secretary and, quite ironically, the dialectically reduplicated 
author of the author or the authors. ...but on the other hand I am very literally 
and directly the author of, for example, the upbuilding discourses and of every 
word in them.’ (p.625) 
Summarily then, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writing can be understood as an attempt 
to create distance from him as author. He wanted his works read independently of 
considerations of his own personality. The pseudonyms also served to remove his readers’ 
philosophical presuppositions, especially those who already embraced Hegelian philosophy. In 
addressing this group, Kierkegaard felt that the indirect approach was the best method. Also, 
Kierkegaard noted that the apostle speaks with authority, doing so directly and under inspiration. 
He was acutely aware that despite the genius he knew he was, he did not possess such apostolic 
authority. This stopped him from speaking directly until much later. When he wanted to present 
what ideal Christianity should be, he used a special pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, listing himself as 
editor. There is also the view that the pseudonyms were designed to orientate the work in a 
philosophical framework.  
 
Kierkegaard’s unconventional style of writing, evident in his works that can often reflect 
lyrical beauty, is definitely as much poetic narrative as it is philosophy. As Evans (2006) says, 40 
 
Kierkegaard was ‘adept at employing masks for the purposes of self-concealment and self-
revelation, but ….also maintained that the poet deals not with personal experience as such, but 
with the ‘possibilities’ and ‘idealities’ that experience generates’. (p.4) While Kierkegaard’s 
indirect method of communication is compelling because it lasted beyond a decade of his 
authorship, it can bewilder and baffle even those who comprehend his scheme. However, 
Kierkegaard himself took great delight in seeing this bafflement of the general public, and although 
Kierkegaard wrote that he has no relation to the pseudonymous works, this is not, strictly 
speaking, true. For sure, there was a deep and personal investment in and devotion of himself to 
his works.  
 
Fear and Trembling dealt with the concept of faith and the issue is explored through the 
story of Abraham and Isaac. Kierkegaard argued here that given the paradoxical nature of 
religion, there are moments when conflict erupts between religion and the ethical demands of 
society. (O’Hara, 2004:19) Kierkegaard considered Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son 
Isaac in obedience to God’s command as exemplifying the true nature of religious existence. 
God’s demand that Abraham sacrifices his son constitutes a flagrant defiance of all logic, and is 
plainly baffling on the ethical sphere. Abraham’s faith and trust in God is commendable even 
though his actions cannot be rationally explained. Insofar as he is beyond words, his reasons are 
inexpressible, and he is beyond mediation. While his actions are ethically unjustifiable, ‘in 
obedience to God there is a higher demand which teleologically suspends the ethical’. (McEnhill & 
Newlands, 2004:169) Hence we can see that for Kierkegaard, obedience to God in a religious 
sphere of existence not bound by ethical demands. 
 
In Either/Or Kierkegaard highlighted two modes of existence - the aesthetic and the 
ethical to describe the human experience. (ibid) Hedonistic satisfaction of one’s own urges is 
what drives the individual in the aesthetic mode of existence. The ethical mode of existence as a 
form of existence is, in contrast, ‘more fulfilling since it is a sort of telos for the merely aesthetic 
form of existence’. (ibid) In his later works, Kierkegaard said that the ethical sphere of existence 
lies outside of the religious sphere of human existence. For Kierkegaard, the believer’s 
intellectual path progresses in this order: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. No natural 41 
 
or rational progression to the religious sphere is possible, and so in that respect Hegel errs in 
saying that it is the culmination of an ‘unstoppable, natural process working itself out through 
history’. (ibid, p.169)  
 
Kierkegaard argued that since the ‘infinite qualitative difference’ between God and man 
remains despite God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ, in responding to Jesus, the same leap of faith is 
needed. (ibid, p.170) The fact that Jesus presents himself to us as the one who is the truth can be 
embraced only in faith, in obedience to Christ whom we encounter in the present. This fact is 
not contingent on a judgment based on the historical evidence about Jesus. Instead, it is a 
personal encounter with Christ at this very moment. For Kierkegaard, human beings must decide 
between living an aesthetic life where one views the world without commitments, or living an 
ethical life. Since the religious sphere or the sphere of grace, based solely on Jesus Christ, lies 
beyond the ethical, we therefore have to go beyond the apparent choice of either/or. (ibid, 
p.171) 
 
Kierkegaard presented the human condition as being in the shadow of despair. God 
alone reveals the fact of sin and this is an offence to human self-understanding. The offensive 
nature of Christianity is therefore ‘not limited to the intellect, but to the very core sense of our 
self-understanding which is offended by God’s estimation of it as sinful’. (ibid) For Kierkegaard, 
the offence of the Cross is not meant as a rational interpretation of the world, as in Hegel. 
Rather, it is a commitment to change the world through an individual’s changed life that is in turn 
based on a leap of faith that is renewed continually from moment to moment. This subjective 
appropriation of truth is ‘instantly translated into existential commitment, inducing both despair 
and triumph over despair through trust in God alone, whatever the appearance of things’. (ibid) 
When Kierkegaard said that ‘truth is subjectivity’, what he meant was that truth can only be 
appropriated by being acted upon and lived out in genuine Christianity. It also means ‘personal, 
existential involvement, staking one’s complete existence on faith in God’. (ibid, p.172) Because in 
a paradoxical way, God’s grace makes this possible, Kierkegaard is not to be read as saying that 
all depended on human effort.  
 42 
 
Philosophical Fragments centred on the subjective approach to knowledge. The Greeks 
said that the truth was in Man, waiting to be unravelled. By this account, to know oneself was to 
find God. In this work, the paradoxical nature of religion was discussed by Kierkegaard, with 
Christ exemplifying the Absolute Paradox, since Christ is God in time. This paradox within 
Christian faith, namely that the polar opposites of God and Man are incarnated in Christ, is not a 
truth derivable from Socratic reflection on what we intuitively know to be the case. Kierkegaard 
hence countered Socratic thinking by saying that this truth must lie with an outside source 
because it is so patently absurd and that something must change within the seeker, through the 
miraculous power of divine grace, so as to enable him to recognise the truth. (ibid, p.19) Put 
another way, only by faith can we know God. Likewise, Kierkegaard felt that Hegel was mistaken 
in his claim that the understanding that God and human beings share an affinity is a natural (and 
reasonable) affirmation. Kierkegaard was against Hegel’s close identification of Creator and 
creature, arguing that in so doing Hegel’s philosophical system actually places God in an 
overarching rational system, something which runs counter to true Christian faith. True faith 
demands instead a leap beyond that which reason can strictly prove. It is a leap in trust, with a 
measure of uncertainty, because sin estranges us from God. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
Kierkegaard further discussed the concept of faith as a continual and constant striving. He argued 
that when one claims to have knowledge of something, ‘one does so solely through an act of 
faith’. (ibid, p.20) Indeed, Christian faith’s ‘unreasonableness’ is a theme that recurs in 
Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. (ibid, p.170)  
 
In later works such as Training in Christianity and For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard 
argued that ‘official Christianity’ or Christendom (state sponsored and supported Christianity in 
which members of a nation are presumed to be Christian by virtue of their birth and infant 
baptism) is an impediment to people arriving at true faith. In Training in Christianity, Kierkegaard 
tried to define what it means to be a Christian in Christendom. He drew a sharp contrast 
between genuine Christian faith and official Christianity in Christendom, the latter of which he 
saw as having incorporated Hegel’s system into its presentation of the Christian faith. He also 
emphasised that the only avenue to salvation is through God’s grace. Due to sin, human beings 
are unable to achieve their own salvation. Citing prominently and frequently the Bible passage 43 
 
‘Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will give you rest’ (Matthew 11:28), 
Kierkegaard asked questions such as, ‘Can one learn from history anything about Christ?’ and 
‘Can one prove from history that Christ was God?’ Kierkegaard’s answer to both questions was 
‘no’. (ibid, p.20) 
 
Kierkegaard argued that life hinges on paradox, an encounter with the absurd, and that 
once we become aware that we are always in sin, faith becomes a possibility. An exponent of 
God’s unconditional grace, Kierkegaard was not greatly influential in his lifetime, but in the 
twentieth century, his work gained currency when the existentialist movement was developed by 
Heidegger and others. He is commendable in his emphasis on the importance of individualism 
when it comes to one’s having to make profound decisions that will shape one’s life, ‘based on his 
convictions rather than an accepted path’. (O’Hara, 2004:11) Kierkegaard argued that doctrine 
shielded people from the true offence of the Cross, and that official Christianity stood in the way 
of people attaining true faith. For him, truth is subjectivity and it means one’s personal, existential 
involvement and his staking his complete existence on faith in God. The paradox in this, of 
course, is that everything is dependent on the God’s grace, rather than on human effort. This is ‘a 
dynamic form of faith in which there are no permanent states, but always the call to be faithful 
from moment to moment’. (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004:172) We will study his ideas on faith in 
greater detail in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Three: Kierkegaard as Radical Fideist and Truth as Consisting in the Proper 
Relationship between Belief and Subject 
 
This chapter focuses on Kierkegaard’s view that genuine religious knowledge is 
grounded in faith beyond reason. The topics discussed here include Kierkegaard’s views on the 
relationship between Man and God, his reaction against Hegelian philosophy, subjectivity of truth, 
faith and its relationship with the absurd, how the views of Kierkegaard and Pascal differ, despair, 
existence and the stages in life’s way. Kierkegaard held the fideist position that God’s existence 
cannot be known and that one’s faith cannot be founded on needs or rational justification, but on 
simply believing in God. Quite unlike many of his predecessors, he maintained that the most 
important aspect of a human being is passion, not reason. (Carlisle, 2006:1) His in-depth analysis 
of the human condition came to have a tremendous impact on such philosophers as Heidegger, 
Sartre and Wittgenstein.  
 
The core of Kierkegaard’s work dealt with the problem of how to be a Christian in 
Christendom, which on his terms contradicted the spirit and intention of the gospel. Christian 
faith, according to him, is not about committing to memory a catechism or extolling Church 
dogma. It is a personal and subjective decision to heed the inner voice which cannot be that of 
the clergy or other human intercessors. Faith becomes the most significant task to be achieved by 
each human, simply because it is only when the individual decides on what his faith lies in that he 
stands the chance of becoming his own self. Kierkegaard’s philosophy has two strands. Firstly, to 
him, there is a difference between true Christian faith and official Christianity in Christendom. 
Secondly, as humans have sinned, they are totally incapable of achieving their own salvation. And 
salvation ‘can only come through grace, received from God who is wholly other than Man. Only 
by faith can we know God’. (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004:171) Through a series of his writings, 
Kierkegaard advanced a highly original critique and reaffirmation of Christian faith. (ibid, p.169)  
 
Kierkegaard said that ‘human beings are not primarily creatures of reason or rationality, 
but caring, desiring and feeling beings that act and make decisions based on this nature’. (O’Hara, 
2004:10) Kierkegaard aimed to make existence deeply intense, for otherwise it is impossible for 45 
 
us to see it as it is. According to him, at the heart of human existence lies utter uncertainty. Life 
is tentative, elusive and a tremendous risk, with no foolproof certainty that the way we choose is 
the right way. Anguish awaits the individual who comes to a full awareness of this fact. Such 
subjective truths are grounded on nothing as they do not depend on objective evidence. In 
overcoming existential dread and despair, Kierkegaard saw hope as being offered by the Christian 
promise of eternal life. There are many who consider him to be an irrationalist. Albert Camus 
says of Kierkegaard in Myth of Sisyphus: ‘Antinomy and paradox become the criteria of the 
religious…Christianity is the scandal, and what Kierkegaard calls for quite plainly is the third 
sacrifice required by Ignatius Loyola, the one in which God most rejoices; the sacrifice of the 
intellect. This effect of the ‘leap’ is odd, but must not surprise us any longer. He makes of the 
absurd the criterion of the other world, whereas it is simply a residue of the experience of this 
world’. (Camus, 1955:28) Besides clearing this misconception or misreading of Kierkegaard as an 
irrationalist, I will appeal to Kierkegaard’s philosophy in the defense of the fideist position that 
religious belief is a matter of personal commitment not grounded on arguments. Kierkegaard’s 
concept of faith will be explained in detail as we discuss how faith figures exactly in his 
existentialist philosophy. References will be made to his works, particularly Fear and Trembling 
(1843) and The Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846).  
 
Strong Christian convictions guided Kierkegaard’s philosophical writing. His own faith 
led the way in the whole of his intellectual endeavours, and this manifested starkly in what and 
how he wrote. Kierkegaard aimed to deepen his reader's relationship with God and hence 
advocated an inward reflection on human existence, namely the terror and uncertainty that every 
individual experiences in the face of his own impending death. The reader was to take individual 
responsibility for knowing who he is and where he stands on the existential, ethical and religious 
issues raised in the texts. He employed a rhetorical form that would lead people to be 
responsible for their own existential choices, and to become who they are beyond their socially 
imposed identities. In this undertaking he was inspired by Socrates, who used irony to undermine 
all knowledge claims that were either taken for granted or unthinkingly inherited from traditional 
culture. Kierkegaard pointed out in his dissertation, On the Concept of Irony that Socrates used 
his irony so as to facilitate his interlocutors’ understanding of subjectivity. Kierkegaard's method 46 
 
of indirect communication sought to prevent the reader from being reliant on the authority of 
the author and the conventional wisdom of the community. (Carlisle, 2006:26)  
 
Kierkegaard directed his attention to Man’s relationship to God, and painstakingly tried 
to show how God was concerned with the individual rather than mankind as a whole. Everything 
comes down to the individual before God, and true Christianity had nothing to do with 
regurgitating church dogma, nor having one’s relationship with God mediated by clergy, 
traditions, or religion itself. Rather than rely on doctrine or others’ advice, Kierkegaard said that 
one must walk the narrow path of faith on his own, and the end result is the ‘single individual 
before God’. The intention of Kierkegaard's inverted Christian dialectic was to point out the 
absolute distance between Man and God. He emphasised that human beings are absolutely reliant 
on God's grace for salvation. To the inquiry on whether religion or spiritual ideas are true, 
Kierkegaard said that it is far more important for one to focus on the how rather than the what, 
and he posed the subjective problem of an individual’s relationship to his beliefs. Kierkegaard 
pointed out that we all conduct our lives by placing simple faith in plans, purposes and people. 
But where it concerns the central paradox of religion, namely that Jesus, the eternal God existed 
in human form, a person could take offence or adopt the attitude of faith. If he chooses faith and 
believes in something higher and life-altering, then the suspension of reason is a necessity.  
 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy was a reaction against Hegelian philosophy, the latter of which 
deems religion as simplified philosophy. Hegel also deemed the faith of Abraham himself simplistic 
and second-rate when compared to philosophy’s intellectual demands. In Philosophical 
Fragments, published under a pseudonym, the theme of understanding faith is examined by 
Kierkegaard. Here he questioned how we arrive at knowledge of religious truth. Like his 
previous works, this was written as a reaction to the philosophical sentiments prevalent at that 
time, chiefly those of Hegel’s and also others. (Thompson, 2007:43) Hegel devised a system he 
deemed all-encompassing and which solved all philosophical problems. Although granting that 
some issues may need to be addressed in the future, Hegel believed a short postscript by his 
disciples could handle that with ease. Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments attacked Hegel’s 
egotism and overconfidence in his system. (Thompson, 2007:44) Hegel system of thought was a 47 
 
comprehensive one, based on reason or abstraction. (O’Hara, 2004:66) Concerning human 
reason, Hegel believed that Man progresses across levels of truth until he eventually arrives at 
the absolute truth. For Hegel’s system, this Absolute Truth is God. God is hence immanent – He 
is contained or comprised in all that exists. Hegel also defined Man in relation to others, and 
Man’s greatest good is as part of society. (ibid) Instead of the individual, Hegelian philosophy 
placed emphasis on the whole. Kierkegaard rejected it thoroughly, seeing the System as 
incomplete, with flaws in its logic and main tenets.  
 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript continued with an examination of the themes that 
Philosophical Fragments left off. This work was his most acknowledged work featuring themes 
that later on came to be equated with ‘existential’ thought. A focal point in this book was 
Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Hegelian System, although Kierkegaard also tackled such ideas as 
truth is subjective, the importance of the individual, the role of faith as opposed to reason as it 
relates to religious truth, ‘the acceptance of paradoxical concepts, how to be, and the difficulties 
of being a Christian’. (O’Hara, 2004:63) Kierkegaard questioned the genesis of Hegel’s system 
and raised issues with its emphasis on rationalism. (O’Hara, 2004:65) He had key objections to 
any systematic approach to knowledge so evident in Hegelian philosophy. Insofar as it was an 
affront to the accepted opinion of Kierkegaard’s time, Concluding Unscientific Postscript was a 
turning point in philosophy. Adopting a new approach and new ideas, Kierkegaard wrote the 
following concerning the subjective issue:  
‘The system presupposes faith as given (a system that has no presuppositions!). 
Next, it presupposes that faith should be interested in understanding itself in a 
way different from remaining in the passion of faith, which is a presupposition (a 
presupposition for a system that has no presupposition!) and a presupposition 
insulting to faith, a presupposition that shows precisely that faith has never been 
the given.... (T)o avoid confusion, it should immediately be borne in mind that 
the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the individual's relation 
to Christianity, consequently not about the indifferent individual's systematic 
eagerness to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs but rather about 
the concern of the infinitely interested individual with regard to his own 48 
 
relation to such a doctrine.... The objective issue…would be about the truth of 
Christianity. The subjective issue is about the individual's relation to 
Christianity. Simply stated: How can I, Johannes Climacus, share in the 
happiness that Christianity promises?... Now, if Christianity requires this infinite 
interest in the individual subject..., it is easy to see that in speculative thought he 
cannot possibly find what he is seeking…and thus all of its response is only a 
mystification.’ (p.14) 
A system of thought, Kierkegaard pointed out, cannot be complete if the experience 
itself is never complete. Kierkegaard also criticised Hegel for having seemingly assumed the role 
of God in the System. As Hegelian philosophy would have it, the thinker (Hegel) is outside the 
System, and to Kierkegaard, a system where the thinker is apart from the system suffers from 
inherent weakness. To Kierkegaard, a reliance on reason or abstraction was also problematic. He 
wrote that ‘abstract thinking is conducted sub specie aeterni (from the point of view of eternity), 
and therefore disregards the concrete and the temporal, the becoming of existence’. (O’Hara, 
2004:67) He likened abstraction or pure thought to one’s travelling through Denmark armed 
with nothing but a small map of Europe, where Denmark is the size of a dot. Rationality as a 
virtue was extolled by Hegel, and Christianity was the ultimate religion mainly because the 
doctrine of the Trinity sat well with his own understanding of logic. God the Father and Jesus 
Christ are identical as each is God, said Hegel, but they remain different from one another since 
they are distinct individuals. The fact that God has made Himself known through the Holy Spirit's 
‘birthing’ of the Church then reconciles this apparent ‘difference’. (Schacht, 1975:158) For Hegel, 
this definition of the Trinity paralleled his own understanding of logic, where opposites are to be 
synthesised so as to enable one to arrive at a deeper understanding of reality. Although Hegel 
referred to Christianity as the ultimate religion, we cannot conclude that he was a strong 
advocate of Christianity. In fact, he also declared that religion was subordinate to his own 
philosophy. He perceived reality as that which could be experienced presently, and rejected the 
notions of an afterlife or otherworldly existence. Since Christianity is based on faith, Hegel 
advocated that for one to be rational, he must transcend religion and embrace philosophy if he is 
to truly ultimate reality. Hegel advocated that if one wanted to attain unity with the ultimate 
reality, he had to become objective, because it is only through the attainment of absolute 49 
 
knowledge that this unity can be achieved, and we can attain absolute knowledge only by 
becoming objective. (ibid, p.71) 
To Kierkegaard, it was pure arrogance if one were to devise a philosophy from a 
detached standpoint, as Hegel did, as if a philosopher were beyond the system that he created. 
Kierkegaard was concerned with the individual before God, and not the system. Subjective truth, 
‘the truth that is true for me’ is far more important than objective truth. He did not deny 
objective, propositional truth, but asserted that in order for truth (especially the claims of 
religion) to have any effect on or value for the thinker, it must be appropriated subjectively. The 
ability to verify the claims of religion benefits the philosopher only if these claims can be 
personally appropriated by him for himself: 
‘Who is supposed to write or finish such a system? Surely a human being, unless 
we are to resume the peculiar talk about a human being's becoming speculative 
thought, a subject-object.’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.120) 
Thus whereas Hegel found truth in the Absolute Spirit and objectivity, Kierkegaard, in 
contrast, found truth in the subjective. He redefined the nature of faith and made it radically 
subjective and totally beyond the processes of ordinary systematic reason. In objection to Hegel’s 
efforts to take all of reality as a system of thought, Kierkegaard pointed out that Hegel had 
forgotten about one’s existence, the single most important element. Hegel’s philosophy, he felt, 
stole people’s attention from the individual to universals, demanding that people think instead of 
be. For him, this was precisely wrong, since life was too precious to be placed in a system of 
abstract logic. One must instead become subjective to attain unity with the ultimate reality. 
Hegel, he said, was simply mistaken about ultimate reality’s nature and the manner by which a 
finite, existing individual can come to achieve unity with it. According to Kierkegaard, truth 
thought of as a relation of unity with the ultimate reality (or God), is attainable only by becoming 
radically subjective, and not by adopting an objective, rational and cognitive orientation. And a 
person can place himself in a relation to this ultimate reality only by suspending his reason and 
taking a leap of faith, the latter of which demands subjectivity and passion, not objectivity and 
rationality. Faith for him is a matter of passionate commitment in the face of objective 50 
 
uncertainty. And faith as subjectivity cannot be grasped by either a doctrine or religion, or by a 
church, but only by an individual who chooses ‘the path of faith’. (Solomon, 2001:84) Hegel’s 
understanding of Christianity as a doctrine of the spirit is hence starkly at odds with 
Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity as a way of life chosen not because it is true or plausible, 
but simply because it is one’s personal commitment without an appeal to reasons or Reason. The 
truly existing individual is both passionate and conscious, Kierkegaard said, and passion is 
essentially non-rational and subjective:  
 
‘It is impossible to exist without passion, unless we understand the word ‘exist’ in 
the loose sense of a so-called existence. Every Greek thinker was therefore 
essentially a passionate thinker. I have often reflected how one might bring a man 
into a state of passion. I have thought in this connection that if I could get him 
seated on a horse and the horse made to take flight and gallop wildly, or better 
still, for the sake of bringing the passion out, if I could take a man who wanted to 
arrive at a certain place as quickly as possible, and hence already had some 
passion, and could set him astride a horse that could scarcely walk – and yet this 
is what existence is like if one is to become consciously aware of it.’ (Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, p.276) 
 
In the plain face of reason, Kierkegaard and fideists like him view God as the Unknown. 
Reason is unable to help us fathom the Unknown. Where it concerns the extreme case of the 
Incarnation, Kierkegaard said that since reason cannot comprehend what God is, it cannot 
comprehend the unity of God and the human being. This is simply the Absolute Paradox. So-
called because of the absolute difference between God and Man, this paradox consists precisely 
in the fact that Man is a particular existing being, whereas God is infinite and eternal. To those 
who say the charge of irrationality is inescapable where religious faith is concerned, we have 
already seen how some philosophers have defended faith against this charge, arguing that that 
believing in God is not irrational. Their argument goes that even evidentialists must concede that 
not all statements require evidence or proof. As Plantinga might say, evidentialists assume that 
belief in God is an evidence-essential belief. Much of his work, as we have seen earlier, tried to 51 
 
show that this assumption is indefensible. But we have also seen that Plantinga’s position is not 
without its accompanying problems. In Kierkegaard’s radical fideism, in contrast, we have a 
philosophy that sees religion in the (correct) perspective in terms of faith being inward and non-
rational, not a rationality-driven or evidence dependent enterprise.  
 
Kierkegaard saw Hegel’s System as having the further flaw of being an impediment to the 
role of possibility, of one’s having and making choices. For him, it is important for the individual 
to have possibilities and make choices because one’s choices define his actions and his life. An 
alternative view of truth Kierkegaard offered is that of truth being subjective. Kierkegaard made 
the assertion that ‘truth is subjectivity’, and in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he drew the 
distinction between objective and subjective truth. Objective truth has no bearing on ethical and 
religious issues, and the real truth equates with what is true for the individual. Subjective truth, 
which is related to one’s experience and values, affects a person and directs his actions and 
decisions. (O’Hara, 2004:67) Indeed, inwardness (or subjectivity of truth) and the non-rational 
leap of faith are two central ideas in Kierkegaard’s religio-philosophical message. We will discuss 
each in turn. 
 
In addition to Hegel, Kierkegaard also wrote as reaction to the works of another 
philosopher, GE Lessing. Lessing argued that if one could prove historically that Jesus lived, did 
this mean that one must also believe that Jesus was the Son of God? In Theological Writings 
(1777 – 1789), Lessing wrote: 
 
‘If on historical grounds I have no objection to the statement that Christ raised 
to life a dead man; must I therefore accept it as true that God has a Son who is 
the same essence of Himself? What is the connection between my inability to 
raise any significant objection to the evidence of the former and my obligation to 
believe something against which my reason rebels?’ (O’Hara, 2004:44) 
 
Lessing claimed further that it was one thing to believe that Christ rose from the dead 
and quite another to say that Christ was the Son of God (and of the same essence of God). He 52 
 
questioned the necessity of this leap to bridge the gap. (ibid, p.45) While Kierkegaard was in 
agreement with Lessing that a gap exists, he argued that reason is useless for many matters, 
especially that of understanding Christianity. Even if faith is not based on reason, that does not 
mean it is not true. Proving events historically does not add to the argument, and for the 
individual, said Kierkegaard, there are two choices – one either tries to find some compromised 
set of beliefs that are in alignment with rational thought or one makes the leap across the gap. 
Kierkegaard used the phrase ‘virtue of the absurd’ to highlight the fact that when addressing 
some issues, we may well have to embrace what reason deems absurd. (ibid) It is no irony that to 
cross that gap, a leap of faith is required, and in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard presented 
these choices and their implications. 
 
Kierkegaard's most famous doctrine was that there can never be any proof for the 
subjective truth of a person’s faith. In applying subjective truth to salvation, Kierkegaard revealed 
to us that how one believes is as important as what one believes. For a belief to be true, it must 
be held passionately, unconditionally, and absolutely, without reservation or doubt.  For 
Kierkegaard, once we analyse everything else away, existence is all that remains. It is something 
that is simply ‘there’. (Strathern, 1997:50) We have to live out this existence, or turn it into 
action by means of ‘subjective thought’, and this is the key element of our subjectivity that leads 
us to subjective truth. This is what Kierkegaard meant when he made the assertion that ‘truth is 
subjectivity’. For Kierkegaard, there are two kinds of truth. Objective truth like those found in 
history and science, are linked to the external world. Such truths can be confirmed by referring 
to the world around us. Hence in this sense, objective truth depends on what is said; the 
emotional or non-cognitive states play no part in one’s assertion of a statement’s truth. (ibid, 
p.51) Subjective truth, in contrast, depends on how a thing is said. Truth here is a relation 
between the proposition and the person who makes the proposition. No objective criteria exist 
in subjective truth. In moral and religious matters, subjectivity is crucial because the truth can 
only be grasped through subjectivity. It is the objective impersonality of truth that Kierkegaard 
rejected. When he argued that truth is subjectivity, Kierkegaard was challenging the received 
philosophical-scientific opinion of his day. The presupposition of a rational system is a rational 
world. A statement like ‘there are dark clouds hovering above’ is a truth that conforms to the 53 
 
objective state of things in the world. When truth is objective, it is inconsequential whether I 
believe what I believe passionately, calmly, tentatively, or a friend tells me so. Truth, according to 
Kierkegaard, must instead be inward, subject-dependent, particular rather than universal, 
personal rather than interpersonal or impersonal. The subjective ‘I’ lies beyond reason and is not 
a part of this world. 
 
Kierkegaard illustrated the difference between the above two types of truth through the 
example of two men in prayer. The Christian, for Kierkegaard, prays to ‘the true conception of 
God’ but does so in a ‘false spirit’. (ibid) The second man prays to his idol with the full passion 
for the infinite. For him, the latter has the greatest subjective truth, because his prayers are done 
‘in truth’. In this respect, Kierkegaard’s concept of subjective truth may be likened to a form of 
deep sincerity or a passionate inward commitment mentioned in earlier paragraphs. For 
Kierkegaard, truth consists in the proper relationship between the belief and the subject, the one 
who holds the belief, and the criterion of its truth lies with how the person holds it. In the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he said, ‘This is the importance of passionate intent. 
Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said’ (p.202) 
and ‘Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation 
with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing 
person’. (p.203) For Kierkegaard, therfore, subjective truths are of immense importance given 
their fundamental link to our existence. In this sense subjective truth has to do with the very 
‘foundation of our values – not so much with whether these values are ‘correct’, but the nature 
of our commitment to them’. (Strathern, 1997:52) In Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
Kierkegaard discussed truth as subjectivity:  
‘In order to clarify the divergence of objective and subjective reflection, I shall 
now describe subjective reflection in its search back and inward into inwardness. 
At its highest, inwardness in an existing subject is passion; truth as a paradox 
corresponds to passion, and that truth becomes a paradox is grounded precisely 
in its relation to an existing subject. In this way the one corresponds to the 
other. In forgetting that one is an existing subject, one loses passion... (and) the 
knowing subject shifts from being human to being a fantastical something. When 54 
 
the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively 
as an object to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not 
the relation but that what he relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that 
to which he relates himself is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth. 
When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual's relation is 
reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the 
individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth.’ 
(p.198) 
Here Kierkegaard was suggesting that the question of whether a person’s life is true 
rests on how those beliefs have been appropriated and have come to change the individual’s 
existence, not on the objective truth of the person’s beliefs. Kierkegaard was not implying that 
true beliefs are unimportant or unattainable for humans. Kierkegaard believed people need the 
truth (in particular, the moral and religious truth essential to human life) and this can be attained 
it solely through subjectivity:  
 
‘Truly, no more than God allows a species of fish to come into existence in a 
particular lake unless the plants that are its nourishment are also growing there, 
no more will God allow the truly concerned person to be ignorant of what he is 
to believe. That is, the need brings its nourishment along with it, what is sought is 
in the seeking that seeks it; faith is in the concern over not having faith; love is in 
the self-concern over not loving…The need brings the nourishment along with it, 
not by itself…but by virtue of a divine commandment that joins the two, the 
need and the nourishment.’  (Christian Discourses, p.66) 
 
  Passion, Kierkegaard believed, while being ‘Man’s perdition’ is also exalts him. Religious 
truths are successfully grasped only if one’s life has the right kind of passion. These truths cannot 
be grasped without being appropriated to some degree, and they cannot be grasped by just 
anyone regardless of his level of emotional maturity or personal concern. Hence a life that is ‘in 
the truth’ is characterised not just by one’s believing the right things, but by the nature of its 
subjectivity. This position is epistemologically different from two others pervasive in western 55 
 
thinking. In modern classical philosophy the main position is that if there is objective truth, a 
method must exist that offers us guaranteed objective access to the truth. This reasoning 
dominated the Classical Foundationalist ideal and its quest for the true method. Great rationalists 
such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and empiricists such as Locke, have disputed over the 
nature of this proper method. This dispute lasts through Kant, Hegel, and even into the twentieth 
century, where the logical positivists tried to render philosophy ‘scientific’ via a refinement of its 
method. Some postmodern philosophers, out of disillusionment from the failure to find an 
objective method of reaching truth, have relinquished objective truth altogether. Kierkegaard did 
not agree that if there is objective truth, an objective method must be there that guarantees 
access to that truth. Though he granted that there is objective truth, he affirmed that for human 
beings there can be no existential ‘system’. Existence itself is in process, and since our thinking is 
always situated historically, contrary to what Spinoza and Hegel claimed, we cannot see things 
from God’s viewpoint. Nevertheless, truth can be realised in our lives because we are 
constituted in such a way that we can be personally developed in the right way, developed 
morally and spiritually through the attainment of what Kierkegaard termed as inwardness, 
seriousness, and subjectivity.  
 
Kierkegaard, because of his view that subjective truth is superior to objective truth, 
objected to Hume’s view on the primacy of fact. (Strathern, 1997:53) Hume believed that 
morality is not derivable from the facts we experience and know and even if sobriety is 
conducive to consistent behaviour, we cannot consequently say that we ought to remain sober. 
Kierkegaard and Hume are in agreement that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’. For 
Kierkegaard, even our attitude and values can, to a large extent, determine so-called ‘facts’. 
When encountering the same reality, the Christian and the hedonist may see different ‘facts’. In 
this respect, each individual is to a certain degree ‘the one who creates his own world, based on 
the values he holds’. (ibid, p.53) As Kierkegaard saw it, the individual alone is responsible for the 
world he inhabits. The individual sees the world that he wills to see, and this is dependent on his 
values that make him who he is. Kierkegaard hence argued that ‘the values that make the 
individual what he is, also make the world what it is’. (ibid, p.54)  
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The religious individual’s existence is thus based on his relationship to God. (Carlisle, 
2006:80) Religious subjectivity hence possesses an eternal dimension that encompasses both 
God’s presence and the likelihood of eternal life. In faith and with passion, one encounters these 
subjectively, rather than as objective facts. Faith involves dependency on God’s grace, and this 
cannot be apart from a consciousness of sin. Whereas the ethical person works to achieve moral 
goodness, the religious life starts by acknowledging that he has sinned. The religious individual’s 
ideal of righteousness is not attainable by his own efforts. For this, forgiveness of sin is needed. 
(ibid) 
 
In the Postscript, Climacus points out that there are two types of religiousness. ‘B’ 
refers to Christianity and ‘A’ incorporates all other religions. D. F. Swenson, as quoted by W. 
Lowrie (1942), gives a definition of Religiousness A and B: 
‘Religion A is characterised by a passive relation to the divine, with the 
accompanying suffering and sense of guilt. But it is distinguished from religion B, 
or transcendent religion, in that the tie which binds the individual to the divine is 
still, in spite of all tension, essentially intact.... The distinctive feature of 
transcendent religion can be briefly stated. It consists in a transformation or 
modification of the sense of guilt into the sense of sin, in which all continuity is 
broken off between the actual self and the ideal self, the temporal self and the 
eternal. The personality is invalidated, and thus made free from the law of God, 
because unable to comply with its demands. There is no fundamental point of 
contact left between the individual and the divine; man has become absolutely 
different from God.’ (p.173) 
In Religion A, the eternal or divine is a quality within each individual that needs to be 
cultivated and seen as a focal point in his life. According to Kierkegaard, this type of religiousness 
is such that one has to surrender his attachment to all finite things and cease the seeking of 
w o r l d l y  s a t i s f a c t i o n  s o  a s  t o  h a v e  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  G o d .  R e l i g i o n  A ,  f r o m  a  C h r i s t i a n  
perspective, does not accord enough emphasis to Man’s sinfulness and the need for salvation, 
even though it provides comfort, security and peace to the soul. (Carlisle, 2006:80) 57 
 
 
In Religion B, or Christianity, we see that salvation comes only through God’s grace and 
love, through his incarnation in Jesus Christ. Kierkegaard incorporated the interpretation of truth 
in the idea of salvation. Sin (or in Kierkegaard’s terms, ‘untruth’) and the gravity of it, are 
emphasised and the unity of the Divine and human nature is recognised as paradoxical. As sin 
accentuates the radical difference between Man and God, only God can bridge the divide. In 
Christianity, this reconciliation has already occurred in the form of Jesus’ life and death, a 
paradox that cannot be understood by the standards of reason. It is upon the Incarnation that the 
individual bases his eternal happiness or hope for eternal life in heaven. (ibid, p.81) Therefore we 
have a situation where ‘in Religion A, the individual sacrifices her temporal interests for the sake 
of the eternal, in Religion B eternity and temporality are as one simultaneously, although the 
contradiction between them remains unchanged’. (ibid) In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
Climacus expresses that many so-called Christians do not actually transcend the immanent 
spirituality of Religion A at all. As Walsh (2005) notes, in religiousness A, the breach with the 
eternal is seen as relative, while in Christianity it is conceived as radical. (p.86) In religiousness A 
and B, ‘a positive relation to the eternal is sustained inversely and indirectly through the 
consciousness of one’s distance and separation from the eternal and through dying to immediacy 
(but) the expression of this sense of separation and death is conditioned by different estimates of 
the extent and implications of the individual’s breach with the eternal’. (ibid) 
 
The virtue of the absurd is explored thoroughly in Kierkegaard’s writing. Kierkegaard 
was referring to the paradoxical notion that only the absurd is the ‘reasonable’ choice, since 
when dealing with issues such as faith, reason must be suspended and subjective passion 
embraced. (O’Hara, 2004:14) Church and Christian dogma are themselves paradoxes that offend 
the principles of rationalisation. In the bare face of the central paradox, namely that an eternal 
God became a temporal and finite human in Jesus, we can choose to adopt an attitude of belief 
or offence. Reason cannot yield an explanation or justification for this ultimate act, and so in that 
sense we cannot speak of having the choice of accepting any reasoning. The choice lies between 
either believing on faith and suspending reason (believing by virtue of the absurd) or embracing 
reason and eschewing faith. In the Bible, Job’s life is returned to him by virtue of the absurd and 58 
 
through repetition of his faith. Abraham also is spared from murdering his son Isaac. Kierkegaard 
also alluded to other instances of the absurd such as how Climacus hopes to make readers 
believe in the truth of Christianity by trying to express something too sacred for expression. The 
Christian God is also seen as personal yet transcendent, humanly able to both love and be in a 
relationship. Because Kierkegaard highlighted these paradoxes, making them acceptable, those in 
the twentieth century came to be acquainted with the idea of the absurd. Inherent in fideism is 
this acceptance not only of the paradoxes, but by virtue of the paradoxes found in Christianity. 
As Kierkegaard saw it, not only is the Christian faith true, it becomes more true by virtue of its 
inability to be rationally explained. It would also be this very absurdity that makes the Christian 
claim worthy of belief. For him, acceptance of the absurdity in the Christian claim can only come 
about through total commitment or through a leap into faith.  
 
Many of Kierkegaard’s works centred on the issue of faith and how Kierkegaard 
conceived of it. His profound concern was with how we can believe that God will keep the 
promise of eternal life. In many ways this problem of faith was the central problem of religion for 
Kierkegaard. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he provided us with a definition of faith: 
‘Faith is the objective uncertainty with the repulsion of the absurd, held fast in 
the passion of inwardness, which is the relation of inwardness intensified to its 
highest.... Faith must not be satisfied with incomprehensibility, because the very 
relation to or repulsion from the incomprehensible, the absurd, is the expression 
for the passion of faith.’ (p.611) 
 Jesus was the Absolute Paradox as God, the infinite and spiritual became a man, finite 
and temporal. The believer, according to Kierkegaard in Philosophical Fragments, finds it an 
impossibility to reckon and comprehend. He then suggested what Lessing did, namely that when 
faith and reason collide, one must choose either faith or reason. The believer must choose to 
take a leap of faith grounded in paradox; he must let go of the demonstration to help it, 
acknowledging that the existence of God cannot be proven. Though it cannot be mediated by 
proofs or reason, this leap is in no way a thoughtless one, but one involving volition; and it does 59 
 
not proceed by quantitative stages or changes. It is a leap from the doubt that exists by virtue of 
the absurd: 
‘In order to perceive the prodigious paradox of faith, a paradox that makes a 
murder into a holy and God-pleasing act, a paradox that gives Isaac back to 
Abraham again, which no thought can grasp, because faith begins precisely where 
thought stops.’ (Fear and Trembling, p.53) 
Kierkegaard added in Philosophical Fragments:  
‘...so long as I am holding on to the demonstration (that is, continue to be one 
who is demonstrating), the existence does not emerge, if for no other reason 
than that I am in the process of demonstrating it, but when I let go of the 
demonstration, the existence is there...Therefore, anyone who wants to 
demonstrate the existence of God (in any other sense than elucidating the God-
concept and without the reservatio finalis (ultimate reservation) that we have 
pointed out—that the existence itself emerges from the demonstration by a 
leap) proves something else instead, at times something that perhaps did not 
even need demonstrating...’ (p.42) 
Thus, according to Kierkegaard, in order that Man arrives at an understanding of the 
Absolute Paradox, he needs the condition of faith. The problem of faith was considered by 
Kierkegaard from the outside, and he affirmed that faith constitutes the highest kind of life 
attainable for a human being. His writing was directed at making faith ‘difficult’ but possible again, 
and how an individual can arrive at religious faith was of great importance to him. Kierkegaard 
believed so much in the importance of faith that he said that faith has its truth in subjectivity. 
Indicating that ‘faith inheres in subjectivity’ and describing the risk involved in believing, 
Kierkegaard said in Concluding Unscientific Postscript:  
 
‘Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the 
infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am 
capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I 60 
 
cannot do this I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith, I must 
constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain 
out upon the deep, over seventy fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.’ 
(p.73) 
 
As part of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Hegelian philosophy, he asked at what point faith 
would need to step in if everything is known. He asked rhetorically in a journal entry from 1842-
43, ‘Can there be a transition from quantitative qualification to a qualitative one without a leap? 
And does not the whole of life rest in that?’ According to Kierkegaard, a person must take a leap 
of faith from unbelief to belief. Faith is itself a miracle, ‘a gift from God, and…through faith, a 
person might find eternal truth’. (O’Hara, 2004:14) The choice of faith, once made, must lead one 
to realise that there must be continual choice and renewal of it through avowals of faith. This 
repetition is the relation which ‘relates itself to itself’, and taking away this reconfirmation of the 
vow of faith plunges the self into despair that undoes selfhood, and the relationship is broken 
with itself: 
‘Despair is the misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself. 
But the synthesis is not the misrelation; it is merely the possibility, or in the 
synthesis lies the possibility of the misrelation. If the synthesis were the misrelation, 
then despair would not exist at all, then despair would be something that lies in 
human nature as such. That is, it would not be despair: it would be something that 
happens to a man, something he suffers, like a disease to which he succumbs, or 
like death, which is everyone's fate. No, no, despairing lies in man himself. If he 
were not a synthesis, he could not despair at all; nor could he despair if the 
synthesis in its original state from the hand of God were not in the proper 
relationship.’ (The Sickness Unto Death, p.15) 
Kierkegaard said that no Church, priest, logical system or intercessor can offer any 
mediation for the individual. Only one individual stands alone before God to repeat the process 
of confirming his faith, which means that the repetition of faith becomes the self. The ongoing 
process is a daily task, as Paul often spoke of ‘I am becoming’ rather than ‘I am’ in his letters. This 61 
 
process explains Kierkegaard’s belief that there is far greater weight in the act than the word. He 
saw faith as the opposite of sin, and with faith, we can atone for our sins. With faith, one 
becomes his true self, and it is this self that God judges. (ibid)  
 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard explained the complexities of faith through the story 
of Abraham and Isaac from Genesis 22. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. God 
intervenes at the crucial moment and tells him not to sacrifice the boy, even though he was ready 
to do so. It turned out that God had meant it as a test of Abraham’s faith in Him. Kierkegaard 
pointed out the irrationality of Abraham’s faith in this instance: ‘Because he believes God has 
demanded it of him, Abraham is prepared to do something obviously immoral. And given how 
God has already promised that Isaac will have many descendants, His apparent decision that Isaac 
must die is illogical’. (Hill, 2007:88) 
Abraham’s attitude involved a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ in that since there is 
trust that God has some final purpose for all of this, Abraham had to hold in check his own code 
of ethics. This, Kierkegaard explained, is by no means an easy task because faith is a trial - a risky 
enterprise undertaken with fear and trembling. (ibid) In making a leap of faith one deliberately 
chooses not to be rational, and in a later work, The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard stated 
that everyone except the true Christian experiences despair. In claiming that ‘in relating itself to 
itself and in willing to be oneself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it’ (The 
Sickness Unto Death, p.14), Kierkegaard meant to say that the self ultimately finds rest only in the 
One who made it. Anti-Climacus is religious in the extreme, and therefore it was from this 
viewpoint that Kierkegaard wrote. 
In Training in Christianity, Kierkegaard defined what it means to be a Christian in 
Christendom as being ‘just as contemporary with His presence on earth as were those (first) 
contemporaries. This contemporaneousness is a condition of faith’. (p.9) He cited the Bible 
passage throughout the first part, ‘Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will give 
you rest’. (Matthew 11:28) In the work Kierkegaard says that we cannot learn from history 
anything about Christ, nor can anyone prove from history that Christ was God. As a radical 
fideist, Kierkegaard saw the philosophical search for God as fruitless because of God’s 62 
 
hiddenness. Although Pascal and Kierkegaard are in agreement in that sense, we shall see that 
there are clear differences between them in the ensuing paragraphs.  
 
As Pascal was a moderate fideist, he emphasised that the truths of faith are beyond 
reason’s reach, and faith and philosophical reasoning are simply incompatible in their motives. 
While rationalism declares that any certain truths are unattainable by reason without faith, 
moderate fideism holds that the only certain forms of knowledge are attainable by faith. 
Mathematical truths like Pythagoras’ Theorem do not involve explicit religious faith. Therefore, in 
moderate fideism, all such truths, outside religion remain uncertain and even if they are certain 
they are categorised as some kind of non-religious faith. The former seems untenable, simply 
because even if one cannot be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow, as Hume said, one can 
surely be certain that 1+3=4, like Descartes, and in this respect, we can speak of having some 
certainties. What this means is that these certainties come from some non-religious faith, in this 
case, the ‘non-religious faith’ being faith in reason itself. For Pascal, placing trust in reason must 
itself be an act of faith, one that is not rationally provable. This is because if we could use reason 
to prove trust in reason, we beg the question by assuming what we are supposed to prove. 
Pascal argued further that our reason is not trustworthy at all if its genesis lies with some evil 
deceiving spirit instead of an intelligent and trustworthy God. Attempting to use reason to prove 
such a good and trustworthy God who created and designed human reason implies our begging 
the question and arguing in a Cartesian circle (by trying to validate God by reason and reason by 
God). The solution to this is a non-rational leap of faith right from the start.  
 
Pascal offered many rational arguments for his faith in the Pensees (1660). He argued 
that if we submit everything to the test of reason, the mysterious or supernatural quality of 
religion would be lost. Yet if what we submit to the test of reason violates reason’s principles, we 
end up rendering our religion absurd and ridiculous. Hence according to him, the two forms of 
excesses would be firstly to leave out reason and secondly to not admit anything but reason. 
Pascal may be taken to be a strong moderate fideist because he denied the possibility of natural 
theology, or using argument to justify religious belief. Such a denial is based on such theological 
reasons as human reason being too tainted by sin to attain, on its own, knowledge of God. As a 63 
 
radical fideist, Kierkegaard said that faith involves the passionate espousal of paradox and the 
casting aside of reason’s canons. In contrast to Pascal, he presented the view that faith is 
prudentially and morally foolish, and consequently, faith and reason are polar opposites - there 
can be no reasoned transition from a life without faith to one with faith. This transition consists 
instead in a leap from one mode of personal being to another. A radical fideist, therefore, could, 
like Pascal, hold that faith does not meet standards of evidence or proof, but could also, like 
Kierkegaard, maintain that the proclamations of faith are paradoxical.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard’s radical fideism looked at faith as a purely personal 
and subjective attitude. He spoke of the ‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between God and humans, 
which makes trying to understand God antithetical to believing in Him. The Divine act of the 
Incarnation, as acknowledged by the believer, is paradoxical. Something like the belief in God’s 
promise of eternal life has no rational justification, evidence, and proof. The Incarnation cannot 
be comprehended as true or false by means of logical argumentation. For a statement like ‘Jesus 
died for my sins’, the promise of salvation, to be treated as objective, as being on par with ‘John 
died in a car crash’, is, for Kierkegaard, precisely wrong. For Kierkegaard, this leap which an 
individual must make from unbelief to belief is one of faith, and as a miracle, a gift from God, faith 
helps a person arrive at a relationship with God. Also, faith as a continual striving helps one 
become his true self, the one that God will judge.  
Kierkegaard heaped scorn on those sought ‘the truth of religion in an objective, 
detached way through evidence and argument’. (Peterson et al, 2003:45)  He considered 
them to have forgotten that their existence as human beings is at stake. Objective, 
rational inquiry is merely an ‘approximation-process’ that leads us no closer to God, since 
there will always one more bit of evidence and argument to consider or evaluate, and this 
spells perilous delay for the individual whose task is to emerge from a state of untruth. As 
Man’s salvation depends upon their finding God, it is vital that there be no such further 
delay. In the intensity of one’s passion, subjective truth is found. For Kierkegaard, if we 
could prove God’s existence and his love for us it would then be impossible to have faith 
in Him. He next addressed the topic of the paradox: 64 
 
‘But what is this unknown against which the understanding in its paradoxical 
passion collides and which even disturbs man and his self-knowledge? It is the 
unknown. But it is not a human being, insofar as he knows man, or anything else 
that he knows. Therefore, let us call this unknown the god…It hardly occurs to 
the understanding to want to demonstrate that this unknown (the god) exists. If, 
namely, the god does not exist, then of course it is impossible to demonstrate it. 
But if he does exist, then it is foolishness to want to demonstrate it, since I, in 
the very moment the demonstration commences, would presuppose it not as 
doubtful - which a presupposition cannot be, inasmuch as it is a presupposition - 
but as decided, because otherwise I would not begin, easily perceiving that the 
whole thing would be impossible if he did not exist. If, however, I interpret the 
expression  to demonstrate the existence of the god to mean that I want to 
demonstrate that the unknown, which exists, is the god, then I do not express 
myself very felicitously, for then I demonstrate nothing, least of all an existence, 
but I develop the definition of a concept...For example, I do not demonstrate 
that a stone exists but that something which exists is a stone.’ (Philosophical 
Fragments, p.39) 
The answer, then, lies with one’s committing himself, taking the leap of faith and 
‘believing without having or wanting any reasons or evidence to show that one’s belief is true’. 
(ibid, p.46) Kierkegaard stated in the Philosophical Fragments that the highest level of any passion 
is to will its own downfall. It is in faith that this passion is realised, and we have the overcoming of 
reason in the face of the absurd, the Absolute Paradox. This is the highest virtue an existing 
individual can attain: 
‘But is a paradox such as this conceivable?... The understanding certainly cannot 
think it, cannot hit upon it on its own, and if it is proclaimed, the understanding 
cannot understand it and merely detects that it will likely be its downfall. To that 
extent, the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, on the other hand, 
in its paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will its own downfall. 
But the paradox, too, wills this downfall of the understanding, and thus the two 65 
 
have a mutual understanding, but this understanding is present only in the 
moment of passion.’ (p.47) 
Christian churches attempt to group people in a crowd, but to Kierkegaard, this is 
wrong, chiefly because a crowd fosters personal irresponsibility. Kierkegaard advocated individual 
awareness, commitment and responsibility. There is far greater merit in relating ourselves to 
God than in relating to others, whether as person, race, vocation, or church. For Kierkegaard, 
the problems and sufferings of life are a reflection of the existence of God. Existence to him 
means our having fallen away from our essential nature – our undying relationship to God. Our 
alienation from God leads to our existential condition of mortality and despair. According to 
Kierkegaard, all human beings have the inner drive to find their essential selves. Reason cannot 
bridge the gap between God and us, and so the leap of faith becomes the only way we can renew 
our relationship with God as well as renew our authentic selves. The further our actions drive us 
from God, the deeper our sense of alienation and despair. The anxiety of alienation stirs in us a 
dynamic drive to find our essential self. Kierkegaard explained this dynamic drive as stages on 
life’s way. (King, 2004:124) 
 
In Either/Or, The Concept of Dread, Stages on Life’s Way, and Fear and Trembling, 
Kierkegaard gave an account of human life involving three spheres of existence : the aesthetic, 
the ethical and the religious, between which we have to choose. Each of these stages is a 
progression toward achieving the virtues of meaning, purpose, and value in life. The three stages 
are, simply put, three different ways to make choices. Of the three, the choice of the religious 
existence is the only way to achieving happiness. When we choose the aesthetic sphere we 
plunge ourselves into a hedonistic life of pleasure-seeking and constant striving for novelty. (ibid, 
p.25) The motivation behind this choice would be the fear of boredom, and a flight from despair, 
but eventually we will descend into depths of melancholy and despair. When we choose the 
ethical sphere, we choose a life of submission to duty and obligation. The ethical stage is a period 
tied to duty and affirmation of the social order. According to Kierkegaard, both the aesthetic and 
ethical stages are spheres within immanence; spheres where the individual is defined completely 
by the context he is in.  
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Given the awareness that the aesthetic man cannot find happiness in personal pleasures 
and that the ethical man simply mirrors the problem of an infinite satisfaction in values, 
Kierkegaard thus developed the idea of the genuinely religious sphere. It is from this sphere that 
stems the phrase ‘leap of faith’. This sphere calls for a submission to God that is true freedom. It 
transcends rationality, and for Kierkegaard it is typified by the story of Abraham and Isaac in the 
Bible mentioned earlier. (ibid) This non-rational step leads us to see the meaning, purpose, and 
value of life through the perspective of Divine Providence. Thus the truth of Christianity is 
subjective simply because it is real to the perceiver.  
 
The religious stage is on a higher plane than the acceptance of the universal moral law 
because it is the highest subjective transformation in which the individual can experience 
complete freedom and self-actualisation. It is in the religious stage that individuals come to see 
themselves ‘before God’; seeing themselves as they really are, with a chasm between themselves 
and God due to the sins they have committed. Because it requires the highest commitment the 
individual can make, this stage represents the highest of either/or choices. Since no one can know 
what God demands, based on such uncertainty, Kierkegaard called this the leap of faith. Through 
this leap, God thus becomes the source of one’s ultimate meaning and hope. As an illustration of 
this leap, Kierkegaard chose Abraham, the Father of Faith. (Strathern, 1997:46) Kierkegaard 
pointed out that God’s commanding of Abraham to kill his son Isaac is an action that is 
completely outside common morality. Kierkegaard was telling us that the leap of faith is not 
rational, but absurd. In choosing to obey God’s command, Abraham ‘neither understands it nor is 
able to justify his decision except in terms of surrender to God’s will’. (ibid) As we noted earlier, 
this leap of faith demanded what Kierkegaard called ‘the suspension of the ethical’, and it remains 
the only way into the religious sphere of existence. Though there is an absence of rational 
grounds for religious belief, it is the only means by which one flees from despair and dread. It is in 
accepting God’s command and surrendering himself to God’s will, that Abraham attains true 
freedom.  
 
For Kierkegaard, the paradox of faith lies in the fact that the individual is higher than the 
universal. Abraham truly ‘exists’, and for the existing individual, truth is that to which he is 67 
 
passionately committed. Thus, for the existing individual, truth and faith are the same, both 
involving the tension of subjective inwardness. Kierkegaard said that our existence can be at any 
of the three stages on life’s way, but despair and guilt will remind us of how alienated we are 
from our essential selves. How we respond to the either/or dialectic within us will point out to 
us the stage of our authenticity. It is only through the leap of faith that we can realise our 
authentic and essential self. The key to existence, said Kierkegaard, is having the courage to find 
our essential self, but sadly, most people tend to come together as a group for security. The 
major task the subjective thinker has to reckon with is that of transforming himself into an 
instrument that clearly expresses in existence everything that is essentially human.  
 
It is only in the religious stage that the leap of faith can help us attain our true essential 
self in a relationship with God. A passionate commitment to God will liberate us from the 
meaninglessness and dread that we encounter in our existence, and it is in the religious stage, 
said Kierkegaard in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, that one must be willing to relinquish 
everything to God, including universal moral laws: 
‘Consequently the believing Christian both has and uses his understanding, 
respects the universally human, does not explain someone's not becoming a 
Christian as a lack of understanding, but believes Christianity against the 
understanding and here uses the understanding—in order to see to it that he 
believes against the understanding. Therefore he cannot believe nonsense against 
the understanding, which one might fear, because the understanding will 
penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder him in believing it, but he 
uses the understanding so much that through it he becomes aware of the 
incomprehensibility, and now, believing, he relates himself to it against the 
understanding.’ (p.568) 
Rationalistic inquiries and arguments concerning the truths of Christian doctrine hinder 
the subjective self-actualisation of the individual who struggles to come to a resolution. (Lowrie, 
1962:93) Kierkegaard focused on developing only the religious sphere of existence for the 
individual because he felt that philosophers and theologians before him did not understand what 68 
 
it meant to be truly religious. His view that religion is essentially non-rational is radically different 
from those of others before him. While others have conceived of faith as believing in something 
for which we have insufficient evidence, which is not necessarily non-rational, Kierkegaard 
defined faith as believing in something logically impossible and absurd, and hence crossing the line 
between rationality to non-rationality. He also did not apologize for the fact that the believer has 
to relinquish his reason, seeing that it is precisely this which makes faith so special and rare. 
Besides, as he saw it, our ability to reason is not our most precious gift; rather, it is our ability to 
feel passion.  
 
For Kierkegaard, being a Christian, or being religious in general, had to be everything in 
our lives. With authenticity, the emphasis is on the ‘how’, not the ‘what’, of knowledge, and in 
subjective truth, sincerity and intensity of the commitment are key. Kierkegaard even commented 
that to stand on one leg and prove God’s existence is a very different thing from going down on 
one’s knees and thanking Him. Since reason is inadequate for supporting our belief in God’s 
promise, Kierkegaard said rightly, our only hope rests with an unconditional leap of faith. I must 
say, with all my heart, ‘I believe’. The skeptic might ask whether we could perhaps look for a little 
bit of support from reason. Surely not. Salvation is a matter of the fate of one’s soul. It is a 
matter of one’s existence, not merely of one’s state of knowledge. And salvation is not something 
one can acquire on his own, even if he is forced to do so. Salvation requires that God reaches 
down to me and lifts me to His kingdom. That gulf between God and the individual must be 
bridged. Salvation is completely different from, say, one’s acquisition of wisdom. Christ is God’s 
instrument for bridging the gulf between Him and the believer. Christ is, for the Christian, the 
Saviour, and the fact that salvation concerns my existence as a believer, the actual, historical 
reality of Jesus is all-important. Whether Socrates ever lived does not really matter, but if God 
never actually became man in the form of Christ, and if Christ never died for my sins, then one is, 
as Kierkegaard maintained, damned rather than saved. It follows, then, that because one needs 
desperately to know that Jesus really lived, and given that the evidence for his belief is merely 
probable (the sort of evidence that a historian can produce), one cannot rest easy in the belief 
that he has been promised eternal life. There is way too much at stake; one’s salvation is 
everything - it is eternity of life rather than death. One’s terror and need for hope and assurance 69 
 
thus reduces him to infinite concern for something that defies rational grounding. One is 
reduced, in short, to a leap of faith. 
 
Kierkegaard’s argument for making the leap of faith runs something like this: the task of 
the individual, as determined by his essential nature as a human being, is that of intensifying and 
purifying his subjectivity. He must attain a spiritual state of ‘infinite passion’ to accomplish this 
task. Faith represents the highest degree of passion in the dimension of human subjectivity. And 
since Kierkegaard further held that without risk there is no faith, and that the possibility of faith is 
directly proportional to objective uncertainty, it follows that the greater the objective uncertainty 
of that which one believes, the greater the faith the believer must have. The greatest degree of 
objective uncertainty lies with the paradoxical. Passion helps the individual deliberately affirm the 
paradoxical. The greatest conceivable paradox thus would provide the greatest possible stimulus 
to passion. But, Kierkegaard contended, the greatest conceivable paradox is the central thesis of 
Christianity, namely the Incarnation. Christianity therefore, is best suited to the intensification of 
subjectivity. It follows, said Kierkegaard, that if one can achieve the infinite passion necessary to 
affirm this central thesis, thereby making the leap of faith, one would have effected the greatest 
possible intensification of one’s subjectivity, and so will have accomplished one’s essential task. 
For this reason Kierkegaard said that subjectivity leads to passion, Christianity is the Absolute 
Paradox, paradox and passion are ‘a mutual fit’. The paradox is thus necessary for the 
intensification of subjectivity and for the attainment of an eternal happiness.  
 
As the culmination of his analysis of human existence, the leap of faith is an affirmation 
that God has existed in human form. Many philosophers have resisted it because the leap 
essentially involves the affirmation of a proposition, the Absolute Paradox, which is radically 
resistant to rational understanding. Kierkegaard instead insisted upon the non-rational nature of 
this proposition, and acknowledged that its affirmation entails the suspension of rational thought. 
We must note however that Kierkegaard is not to be construed as meaning rational thought as 
something to be lightly abandoned. To summarise, Kierkegaard defended the leap of faith by 
saying that Man has a most profound desire for what he calls an infinite or eternal happiness; one 
that is in no way contingent on external circumstances and which therefore cannot be affected by 70 
 
the loss of anything finite. But Man is also a being the truth of whose nature is subjectivity. It is 
only through the leap of faith that a being whose truth is subjectivity can attain eternal happiness. 
Having already touched on the notions of subjectivity, the leap of faith and eternal happiness and 
the connection between them, one can further add that eternal happiness is possible for Man 
only if it is possible for him to relate himself to God. Man, however, is a being who exists in time 
and it would be downright impossible for him to enter into a God relationship if God had not 
also at some point existed in time.  
 
Kierkegaard argued that by means of passion and subjectivity, one can enter into a God 
relationship and thereby achieve the eternal happiness which the God relationship alone renders 
possible. The intensification of passion which a leap of faith requires is what assigns it its 
importance. The importance of the leap of faith also lies in the deepened subjectivity to which it 
gives birth to. For Kierkegaard, the more intensely subjective the individual is, the more profound 
and complete this person is. Kierkegaard also said that correspondingly, an eternal happiness 
exists only for those who are subjective, or emerges for the individual who becomes subjective. 
This seems to suggest that the eternal happiness man seeks is attained once his essential 
subjectivity is realised completely, and is a function of the attainment of a state of radical 
subjectivity as such. (Carlisle, 2006:85) 
 
In the Kierkegaardian sense of existence, God’s existence means the truth about Christ, 
and this, I agree, is a matter of faith, rather than of demonstration. Like Kierkegaard, my view is 
that God’s existence can be grasped only by being believed. His existence is assured to me only 
when I relinquish the need for proof. For me, the persuasiveness of Kierkegaard’s argument rests 
upon his view that ultimately, the matter of believing must emanate from a spiritual need with the 
knowledge that one is taking a calculated risk which might result in corroboration of another 
sort, that is, the grace of faith (Hannay, 1982:65). Kierkegaard is not attempting an argument that 
would persuade atheists, agnostics, or those of another faith. What he is pointing out is that the 
remedy at hand for nominal Christians is a faith that they understand and appreciate, but which 
they are not authentically submitting. The life of faith, for Kierkegaard, is the resolution to endure 
and overcome the despair and dread. Thus the option of faith is not merely one in which faith in 71 
 
God is presented as a reckless gamble but a well-calculated risk, one with its own ultimate 
reward. Kierkegaard understood that the option of faith, even though a risk, on pragmatic 
grounds alone it is nevertheless a risk worth taking, because in taking the leap of faith, the 
individual is rescued from the madness and disintegration (brought on by existential dread) by his 
subjective inwardness being related to God. (Strathern, 1997:59)  
 
In closing, I shall highlight the key points of this chapter. For the radical fideist, believing 
is outside of reason’s limits, and what is believed is neither established nor disestablished by what 
is known. The realm of faith is different from that of reason, and there is no overlap between 
them. For the unbeliever, the content of faith may seem nonsensical, but faith for the radical 
fideist is never a matter of objective certainty to begin with – there are no probabilities to be 
contemplated, and no doctrine beckoning intellectual acceptance. Because faith involves a 
submission of the intellect, both beyond and counter to reason, it is an expression understood 
only in terms of the absurd. In a leap of faith, as mentioned earlier, I believe it because I want to 
believe it. Kierkegaard is thus best viewed as standing at the heart of the Christian tradition, 
‘deeply informed by the Church’s thought and its spirituality… (and he was) a theologian in the 
classical, Catholic and orthodox sense, not on the model of the academic theologian, but rather 
one whose work was not merely to describe or analyse doctrine but rather to proclaim God’s 
relationship with us and point out the way of following Christ, of imitation as the pattern of the 
baptized life.’ (Gouwens, 1996:22) Kierkegaard’s immediate task as a religious and Christian 
writer was that of ‘communicating religious and Christian capabilities to persons surfeited with 
‘knowledge about’ religious and Christian matters, but who nonetheless lived in ‘aesthetic’ 
categories (living for pleasure), committing the intellectualist error of confusing their ‘knowledge 
about’ Christianity with faith’. (Ibid, p.16) Hence he saw the need for more persons learning to 
hear religiously and Christianly rather than the need for more knowledge about Christianity. His 
approach stressed a significant feature of religious experience, namely that it involves a 
relationship between the thing experienced and the experiencing subject. This relationship stops 
being ‘religious’ if the object is analysed. (Thompson, 2007:103) As a religious poet, Kierkegaard’s 
writings are dramatic, ironic, passionate and existential, ‘seeking to bring about an existential 
change in the hearts and minds of his readers’. (McEnHill & Newlands, 2004:170) His staunchly 72 
 
held the view of the individual having to make profound decisions that will shape his life, rather 
than of an integrated philosophical or theological system where the individual is insignificant.  
 
Kierkegaard saw Christianity as a way of existence, an answer to the question of how to 
live the human life. To the enigma posed by human existence, Christianity may be seen as offering 
a practical and not a theoretical answer. Christianity also influences the way an individual thinks 
about himself and the world. Hence, Kierkegaard’s project of reintroducing Christianity into 
Christendom called for his deep reflections on the nature and state of human existence. His 
stand on these subjects has influenced even those who do not share his view of the Christian 
faith. He focused on the meaning of human life and the different avenues by which people could 
try to structure their lives so as to achieve a personally meaningful existence. ‘Being’ (existence) 
precedes knowledge (rationality), and the postulate of God’s existence is a life-necessity, not 
something arbitrary. Life is contingent on paradox, on the absurd, and it is only in the realisation 
that we are always in sin, is faith then possible. (ibid, p173) Through the use of the concept of 
‘virtue of the absurd’ in many of his works, Kierkegaard illustrated the paradoxical notion that 
only the absurd is the defensible option, since when it comes to faith, there are the twin 
entailments of the suspension of reason and embracing of subjective passion. Through writing at 
length about the paradoxical nature of faith, dread, despair and subjectivity, Kierkegaard tried to 
lead individuals to an awareness of their spiritual poverty. His justification for faith in God rests 
on two possible choices for the individual – one either possibly reaches a state of authentic 
selfhood through the leap of faith, or one continues to languish in an inauthentic state of being.  
 
In Kierkegaard’s work we note also that intuition and risk often ‘provide a starting point 
for what develops into a serious commitment and new understanding of life’. (ibid, p.12) He was 
not satisfied with convincing his readers merely on an intellectual level, and wanted to show them 
a form of life that they can actualise in their own existence. Many religious people are drawn to 
Kierkegaard’s idea of faith, perhaps because it resonates with their own experience and concept 
of faith than the logical approach advocated by strong rationalism. The idea that faith involves 
commitment and risk-taking finds ready acceptance by many believers. Although his radical 
fideism means the believer no longer has to worry about contradictions, I agree with Kierkegaard 73 
 
that saying religion is non-rational makes believing in God less comfortable for some people than 
they would probably like. But Kierkegaard would say it is entirely our choice whether we want to 
believe in God or not. If more people reject religion because they simply want to cling on to the 
merits of reason, Kierkegaard would deem that acceptable, since that would be far better than 
having the majority of people think they are religious when in fact they are not. And as Evans 
(2006) points out, Kierkegaard’s concern was not to defend the ‘reasonableness’ or 
unreasonableness of Christianity but rather ‘to argue the impossibility of neutrality. When reason 
encounters the paradox, faith and offense are both possible; what is not possible is indifference’. 
(p.131) 
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Chapter Four: Is Kierkegaard’s Radical Fideism a Defensible Justification for 
Religious Belief?  
 
In the earlier chapters we discussed why fideism appeals to many religious persons. 
Whereas evidentialists are unable to accept a belief in God in the absence of evidence, the 
fideists, in contrast, readily accept the truth of Christianity on faith alone. For a fideist like 
Kierkegaard, God is, in the plain face of reason, the Unknown and reason's efforts cannot make 
the unknown known. Philosophers like Kant tend to adopt the modest response of declaring 
reason’s limit as an unknown, but Man would always try to project the known onto the unknown 
to overcome this limitation. Kierkegaard’s fideistic views, however greatly disputed in his time, 
have withstood criticism and are now representative of those in the Christian faith who do not 
demand philosophical tenet, evidence of the Trinity or the existence of God in order to have a 
lasting, personal faith.  
 
It is through an appeal to faith that the fideist accords knowledge status to beliefs that 
have not fulfilled the minimum (or evidential) requirements of objective knowledge. And for 
some people, it seems contradictory that something could be labelled as ‘knowledge’ when it has 
not been rationally demonstrated. However, the essence of faith is precisely to deem an idea as 
having a referent in reality while at the same time casting aside the process by which reality can 
come to be known by Man. Fideism thus points to the acceptance not only of the paradoxes, but 
by virtue of the paradoxes present in Christianity, and for Kierkegaard, the Christian faith is 
rendered more true given its outright defiance of rational explanation and demonstration.  
 
Theologians and philosophers of religion often claim they encounter a major problem in 
terms of justifying belief in God. Belief in God is ‘a religious experience we encounter in an 
ultimate way, challenging the very significance and meaning of our lives. It is a matter of our 
‘ultimate concern’, in the words of Paul Tillich. (Thompson, 2007:15) Beliefs about God ‘are not 
subject to the normal rational checks that we can apply to other beliefs’. (Hill, 2007:81) Deeply 
religious people often claim that they ‘already live in a dynamic relationship with God and that 
rational argument and other intellectual exercises are patently beside the point’. (Peterson et al, 75 
 
2003:313) Our knowledge of God, whether seen as a direct encounter or as a conclusion derived 
through logical inference from evidence, is unique because our gaining this knowledge 
presupposes our having to cross the boundary that divides the natural from that which lies 
beyond. And as humans in a world in space and time trying to reach out to grasp a Being infinitely 
superior to us and nature, we cannot envisage the kind of encounter which communion with 
such a Being could be. Suppose we try too hard to conceptualise it, then we might just risk 
destroying theism through removing the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. It 
is also immensely difficult to expect an argument whose premises all refer to what is within 
nature to yield a conclusion lying beyond it. In any case, we need to be mindful that the concept 
of faith becomes inapplicable if ever the theist claims that the articles of faith can also meet the 
requirements of reason, for faith is only possible in beliefs that defy rational demonstration or 
guidelines. 
 
Scientists can scrutinise and weigh the evidence for hypotheses and not accept them 
purely ‘on faith’. When one believes in God, one believes on faith and transcends the evidence. 
Believers will consider proving (or disproving) God’s existence as missing the point; their 
justification being that faith involves personal trust and commitment. This trust and commitment 
is not the same as a list of the things that one claims to believe. Although it includes them, it 
further describes the way in which one relates to them. For example, as Thompson (2007) says, 
one can have faith in his doctor, but need not have an understanding of medicine. (p.37) We can 
see it expressed as the difference between believing that something is true and believing in 
something. When one believes in something, there is the presupposition of commitment and 
trust. Believing that something is true simply means that one thinks the statement is correct, 
whether or not it is of any personal interest to him. The statement, ‘I believe that God exists’ 
may be the logical conclusion of an argument, but does not mean the person is in any way 
influenced by that belief, whereas ‘I believe in God’ suggests one’s having a ‘personal relationship 
with God, or at least believes that God in some way matters’. (ibid, p.38) 
 
This chapter considers the objections to Kierkegaard’s fideistic position, seeking to 
defend his type of radical fideism as a good justification for religious belief. We will discuss 76 
 
whether philosophical interest in religion misses the essence of religious faith, and whether 
religious faith can ever be subject in any way to rational investigation. The idea of faith as non-
rational belief contrary to the sum of evidence for that belief will be examined in the context of 
showing that belief in God is not a matter of defending certain arguments. In fact, I advocate the 
view that nobody comes to believe in God because of arguments. Religious faith permeates our 
being deeply, encompassing our feelings, commitment and passion more than our reason, and 
offers us hope and meaning in life. For the believer, God provides some guarantee to his concept 
of the meaning of life; and even if one does not believe in God, no less significant would be the 
absence of those same guarantees. If God does not exist, Man descends into a life of meaningless 
existence. In an age where life has too often been described as meaningless and absurd by 
existentialist philosophers, a belief in God gives us purpose and direction to life. We can say that 
too many people are uncertain about the purpose of life in general and about their own lives. 
(Little, 2000:166) Undoubtedly, a non-Christian has such purposes as family, career and money 
that yield temporal or limited satisfaction. God in Christ offers a cosmic purpose to the believer’s 
life, ‘tying him in with His purpose for history and eternity’. (ibid) We also see the transformation 
of routine as we live our lives in God’s purpose and heed the admonition ‘Whether you eat or 
drink or whatever you do, do it all for the glory of God’. (1 Corinthians 10:31) This eternal 
purpose comes to pervade every aspect of the believer’s life. Hence when it comes to one’s 
having to decide between despair and belief in God, I feel that a Kierkegaardian leap into the non-
rational realm ought to be one's choice. It is only through a leap of faith grounded in infinite 
passion and the absurd that one enters into a relationship with God and consequently achieves 
eternal happiness.  
 
The rationality of faith has encountered criticism from the evidentialist challenge since 
the European Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. One of the first to issue the challenge was 
John Locke. Others turned to W K Clifford as spokesperson for the evidential challenge. In his 
essay ‘The Ethics of Belief’, Clifford said that ‘It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. Theists can adopt two approaches in responding to 
the evidential challenge, and I shall argue that fideism as one of the approaches is the more 
promising one. Indeed, fideistic philosophers who emphasise faith above reasons in religious 77 
 
matters usually concede that it is impossible to meet the evidentialist challenge. More than 
merely arguing that there is insufficient evidence for religious beliefs, they emphasise faith instead 
as a proper attitude for adhering to a belief in God. While the evidentialist may be right in 
insisting that the rationality of religious commitment requires evidence, faith would not be 
possible if any evidence exists that could eliminate reasonable doubt that God exists. The fideist 
sees the evidential challenge as mistaken in that it requires evidence which, while appropriate for 
some things, is not appropriate for faith. And faith cannot be said to be irrational merely because 
it does not fulfill the requirements needed to make belief rational. Is the fideist position better 
than the other approaches in its response to the evidentialist challenge? We now examine the 
objections to fideism. 
 
Critics of fideism maintain that there are grounds for them to be uncomfortable with it. 
Firstly, fideism seems self-validating in that people who state that faith supersedes reason must by 
definition also claim no argument has any bearing on the truth of a faith statement. The world is 
thus naturally divided into groups of people who hold differing positions, and these groups are 
merely able to inform other groups about their faith. Not much point exists in discussing these 
differing positions, since all discussion aimed at understanding must start with the premise that 
one's position might change given new information or more convincing arguments, in other 
words, in the light of reason. 
 
A second objection concerns the assertion that faith is a valid way of asserting a truth. 
The argument goes that this is itself a rational statement as it can either be true or false, and it is 
only through rational examination that we can establish the truth or falsity of any proposition. 
Examination of anything through the use of reason may not provide ‘proof’ in the sense that an 
absolute truth is stated by a proposition. Therefore, it seems that the fideist demand is 
contingent on a presupposition about the nature of reality and of truth in particular, and this is 
non-viable. 
 
Thirdly, faith seems to be about blindly accepting beliefs in certain propositions that are 
not rationally provable. Belief in this sense seems to be the assertion of propositions about which 78 
 
we have cause for doubt. Similarly, when religious people use the term ‘believe’, they usually 
mean that they have chosen to regard something as true and worthy of their assent despite 
grounds for doubt. What seems problematic with this position is that it is difficult to 
demonstrate that Christianity is essentially a faith in the sense that it is a system of belief. Belief 
may be a requirement of the Church, but Christianity is a way of life. Put simply, faith lies in a 
continuum that involves choice of certain attitudes, priorities and actions, and if we separate any 
one part of that continuum at the expense of the others, we can no longer be said to be talking 
about faith. 
 
A fourth objection goes that radical fideism, despite all its insistence on faith’s spiritual 
purity, may actually be a form of false consciousness or ‘bad faith’, in Sartrean parlance. For a 
start, between the theists and atheists, there appears to be no possibility of any meaningful 
dialogue. Far worse than this, the fideistic position might even seem to entail that the believer is 
compelled to concede that his belief in God is irrational and unreasonable. Further, the 
philosopher will find it difficult to respond to radical fideism, since the radical fideist seems to 
reject all the rules to which the philosopher can appeal. On the surface, the fideist seems to have 
chosen to accept the claims of one authority (faith) and disregard the opposition of another 
(reason). While no logical difficulty exists with one’s holding with a lot of passion some self-
contradictory doctrine, and yet not realise it, it is quite another matter to consciously live in 
inconsistency. If one thinks that there is something truly paradoxical about what he believes, then 
although he has come to believe it from a certain cause, he also comes to believe in its falsity 
because he will encounter a conflict of beliefs. With Kierkegaard’s recommendation that one 
embraces a paradox with wholeheartedness, he is saying that one does not have the belief in its 
falsity with which the belief in its truth is contending in his psyche. In this respect, it seems that 
the radical fideist is maintaining verbally that the inner conflict is resolved when it is not, because 
as one cannot resolve this conflict by denying its presence, even though over time the demands 
of reason can gradually be removed. Yet when that happens, it would mean one no longer judges 
the faith-commitment to be paradoxical. To say before that happens that faith is chosen over 
reason is hence to deny the inner conflict and deceive the self, which is tantamount to a kind of 
bad faith.   79 
 
Fifthly, some philosophers question if there are good grounds at all for applying less 
rigorous criteria for judging statements on religious matters than we do for other statements. 
These critics question religious faith as a proper method in our efforts to arrive at truthful 
propositions, insisting that reason and argumentative thinking are credible as proper methods for 
seeking truth precisely because reason has helped us devise solutions to problems on a daily 
basis. In science, for instance, reason has led to progressive knowledge increase. In contrast, it 
seems that in circumstances where our reason is deemed insufficient for helping us arrive at the 
truth, faith gives us no grounds for saying that it serves us in our daily attempts at seeking truth, 
and this is exactly where fideism fails. Peterson et al (2003) echo this view:  
 
‘All important issues in human life must be subjected to responsible, reflective 
reason. This holds for beliefs associated with a particular theistic religion, 
beliefs drawn from theistic religions generally, or beliefs maintained by non 
theistic religions. If religious beliefs are not subject to earnest, objective 
approach of reason, then prospects for the human venture are bleak indeed’. 
(p.312)  
 
There is also the likelihood that sometimes people end up accepting ideas that are strange or 
dangerous when they adopt religious belief systems without any consideration for the 
reasonability or truth of the beliefs concerned.  
 
A final objection to fideism goes that even God’s authority cannot be the ultimate 
criterion of certitude. Here the critic’s stand is that an act of faith simply cannot be the primary 
form of human knowledge. For this authority to be a motive of assent, there must be previous 
acknowledgement of its being certainly valid. In other words, we must first have absolute 
knowledge of God’s existence before there can be belief in a proposition as revealed by God. 
We must know a given proposition is revealed by God, and that His teaching is worthy of assent, 
all of which must be ultimately decided by an act of intellectual assent hinging on objective 
evidence. Hence it seems fideism fails on two fronts - firstly, it denies intellectual knowledge and 
secondly, it logically ruins faith itself. 80 
 
Given the above criticisms, how does the fideist respond? The fideist could probably 
begin by saying that philosophically speaking there are no ironclad arguments for God's existence. 
God is not the conclusion of a logical chain of arguments. He does not exist at the end of any 
objective mathematical equation or calculation, nor is He an observable through the use of the 
most powerful of telescopes. As Kierkegaard says, to exist has nothing to do with objective 
principles. What matters when we say we ‘exist’ is instead a subjective awareness of our unique 
individuality. (Carlisle, 2006:25) For the believer, a stark problem with arguing about God 
through logical arguments is that one stands to derive no spiritual or emotional comfort from 
this rational process. Kierkegaard, through the biblical story of Abraham in Genesis 22, illustrated 
his belief that science and mathematics have little to do with eternal happiness. (Carlisle, 
2006:116) He pointed out that science and mathematics could not help Abraham decide whether 
to obey God and sacrifice his son, Isaac. And like Abraham, we all encounter situations that 
compel us to come to awareness of ourselves. The all important truths are simply personal, and 
truth is subjectivity, ‘the tension of the subjective inwardness’. Kierkegaard defined ‘truth’ in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript as: 
 
‘An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation–process of the most 
passionate inwardness…The truth is precisely the venture which chooses an 
objective uncertainty with the passion of the infinite.’ (p.203)  
 
As Thompson (2007) says, given that God is infinite, He cannot be expected to exist in 
the same way that finite things do. The matter of His existence (or otherwise) cannot be debated 
in the way that we do when we define or draw up parameters for ordinary things. The believer 
simply cannot point to something and say, ‘Go to that corner and you will see God standing 
there.’ We can seek evidence to ascertain if ordinary, limited things might or might not exist, but 
by definition, God is not such a straightforwardly ascertainable ‘thing’, and for us to say that God 
‘exists’ in the literal sense is therefore to deny Him. (p.41) The critic can then ask if it makes any 
sense to say God exists at all if He does not even exist in the same sense that finite things do. To 
this, I feel the fideist can respond by asking about the existence of such items as ‘space’, ‘reality’ 
or ‘time’, all of which are not items we can point to or readily set boundaries, yet collectively 81 
 
these form a sort of framework within which things are experienced. In like fashion, ‘God’ could 
be seen as a framework for articulating religious experiences. (ibid) Another clear example of 
something that may be described as existing, but which has no separate existence on its own 
would be ‘love’, as mentioned in one of the earlier chapters. A description of the ‘love’ may 
encompass many things like social bonding, acts of kindness, sexuality, and fellowship, yet love 
does not exist on its own as a separate entity. The point here is that for us to speak of God as 
having a literal existence in a particular place, a Being either within or external to our world, is 
for us to actually limit Him, and a Being that we so limit cannot be God. Thompson (2007) adds: 
 
‘If something is absurd, one cannot accept it rationally. To believe it takes an 
act of commitment. Commitment to what is beyond rational proof is a 
common phenomenon; totally rational people would never fall in love or make 
war; shopping for the latest fashion would be suspect, rock climbing, bungee 
jumping, and stamp collecting would cease! Many religious experiences are 
actually of quite mundane things – what makes them religious is the way in 
which they are interpreted, the impact they have on the people experiencing 
them, and the depth or quality of the experience. A superficial religious 
experience is almost a contradiction in terms.’  (p.12-13) 
 
The fideist can further strengthen his position by pointing to the impossibility of 
comprehending something that is incomprehensible by definition. Philosophers grant that if there 
is indeed a reality called God as known in religion, this can only be established by a logical 
procedure that would develop a coherent concept of God and then demonstrate that this 
concept has a referent. In Pascal we see the shift from the rational argumentative to the 
experiential type of philosophy of religion. Pascal has in mind Descartes in his criticisms, and in 
the latter, the existence of God is established by the most rational of all the traditional 
arguments, the Ontological argument, and in Cartesian philosophy the function of God seems to 
be chiefly that of guaranteeing the veracity of our knowledge of the external world. It is in this 
context that Pascal said, famously, ‘God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the 
philosophers and scholars’ and ‘If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having 82 
 
neither parts or limits, He has no affinity with us. We are incapable, therefore, of knowing either 
what He is or if He is’. (Flew, 1984:62) The existence of God simply cannot be established by 
empirical investigation or philosophical demonstration.  
 
Where the essential qualities of God are concerned, such as eternity, infinity and 
omniscience, we must acknowledge that we have limited understanding of the Divine Being. 
Throughout the Judaeo-Christian tradition God’s incomprehensibility is affirmed, and in the Book 
of Isaiah, we read: ‘For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways, says 
the Lord’. (Isaiah 55:8). Similarly, Thomas Aquinas writes in Summa Theologiae that ‘Though in 
Himself supremely knowable, God surpasses the power of a limited intelligence by very excess of 
truth’, and ‘to realise that God is far beyond anything we think, that is the mind’s achievement’. 
Kierkegaard likewise insisted (in direct opposition to Hegel’s claim that human intellect can 
adequately know the Absolute) that God is wholly unknowable. The critic can object by saying 
that if the fideist assertion is right that the Christian God is an incomprehensible one, then it 
seems we are too often making seemingly positive affirmations concerning His character, and 
hence saying a lot about God. Kierkegaard did not address this antinomy, but to escape the 
charge of irrationalism, it is important that the fideist make some attempt to address it. It would 
appear that either we must assert God’s incomprehensibility and not utter a word about His 
nature, or we must justify the description of God by acknowledging that we can to a certain 
extent understand His nature. Apophatic theology, while asserting that God’s nature is 
unknowable, does not assert that one cannot know this about God. 
 
Owen (1971) postulates one solution to the above. He suggests that we can postulate a 
real analogy between finite symbols and their divine object in the attempt to validate their use. 
Positive language referring to a transcendent God can be justified by the doctrine of analogy of 
being (analogia entis) (p.103). According to the analogy of being there is both a likeness and 
unlikeness between God and Man. To the extent that they are both existent and exhibit those 
forms of spirituality that distinguish man from sub-human creatures, they are alike. God differs in 
kind from us insofar as only He is self-existent, which means His existence is not dependent 
either on our existence or the existence of anything else. Our existence, however, is dependent 83 
 
on God’s will as we are part of God’s creation. Also, only God expresses spirituality in an infinite 
form. The likeness between God and His creatures entitles us to attribute spiritual properties 
(such as wisdom, goodness and power) to God in a way that is appropriate to His self-existence, 
even if our positive knowledge of these properties is limited to their finite modes.  
 
There are at least three reasons that justify the assumption of the above form of 
analogy. Firstly, the very idea of creation presupposes a Creator, and only a spiritual act of will 
can bring the world into being ex nihilo. If love is the only conceivable motive for God’s act of 
creation, then we cannot even begin to speak meaningfully of creation without implying the 
analogy of a loving personal Creator. Secondly, this analysis of ‘creation’ is confirmed by the 
Scriptural affirmation that God created man ‘in His own image’. The Book of Genesis writes: 
‘Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, in our likeness…’ So God created man in His 
own image.’ (Genesis 1:26) Thirdly, the concept of analogia entis is an essential part of Biblical 
revelation. If God wishes for us to conform to His will and nature, then some limited similarities 
must exist between God and Man. From the standpoint of a believer, I believe that God as He is 
in Himself can never be known. One can only attempt to highlight His mystery through limiting 
concepts that, in substance or form, are wholly negative, and to employ positive analogies for 
which we can give positive meaning only from our own experience. (Owen, 1971:106) The point 
is that for all God’s attributes, we must remember God’s incomprehensibility. Even if we grant 
that we can conceptualise God, this does not mean we can prove that God exists, which would 
be why we need faith. Faith would not be needed if we could offer airtight proof of His existence. 
 
The rational process is ‘one in which conclusions are drawn from premises by a 
sequence of mental steps which can be followed, verified and which others would accept as being 
true – and true for everyone, not just for that particular individual’. (Thompson, 2007:40) I feel 
the rationalist approach to the philosophy of religion often inadequately addresses the 
experiential dimension of religious faith, and (mistakenly) conceives of God as an inferred entity. 
The understanding of a religious experience cannot be through rationalist or empirical 
approaches, or else it would merely be a scientific description of what is seen or heard, with 
nothing that qualifies it as distinctively religious or eternally significant. (ibid) In this connection, a 84 
 
scientific observer will never be fully satisfied with an explanation of religion. Nor can any 
scientific or rationalist interpretation of the evidence ever be exhaustive. What will always elude 
description is that bit of ‘extra’ that does not necessarily go counter to reason (making it 
irrational) but rather transcends it, involving a step not demonstrable by logic or evidence, but 
which one feels the compulsion to take.  
 
More than the mere acceptance of a theistic hypothesis, religious faith is a commitment 
different from the tentative kind of commitment involved when we accept a hypothesis. Faith is 
not a passive, intellectual assent to doctrines. For the fideist, faith means being in a state of trust 
and commitment, with the object being God Himself and not propositions about God. In science, 
it is appropriate that reason should demand objectivity and detachment. Where the matter is of 
one’s salvation, this is where passionate involvement is required. Few people become religious as 
a direct result of arguments and most would agree that there is an experiential dimension to 
religious faith. A person can never arrive at it by sifting through evidence. And certainly, faith is 
not formulated when we sit down to prove a theorem. While the knowledge of the existence 
and unity of God is a necessary condition to matters of faith, it is not necessary that these be 
established by demonstration, but those who do not hold them by demonstration must at least 
posit them by faith. Faith is not logically dependent on a prior demonstration of the existence of 
God. It is personal, involving the inner person, and believers also see faith as a gift of God, with 
an essentially supernatural quality. As Thompson (2007) says, attempting to use rational means 
alone to grasp religion is much like trying to find a mate through a dating agency. Although the 
agency can work out the necessary details, ‘unless you find in your computer-selected partner 
some spark of emotion, some willingness to take a risk, a leap beyond what is reasonable, you 
are hardly likely to embark on the most passionate relationship of your life!’ (p.40)  
 
In modern times, religion continues to be one of our ultimate concerns because here we 
are dealing not with abstract and theoretical questions, but with the eternal dimension of life as 
well as with choosing our commitments, hopes, and direction in life. As Kierkegaard says, for the 
religious person, the leap of faith is the necessary step towards bridging the gulf between the 
finite and infinite, Man and God. Given the significance of such a leap, which comes about not 85 
 
from haphazardness, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that it is an irrational move on the 
religious believer’s part, if by ‘irrational’ here we mean to suggest a believer’s delusion or even 
depravity. I agree with Kierkegaard that true religiousness hinges on inwardness and 
incomprehensibility, and by absurd, Kierkegaard does not mean foolish, but incomprehensible, 
because mere thought cannot resolve it. The leap of faith is not one of blindness, lunacy or 
speculation:  
‘Consequently the believing Christian both has and uses his understanding, 
respects the universally human, does not explain someone's not becoming a 
Christian as a lack of understanding, but believes Christianity against the 
understanding and here uses the understanding—in order to see to it that he 
believes against the understanding. Therefore he cannot believe nonsense 
against the understanding, which one might fear, because the understanding will 
penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder him in believing it, but he 
uses the understanding so much that through it he becomes aware of the 
incomprehensibility, and now, believing, he relates himself to it against the 
understanding.’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.568) 
For the religious believer, his leap of faith, even though it falls outside of the whole 
enterprise of providing justification, is passionately real, calling for an act of will, commitment and 
preparedness. And insofar as religious belief is an expression of a certain passion and is not a 
matter of cognition, I maintain that it may not even be a matter of rationality. ‘It is the experience 
of meeting God’, Evans (2006) writes, ‘which produces the passion of faith...Such an encounter 
may properly be said to be the ground of faith without constituting evidence for faith’. (p.128). 
The Kierkegaardian leap of faith is no leap of blindness or ignorance at all because the believer 
knows what he is leaping to, and why he is leaping. This leap is necessary firstly because 
speculation affords us at best a mere ‘approximation’, and secondly, an objective fact is unhelpful 
until there is subjective appropriation of it on our part. In the stark absence of subjectivity, the 
theist and the atheist relate to God in the same way.  
 
 86 
 
Martin Gardner (1996), one of the founders of the modern skeptical movement, grants 
that the existence of God is unprovable. A fideist, he argues that one has the right to make a leap 
of faith if this provides ‘sufficient satisfaction’. Gardner believes in God for personal or pragmatic 
reasons. Granting that the atheists have more persuasive arguments, his position is best 
encapsulated by the phrase, Credo consolans, - I believe because it is consoling. (Shermer, 
2000:302) Gardner points out that any evidence for another life would eradicate faith. If we had 
knowledge that following our death, there is a Heaven that awaits, and we know this with the 
kind of certainty that we do concerning, say, the existence of Tokyo or Paris, our lives would be 
downright governed by our impatience or anxiousness to get there. To travel a road to reach the 
end of it is one thing, and jumping off the roof is quite another. As Gardner says rightly, the 
hiddenness of Heaven is what makes faith the uncompelled leap that it is. There is merit to this 
line of thought for the faith believer, as I shall point out in the following paragraphs. 
 
From a fideistic standpoint, abstract analysis of religious concepts and the logical 
examination of theological beliefs may be said to miss the heart and intent of true religion. For 
sure, these approaches do not deepen the believer’s appreciation of the intimate, personal 
involvement of religious faith. Since the God of philosophers is not the God of faith, the fideist 
can argue that rigorous intellectual investigation does not help deepen faith or passionate 
religious commitment. For a sincere religious believer, faith itself is the foundation of one’s life, 
and this being so, the idea of testing one’s faith by some external, rational standard seems to be 
reflective of a lack of true faith. Thus it is sometimes said that ‘if we test God’s word by science 
or logic, we are really worshipping science or logic rather than God’. (Peterson et al, 2003:45) It 
is also open to the fideist to maintain that a God relegated to our level (as to be clearly 
imaginable) would not be God. Whatever God is, we can expect He could not possibly be 
conceived of by such a corporeal, time-bound, three-dimensional, non-omniscient, non-
omnipotent, non-omnipresent being as Man. To me, there is cosmic significance in the idea of 
God’s transcendence and His being beyond human comprehension. Just as the two-dimensional 
creature cannot possibly grasp the nature of three-dimensionality despite being armed with logic 
and reasoning, we cannot by human terms understand God's existence or otherwise. By that 
token, what cannot be understood or proved remains insoluble.  87 
 
Critics of fideism might still insist that fideists have not thoroughly weighed the 
consequences of severing religious belief from reason completely. There is a need for one to 
seek reasons or evidence if one wants to hold that his beliefs are in some sense true. In 
response, the fideist can say that we must refrain from being professionally committed to relying 
too much on arguments and too little on personal experience, feelings and passion. Faith is not a 
matter of scientific thinking. Just as science shows how this world can be known, faith allows the 
believer to know God. Norms of rational belief formation need not be adhered to when it comes 
to faith. Most important things in life are not undertaken on the basis of rational assessment 
alone. Belief in God is one of those beliefs one cannot rationalise, as it is not just a matter of 
defending certain arguments. Hopes, fears, emotional attachments, memories and the longing to 
share activities with those we love and admire, all have their part to play. Christianity, as 
Kierkegaard pointed out, is not about intellectualizing - nobody comes to believe in God because 
of logical proofs and mathematical reasoning. Faith helps us become involved in a whole way of 
life. The faith believer is able to find within his heart intimations of Divinity, and he sees God’s 
existence as a revealed truth. Emotion may be warm whereas reason can often be seen as 
detached or cold. (Thompson, 2007:8) How could a human being ever hope to conceive of or 
prove the existence of an Infinite Being? Faith must step in. It is also God who provides some 
guarantee to our conception of the meaning of life. If we want to believe that life ought to be fair, 
for example, then it is truly important for us to believe that some powerful Being exists who will 
effect things in some fair way, either in this life, or in another.  
 
The critic of fideism will argue further that the concept of the infinite is employed in 
other areas of human thinking, for example, mathematics, so surely one is not claiming that it is in 
principle impossible for a finite being to reason about the notion of the infinite. Besides, since the 
Being in question is conceived of in a certain way, this Being must be intelligible or definable to 
the degree that our conception can make some sense. After all, it is supposedly ‘mere’ human 
thought that gives firstly, meaning to the concept of God and secondly, some content to the 
supposed object of worship. If the infinite is wholly unintelligible to the finite mind, can one even 
speak of God as a religious object?  
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The response to the above criticism can go something like this: People usually conceive 
of Christian God as a Being with an infinitely perfect set of characteristics. He is supposedly 
immaterial, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving, and unchanging. To the extent that we understand 
what it means for us to know, have power, and be loving or morally good, we do at least have 
some conception about God’s nature, since a Being infinite in power, knowledge and goodness 
would have to be at least as powerful, knowledgeable and good as we are. Hence to have a 
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h i s  k i n d  o f  G o d  a s  a n  o b j e c t  o f  f a i t h  i s  t o  a d m i t  t h a t  t o  a n  e x t e n t ,  G o d  i s  
intelligible, definable and can be thought about by a finite mind. Also, I see nothing to keep us 
from asking if there are grounds to think that such a Being, so conceived, actually exists. To 
explain certain phenomena in our world and our experience, people do talk as if they know 
something about God’s nature. God is said to have a purpose, to love us, to do certain things and 
so on. Such talk makes sense only if one admits that a finite mind can think somewhat adequately 
about God, for otherwise religion would not be possible, particularly if God cannot be conceived 
of, talked about or defined in some way. This, as was mentioned in an earlier section of this 
chapter, is not to say that we can fully understand God, if He exists. It only means we can 
understand something about God for otherwise there would be no sense at all in the religious 
talk we do engage in.  
 
To the religious, the affirmations of faith have a more encompassing, more fundamental 
and more imperative quality than others. The merit of faith is seen as diminished if a person 
believes only in the light of human reasons. Even though one may have reasons confidently based 
on the demonstrations of the existence of God, he should be willing to believe solely on the 
authority of God. It may not be totally possible to convince a skeptic that the universe must have 
been created by God, or that the existence of laws of nature points to a Universal Lawgiver, but 
these are still roles that Christians traditionally assign to God. Christians also claim they exist in a 
special relationship with God, and ‘see’ Him working in the world around them, for example, 
even if they cannot prove this to others. The arguments may be criticised, but the doctrines that 
they express have always been at the core of the Christian faith. (Hill, 2007:57) 
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Kierkegaard’s philosophy, as we have seen, rests on the theory that the real truth is an 
individual’s experience, not objective logic and reason. Kierkegaard accurately observed that no 
formula (no certainty) will ever guarantee eternal happiness. Philosophy, in Kierkegaard’s view, is 
not a substitute for faith, and cannot help one to achieve essential humanity as well as a sufficient 
understanding of and a deep relationship with God. I agree with this observation, because 
suppose by means of science and mathematics we do succeed in proving everything about the 
Scriptures, how does this impact one bit the person who does not have faith to begin with? 
There is scarcely any impact simply because religious faith does not lie at the end of a scientific 
inquiry. In fact, the result of successfully proving the truth of the Scriptures might lead to the very 
opposite of what is intended, in that objectivity ends up eliminating the infinite interest which is 
the condition of faith. For the one who already has faith, his faith is not made stronger through 
his now having facts to support his belief. And if passion is eliminated, faith no longer exists. I am 
in agreement with Kierkegaard that for the believer, when faith desires proof and ceases to be 
passionate, it is like a young woman whose love for her lover has started to diminish and she 
earnestly seeks reasons why she should admire the lover she no longer has any affection for: 
 
‘But when faith begins to feel embarrassed and ashamed, like a young woman for 
whom her love is no longer sufficient, but who secretly feels ashamed of her lover 
and must therefore have it established that there is something remarkable about 
him – when faith begins to lose its passion, when faith begins to cease to be faith, 
then a proof becomes necessary so as to command respect from the side of 
unbelief.’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.31)  
 
Though Kierkegaard was highly critical of the system of rational knowledge as an answer 
to life’s problems, he grants that it is legitimate to employ the methods of mathematics and 
science when these are used properly. However, Kierkegaard is right in his observation that such 
are not items in the believer’s daily prayers. Nor do they cause us to lie awake at night pondering 
over them. The objective truths found in mathematics and science are simply too detached to 
essentially permeate the human experience. He also rejected the ideas propounded by systematic 
philosophers that rational systems could assist the believer in the understanding of human nature. 90 
 
For instance, Plato believed that if we know the Universal Forms, especially the Form of Good, 
then we will do the good. Kierkegaard opined that such thinking made light of our actual human 
dilemma; individual decisions have to be made whether we know the good or not. He illustrated 
his belief that science and mathematics have little to do with daily life or eternal happiness by 
alluding to the biblical story of Abraham in Genesis 22. This story was used to demonstrate that 
there is a goal higher than that of ethics (which counters the Hegelian claim that performing one's 
ethical duty is the highest task for a human being) and that Hegelian ethics cannot explain faith 
(which counters Hegel's claim that there is a rational philosophical explanation for Christianity). 
Like Abraham, we all face situations that compel us to be aware of ourselves. Kierkegaard asked 
if science and mathematics can help Abraham decide whether to obey God and sacrifice his son, 
Isaac. The answer, to him, was obviously not.  
 
Religious faith involves personal trust in God, and this trust is usually based on a number 
of beliefs about what God is like and how an individual relates to Him. It is also true that to have 
faith in God and for one to live in ways that reflect that attitude amounts to more than just 
intellectually adopting beliefs such as ‘God exists’ and ‘God is perfect in power, knowledge and 
goodness’. As Thompson (2007) rightly says, if we apply logical analysis to religion in the way we 
do with science, politics or language, we will either fail to reach logically coherent conclusions or 
fail to convince those who practise religion to accept these conclusions. (p.260) This is entirely 
within expectations because an individual’s personal hopes and fears are simply not confined 
within the boundaries of rational thought alone. Religious intuitions (along with love, hate, fear 
and other powerful emotions) come about when we are engaged in the ‘now’ of experience. 
(ibid, p.261) It is futile for the atheist to show that religious beliefs are irrational, or that 
satisfactory evidence for the existence of God is lacking or inadequate, as doing so is unlikely to 
change anyone’s views. This is because such beliefs rarely depend on reason or evidence, but on 
intuition and the interpretation of personal experience. Unique to religious experience is ‘a sense 
of wonder, new insight and values, holiness and profundity’. (Thompson, 2007:6) Such experience 
involves the whole person, his mind, emotions, values and relationships, and encompasses the 
most fundamental sense of being oneself. I agree with Kierkegaard that if one adopts the 
superficial approach to religion and religious commitment, through participating in religious 91 
 
ceremonies but without either engaging emotionally or intellectually in the beliefs of that religion, 
there would not be any significant or lasting contribution to his life or prospect of entering a 
meaningful relationship with God.  
 
Earlier on I mentioned that there is a strong presumption by some that one should 
believe Christian doctrines only on epistemic reasons. The evidentialist insists that one ought not 
to believe what was not supported by evidence means that if the evidence does not seem to 
support Christianity, one ought not to believe it. On the surface, there seems to be good 
utilitarian arguments for believing them only when there is good evidence for them. 
Mathematician William Clifford, in an article entitled ‘The Ethics of Belief’ (1877), paved the way 
for modern skepticism towards religious faith. In it he pointed to the moral failing of those who 
believe on insufficient evidence. (Hill, 2007:84) Clifford argued that belief is impractical and 
immoral if it is not grounded in specific evidence. He wrote: 
 
‘Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we weaken our 
powers of self-control, of doubting, of judicially and fairly weighing evidence. We 
will suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false beliefs and 
the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the evil born when one such 
belief is entertained is great and wide. But a greater and wider evil arises when 
the credulous character is maintained and supported, when a habit of believing 
for unworthy reasons is fostered and made permanent.’ (Peterson et al, 2001, 
p.84.)  
 
Clifford’s case was built on the insistence that every belief has an impact on other 
people, regardless of who holds it. Just as it is obviously a serious matter if a political leader is 
mistaken about something, it is just as serious if an ordinary person is mistaken about his beliefs, 
for superstitions or false beliefs are detrimental to others, including the generations to come. 
Clifford even suggested that every belief will leave its mark upon our character for all time, and 
consequently, false beliefs will inevitably result in immoral character. He concluded that it is of 
ethical importance that we form our beliefs rightly. Clifford also argued that belief is not just an 92 
 
individual matter; any instance of believing for insufficient reasons could possibly corrupt the 
system of belief norms which we depend on. He warned that we will degenerate into savagery if 
individuals got away with either believing wrong things, doing away with testing or inquiring their 
notions. For him, there is a universal ethics for Mankind and one must not allow his own 
gullibility to guide him, or else he lets everyone down. How can others be expected to respect 
our positions, Clifford argued, if we are careless about the truth and believe things simply 
because they are ‘comforting and pleasant’? (Hill, 2007:85) In summary, Clifford said that it is 
wrong under any circumstance to believe in something without adequate evidence. To him, 
religious claims can never satisfy the burden of evidence. He pointed out the fact that there are 
many conflicting religious claims, saying that no one has the right to say, for example, that Buddha 
is right and Muhammad wrong. Also, many religious claims appear to be at odds against scientific 
claims. Just as Hume had argued that believing in miracles is never justifiable, given the 
improbability of miracles in contrast to other more plausible explanations, Clifford concluded 
that one can never be justified in having religious faith and it is actually even immoral to be 
religious. (ibid) 
 
The religious believer will undoubtedly view Clifford’s arguments as too exaggerated to 
consider seriously, especially his insistence that immoral behaviour is the inevitable result of 
every false belief. However, Clifford was speaking primarily about believing something on 
insufficient evidence, not about believing something that is contrary to the evidence. Some 
Christians have accepted Clifford’s challenge and tried to demonstrate how Christian belief can, 
in fact, be shown to be correct. CS Lewis’ Mere Christianity, first published in three parts in the 
1940s, was one of the most famous attempt at arguing for more distinctive Christian doctrines in 
modern times. (Hill, 2007:85) Lewis tried to firstly describe what all Christians, regardless of 
denomination, believe and secondly, convince skeptics that these beliefs were true. The doctrines 
of the Incarnation, atonement and so on were examined by Lewis in the same manner. Similar 
strategies were attempted by Presbyterian theologian Francis Schaeffer and Orthodox 
philosopher Richard Swinburne.  
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To believe on epistemic reasons means believing based on reasons that make doctrines 
likely. To believe on beneficial reasons is to believe on reasons that benefit the believer and 
others. Some Christians have argued that Clifford missed an important point. Clifford’s argument 
for basing belief only on epistemic reasons was itself a moral one. (Martin, 1991:19) Hence, in an 
ironic way, his reason for not using beneficial reasons in justifying belief was apparently based on 
one type of beneficial reason - namely the undesirable moral consequences of doing so. In 
addition, Clifford should have argued that there is an independent epistemological duty to base 
one’s beliefs on purely epistemic reasons. One is being epistemologically irresponsible if he does 
not so base them. Under some circumstances this epistemological duty may have to yield to 
moral considerations. (ibid) But this in no way means there is no epistemological duty that must 
be outweighed by moral considerations. Although Clifford offers strong moral grounds why in 
general this suspension is impermissible, he does not take into consideration the initial 
epistemological duty that these reasons must outweigh. (p.19) 
 
Others have objected to Clifford’s views on the grounds that very few people are 
converts of Christianity by virtue of their being persuaded by evidence of any kind. While 
attempting to present Christian doctrines rationally gives the Christian the reassurance that he 
does not believe something foolish, those who are not already committed to the truth of these 
doctrines being defended will hardly allow themselves to be convinced by such arguments in their 
defense. (Hill, 2007:87) If God really exists, why is the evidence not more plain and simple? The 
faith believer has recourse to saying that any evidence at all can probably be rationalised or 
explained away anyway as long as a person objects to any possibility of there being a God. All the 
evidence of Martians existing, for example, would convince no one if people already conclude 
that Martians cannot possibly exist. The tendency on the part of some of us is to demand more 
evidence even in the face of overwhelming evidence. Would the performance of an undeniable 
miracle in the skeptic’s presence be enough? How clear then, we ask, does the evidence have to 
be before people would universally recognise the existence of the God of the Bible? The radical 
fideist can thus say that even if he should grant that we need evidence that proves God’s 
existence, no matter how clear the evidence is made by God, it will never be sufficient for some. 
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view. Finally, genuinely religious people do not believe that statements such as ‘there is a God’ 
are true in the same manner that they believe that such statements as ‘The earth goes around the 
sun’ are true. (ibid) A genuine understanding of faith is one that really gets to the heart of what it 
is like to have faith. Faith is not simply intellectual assent; it involves much more than that – it 
involves an attitude of the whole person, not merely the mind.  
 
I think Clifford missed the mark when he considered to faith as ‘a bright mirage’. Reason 
explains and justifies what we already believe, but to me it seems wrong to say that one should 
never believe in something that is not proven. Not every given that we live our lives by can be 
proven. It is entirely within expectations that some people should be uncomfortable with the idea 
of what they deem as blind faith; it is immensely difficult for them to believe in that which they 
feel they cannot prove. However, as Kierkegaard says, everyone already has faith, and this need 
not be religious in nature. Faith empowers a person, and those with an authentic faith in the 
rewards of God are likely to be willing and eager to live their lives accordingly. Because faith is 
much more fundamental and instinctive, in this sense it may be said to be empowering. The level 
of fulfilment in one’s life then becomes dependent on the way he chooses to align his actions with 
his faith. Any faith based on ‘shoulds’ and which is devoid of personal passion is, in my view, 
unauthentic and unfulfilling. The important point here is that faith is what gives the believer a 
reason or purpose to live and act as he does. Reasoning will not lead to eternal happiness, and 
even if the believer should grant that his faith is not in the Christian God, spirit, or immortality, 
but faith in science, human greatness or nature’s beauty, the fact that we are where we are 
remains absurd and inexplicable. Hence while here we do well to set our hearts and sights on 
that which empowers and fulfils us. 
 
While Clifford argued that it is unethical to believe in that which one cannot prove with 
evidence, William James argued that we can rely on faith even when there is no proof available. 
James argued that it is psychologically impossible to hold oneself back from believing things that 
he cannot prove. In particular, religious claims demand a response one way or the other. James’ 
‘The Will to Believe’ was in many ways a response to Clifford’s essay and he sets out to make a 
philosophical justification for faith. (Flew, 1984:39) James offered a few definitions. Firstly, a 95 
 
hypothesis is anything that might be offered for us to believe, for example, that it will rain on 
Tuesday, or that little green nymphs rule the earth. Secondly, a live hypothesis is one that we 
have at least some slight tendency to believe. The hypothesis that next Tuesday it will rain is live 
probably because it has some plausibility for you. The hypothesis that little green nymphs rule the 
earth is most likely one that you would rule out, and so therefore it is a dead hypothesis. Thirdly, 
an option is a choice between two hypotheses. Fourthly, a living option is one in which both 
hypothesis are live. Fifthly, a forced option is one in which we have no other live options - where 
the choice between two options is unavoidable if we are to choose at all. Finally, an option is 
momentous if the opportunity is unique, or the stakes are significant or the decision irreversible.  
 
A momentous choice would include going on a ‘one time only’ outing with one’s dream 
date. The choice between watching one television programme or another would be trivial. Two 
objectives typically motivate one’s forming a belief - one is to find the truth and the other is to 
avoid error, and these are separable. One can avoid error by never making up one’s mind, but in 
doing so one will never believe the truth, because one will always believe in nothing. James 
argued against Clifford’s reasoning that we should believe nothing where there is a chance we will 
believe in error. He claimed there are worse things than being deceived, namely, going through 
life with an ‘excessive nervousness’, always searching for proofs. This would be a life based on 
avoidance that runs counter to our passionate nature. (King, 2004:131) 
 
James pointed out that in order for a hypothesis to be ‘live’ for us, the will and passion 
do and must play a part. Our beliefs are usually based on ‘faith in someone else’s faith’, so logic 
and rational proof have little influence on what we believe. Even scientists, James contended, are 
often passionate about their favourite hypotheses. James wanted to address how we should form 
our beliefs, and arguing that it is acceptable to let passion influence belief when we are faced with 
a living option that cannot be resolved on rational grounds alone (for example the belief in a 
higher power or a belief in the inherent goodness of Man). In these cases, one has a right to 
believe in that which would empower him. (ibid) Logic or proof cannot always offer answers to 
moral questions; such questions begin and end with one’s will and passions. In other words, 96 
 
where evidence is unclear or unavailable, people have the right to believe the better story rather 
than the worse: 
 
‘…(T)his command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, and 
courage, and wait - acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religion were 
not true - till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect and senses working 
together may have raked in evidence enough, - this command, I say, seems to me 
the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. To this I add, why 
wait for evidence to will our own experience of fulfilment if that evidence will 
never come?’ (http://falcon.jmu.edu/~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html)  
 
General beneficial arguments like those offered by William James for the existence of 
God offer no unique reason for accepting the Christian God over other supernatural beings. 
(Martin, 1991:21) In addition, whether someone would be better off believing in Christianity’s 
truths instead of those of Islam or Judaism really is ‘an individual matter that must be decided 
with respect to the particular person’s background’. (ibid) Kierkegaard, as opposed to Clifford 
and James, argued that great merit lies with Christian belief that not only goes beyond the 
evidence but even against it. He rejected any appeal to the traditional arguments for the 
existence of God and any recourse to historical evidence to substantiate the claims of Scripture, 
seeing these as irrelevant to Christian faith. (p.24) He also championed faith as the passion which 
is our basic guide in living. Maintaining that religious faith was more important than reason in 
achieving happiness, and interpreting religious faith as a total and passionate commitment to God, 
he argued that people with this faith completely disregard any doubts that they may have. 
(Martin, 1991:22) Kierkegaard argued that even when the Christian God seems paradoxical and 
absurd, total and passionate commitment to God without adequate evidence for such 
commitment is ultimately necessary for human salvation and happiness.  
 
As mentioned in chapter three, Kierkegaard’s discussed ‘truth’ and ‘subjectivity’ in great 
detail in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Some philosophers unfairly dismiss his argument as 
unworthy of serious attention. This is due largely to a misinterpretation of the pivotal claim, 97 
 
‘truth is subjectivity’, around which nearly the entire work revolves. God Himself is a subject and 
that is central to Kierkegaard’s view of a human’s relation to God. Kierkegaard argued from a 
fideist standpoint that it is not very useful to prove our faith. Instead, as we have seen in chapters 
two and three, he believed the important test for a person is his commitment to faith in spite of 
the absurdity of that faith. One does not require objective reasoning to rationalise passionate 
faith - it is the leap that makes faith worthwhile. Even if through logical analysis it emerges that it 
seems unreasonable that one would believe in God, the passion with which one holds the belief 
leads to greater fulfilment in an his life than any amount of objective evidence could. To 
Kierkegaard, faith is the highest virtue; above reason, improvable with reason, and faith in 
something makes it true - there is no truth beyond that. I share Kierkegaard’s standpoint that 
believing in God is not a subject for intellectual debate, and we cannot empirically know God or 
investigate His existence objectively. Christianity is about knowing God, in terms of being in a 
relationship with Him; it is not about objective knowledge in terms of knowing about God. The 
urgency of one’s decision hence cannot be underestimated, as subjective knowledge considers 
every delay perilous. If one is simply looking for truth a kind of objective fact, then as Kierkegaard 
rightly said, it will be there when one gets to it, but without being impelled by the urge of 
passion, one is merely ‘rambling on the long road of approximation’.   
 
Martin (1991) says that there are many problems with Kierkegaard’s theory of faith. For 
one, religious faith as Kierkegaard conceives of it can be condemned on ethical grounds. (p.24) 
To allow oneself to be guided by blind, passionate faith is dangerous, yet this is precisely what 
Kierkegaard seems to be advocating. It also appears that Abraham, Kierkegaard’s model of a 
knight of faith, is a fanatic who was even willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac. History has shown that 
fanaticism can and does lead to unimaginable harm, and it was Walter Kaufmann who called 
fanaticism ‘one of the scourges of humanity’. (ibid) Faith, as Kierkegaard conceived of it, is in that 
case a vice and not a virtue as soon as one contemplates the unspeakable destruction stemming 
from the many wars waged by opposing sides that cleave blindly to the rightness of their cause. 
With such great social harm that can and has stemmed from blind faith that culminates in 
fanaticism, Martin argues, Kierkegaard is definitely mistaken in his view of religious faith. (ibid) 
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reconciling it with the view of a benevolent God. It seems inconceivable that an all-good and all-
loving God would demand that his creatures ‘have blind faith in Him despite adequate evidence 
let alone with negative evidence’. (ibid) Equally inconceivable would be the idea of an all-good 
God who wants his creatures to be fanatics particularly when there is good reason (and 
evidence) for our supposing that the result of fanaticism is human suffering of massive 
proportions. Hence it would seem that Kierkegaard’s model of faith is not someone that an all-
good God would desire or reward. Martin further argues that there are also other grounds for 
thinking that God would not want his creatures to have faith in Kierkegaard’s sense. According 
to Kierkegaard, given that Christianity is absurd and paradoxical, and that one should have faith in 
improbabilities and absurdities, one should have faith in the Christian God. But there may well be 
other religious beliefs that are even more absurd and improbable in comparison with Christianity. 
(ibid, p.24) 
 
Suppose the critic concedes that Kierkegaard is right in suggesting that some sort of 
subjectivity is possible only through the heightening of passion, that ‘paradox and passion are a 
mutual fit’, and that the greater the paradox one can summon the passion to affirm, the more 
complete one’s subjectivity of this sort will be. Nevertheless, there are clear grounds for 
questioning his view that this is a desirable sort of subjectivity that constitutes the fullest possible 
realisation of Man’s essential nature. And even if Kierkegaard is right that for an existing human 
being, the attainment of complete objectivity and rationality is neither possible nor desirable, it 
seems we can accept this point without swinging totally in the opposite direction. And suppose, 
the critic adds, we grant that it is impossible for an existing human being to achieve an eternal 
happiness unless he takes a leap of faith and accepts that the Absolute Paradox is true. But what 
this merely implies is the necessity of affirming a particular paradoxical proposition for the 
purpose of achieving this end, and not the desirability of affirming the greatest paradox imaginable, 
simply because it is the greatest paradox possible. In his preoccupation with the paradoxical, 
Kierkegaard seems to have overlooked what it means to exist as truly human, doing the very 
thing he accuses Hegel of doing. It may be possible to not accord such prominence to ‘passion’ 
and ‘paradox’ in the process of becoming subjective, but the fact they do have such a position in 99 
 
Kierkegaard’s discussion points to a very evidently one-sided view of Man’s nature that could 
potentially be more subversive than Hegel’s.  
 
In response to the above objections, even if we concede that Kierkegaard has a highly 
specific notion of what it means to truly exist as a human being, he understood firstly the 
possibility of living other than along these lines and secondly, the alternative ways in which people 
may live their lives. He readily acknowledged that most people definitely do not achieve the 
specific sort of existence he advocated, and examined what he deemed to be the most common 
modes of existence which they can adopt. Indeed, he not only described these modes, but also 
further subjected them to scrutiny both in their ‘existential tenability and in their essential 
adequacy’ (Hall, 1993:57). Also, he presented these modes not merely as different and isolated 
alternatives, but as a clear but not rigidly ordered developmental sequence. As Carlisle (2006) 
says, Kierkegaard believed it can be demonstrated philosophically that the ultimate in subjectivity 
is attainable only through belief in the paradox of the Incarnation. (p.68) Genuine individuality and 
a truly lasting happiness are attainable by an existing human being only if he succeeds in relating 
himself to God. He acknowledged, however, that to understand this philosophically is a different 
thing from actually taking the leap of faith into a God-relationship. Since the reality of God and 
the Incarnation are matters that cannot be rationally argued for, it seems that while Kierkegaard 
has highlighted three different modes of religious existence, he has not shown that the God 
relationship on which they depend is actually possible, because to do so, he would have had to 
establish the reality of God. Consequently, he has also not demonstrated the actual possibility of 
the sort of individuality and true enduring happiness that presuppose the attainment of a God-
relationship.  
 
To the above criticisms, we can nevertheless maintain that Kierkegaard has successfully 
shown and awakened us to the fact that human life must eventually culminate in despair in the 
absence of the attainment of an adequate God-relationship, even if he has not argued that despair 
can actually be eliminated through this relationship, since its central presupposition that God 
exists, cannot, and need not be proven. (ibid) A popular myth concerning Kierkegaard’s work is 
that he was advocating irrational thinking and discounting the importance of clear and honest 100 
 
thinking. While Kierkegaard did deny the power of reason to yield universal and objective truth 
in matters of value, one must study his entire philosophical framework before jumping to the 
conclusion that he is an irrationalist par excellence. For Kierkegaard, the life of faith is simply one 
in which the individual makes the decision to bear with and overcome dread and despair. Faith 
requires acceptance of the paradoxical nature of religion. Because God is subjectivity and we do 
not know what to expect or what is expected of us, we take the leap of faith with fear and 
trembling. There is no certainty on our part that whether Christ is God, or that there is a God 
who looks after us as a perfect Father would. It is in this respect that through an act of faith we 
accept the absurd claims of Christianity as actualities (and not mere possibilities) that will guide 
our lives and give us hope. Seen in this way, there would be nothing irrational with Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy.  
 
The critic can ask, ‘What about the person who believes wrongly, even if passionately?’ 
Kierkegaard would answer that as long as there is true passion, a person will ultimately be led to 
the truth. He claims that ‘he who with quiet introspection is honest before God and concerned 
for himself, the Deity saves from being in error…him the Deity leads by the suffering of 
inwardness to the truth.’ (O’Hara, 2004:73) Kierkegaard acknowledged that ‘to exist in truth, so 
that our existence becomes saturated with consciousness – to be eternal, as if far beyond 
existence, at the same time as being in it yet in the process of becoming – that really is difficult.’ 
(ibid, p.74) But he deemed the struggle worthwhile: ‘Nature, the totality of created things, is the 
work of God. And yet God is not there; but within the individual man there is a potentiality (Man 
is potentially spirit) which is awakened in inwardness to become a God-relationship, and then it 
becomes possible to see God everywhere.’ (O’Hara, 2004:73) For Kierkegaard, such attempts at 
rational justification fail simply because the gulf between the finite man and infinite God renders 
any rational bridge between the two pointless. Man cannot reason his way into the presence of 
God, any more than a mathematician could calculate his way to infinity. For Kierkegaard, what is 
important therefore is not our conception of God but the passion with which we believe in Him.  
 
Kierkegaard presented an analysis of possible modes of religious existence, all of which 
involve God relationships of some sort, and said these modes are possible. He asked us to 101 
 
consider the consequences for human self-realisation and happiness, on the assumption that they 
are possible, and the consequences if one does not achieve them. For Kierkegaard, the leap 
cannot be made with confidence but rather only in fear and trembling as it involves risking 
everything on that which is uncertain, improbable and even absurd, in the case of Christianity. 
Hence Kierkegaard’s title for the book in which he presents his analysis of the person with faith, 
‘the knight of faith’, is Fear and Trembling. The knight of faith is conscious of the possibility of 
error in such a commitment but there is no anxiety due to this possibility. The knight keeps well 
in mind that according to objective reasoning, that is, reasoning that would be accepted by all (or 
almost all) intelligent, fair-minded and sufficiently informed persons to have established its 
conclusion as true or probably true, belief in God is not justified. (Martin, 1991:23) Nevertheless, 
it is precisely because it is not based on objective reasoning that faith is the highest virtue. 
Objective certainty leads to spiritual stagnation or a lack of personal growth. With faith, there is 
risk, ‘danger’ and adventure, all crucial for spiritual growth and transcendence. He invited us to 
take the leap of faith ourselves, maintaining that nothing short of this leap will make us both truly 
human and truly happy. Kierkegaard also added that faith is an individual choice. Contemporaries 
of Jesus encountered the same difficulties as Kierkegaard’s contemporaries faced (and we face 
today). What happened before is of no consequence, and we all must now make a choice. 
(O’Hara, 2004:51) I feel that insofar as there is no element of compulsion in Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy, and every individual is given the choice, Kierkegaard’s philosophy is acceptable. And 
Kierkegaard is certainly clear that if there is no God, this leap is ridiculous, and the result is a life 
of despair and untruth. We do not know whether God exists. This is why we must question 
whether or not we believe. If there were proof, what need would we have for faith? Would a 
God whose existence was demonstrable still be God? (Comte-Sponville, 2000:70) Even if the 
proofs of God’s existence point to the existence of something necessary, absolute, eternal, 
infinite and so on, they fail to prove that this something is a God in the sense in which most 
religions use the word: ‘not simply a being but a person, not a reality but a cause, not a 
something but someone, not only a Principle but a Father’. (ibid, p.79) 
 
The opposite of despair is faith, said Kierkegaard. God is the only possible Being who 
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knowledge of Him, and this is possible only through reason, revelation or grace. But as Comte-
Sponville (2000) says, ‘the philosopher’s God matters less to most of us than the God of the 
prophets, the mystics or believers’. (ibid) Reason is becoming increasingly ineffectual in matters 
concerning religious belief. Kierkegaard goes to the essential point more effectively than 
Descartes or Leibniz: God is an object of faith rather than of cognition, or rather, a subject, giving 
Himself only through revelation and love. God is ‘more mystery than concept, more question 
than fact, more a wager than an experience, and more a hope than a thought’. (ibid, p.80) God as 
a postulate helps us overcome despair and it is why hope, like faith, is a theological virtue, since it 
postulates God as its object. Of what use, says the fideist, are arguments that leave no room for 
hope? To overcome existential dread and despair, Kierkegaard saw hope as being offered by the 
Christian promise of eternal life. 
 
The critic might object that God is not so much a truth (the object of knowledge) as a 
value (the object of a desire). But for the fideist, to believe in Him is to believe that this supreme 
love is also the supreme truth (God) that cannot be proven or refuted, but which can be thought, 
hoped and believed. God is the combination of truth and goodness, and in this sense the standard 
for all truths. At this highest level, what is desirable equates with what is intelligible and it is this 
identity, if it exists, which is God. There appears no better explanation that God alone can fulfill 
or console us absolutely. Even Heidegger admits, in an extremely puzzling statement in an 
interview late in his life: ‘Only a God could save us’. We must therefore believe, says the fideist – 
or renounce salvation. We should note that this is why belief in God has meaning and offers 
meaning: firstly, without Him ‘all meaning falters on the madness of death, and secondly, there 
can be meaning only for a subject and absolute meaning only for an absolute subject. God is the 
meaning of meaning, and in that sense, the opposite of despair’. (ibid, p.82) 
 
There are those who consciously or unconsciously hold the assumption that if a 
statement cannot be proved in a laboratory by the scientific method, it is untrustworthy, 
unreliable and hence unacceptable. Such individuals always look upon statements that must be 
accepted by faith as highly suspect. Biologist E.O. Wilson illustrates this position when in his 
book, On Human Nature, he writes, ‘The final decisive edge enjoyed by scientific naturalism will 103 
 
come from its capacity to explain traditional religion, its chief competitor, as a wholly material 
phenomenon’. (Little, 2000:114) The fideist can reply by saying that surely there are means other 
than the laboratory for the attainment of real knowledge. The process of falling in love, for 
example, does not stem from a laboratory with a battery of instruments, yet anyone who has 
ever experienced it would be the very last to concede that their knowledge of love is uncertain 
or unreal. (ibid) The point is that true, rationally justified beliefs can be located in many fields 
outside of science, and the method of science has validity only for those realities measurable in 
physical terms. (ibid, p.115) God, in contrast, is a different kind of reality from the world of 
nature examined by science. While God is a personal Being revealed in history who can be 
known personally, insofar as God is also, paradoxically, a Spiritual Being existing outside of time 
and space, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that His existence can be proven through the 
scientist’s empirical investigations.  
 
As Little (2000) further points out, many have come to recognise that science cannot 
make value judgments about the things it measures. (p.116) Many who are in the forefront of 
scientific work are increasingly noting that there is nothing inherent in science that guides them in 
the ‘application of the discoveries they make’.(ibid) Also, it appears that science can reveal how 
something works but not why it works in a particular way. Science holds no answer, for example, 
to the question of whether there is any purpose in the universe. We are dependent on 
revelation, eventually, for many kinds of information, without which we will not arrive at a 
complete picture. Carl Sagan once made the religious pronouncement that ‘the cosmos is all that 
is or ever was or ever will be…Whatever significance we humans have is that which we make 
ourselves…and if we must worship a power greater than ourselves, does it not make sense to 
worship the sun and the stars?’ To this, we can readily ask why we would ever worship nature if, 
as Sagan himself states, it is ‘the result of blind chance and part of a pointless process’. (ibid, 
p.114)  
 
God does not ask us to understand but just to trust Him in the same way a child is 
asked to trust his parents’ love and care when they bring him to the doctor. There is comfort 
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to show us ‘the edges will be great’. (ibid, p.142) Carl Jung once said, ‘The central neurosis of our 
time is emptiness.’ For the believer, God in Christ gives his life cosmic purpose, binding him with 
His purpose for eternity. Even routine is transformed as we live the whole of our lives in God’s 
purpose. This eternal purpose then permeates every aspect of life. (ibid, p.167) There is much 
power in this hope for an age where life has frequently been described as meaningless, and I 
agree with Kierkegaard that fulfilment for the believer comes only in God. The Christian 
experience offers this fulfilment in a personal relationship to Christ, for the one who experiences 
Christ arrives at inner contentment, joy and spiritual refreshment that enable him to transcend all 
circumstances. It is also this supernatural reality that helps the believer to find cause for rejoicing 
in the midst of adversity.  
 
Faith remains the most important task to be achieved by the believer today, and on the 
grounds of faith alone does the believer realise his true self, the very self that God judges for 
eternity. The subjective approach to justifying Christian belief accentuates the uniqueness of the 
Christian experience. For advocates of this approach, the religious experience is self-validating, 
with the experience itself able to stand as its own proof, and the believer’s faith can already be 
deemed tangible proof of God. Kierkegaard is right that true faith demands passionate 
commitment in the face of objective uncertainty, and that if this very faith were to lose its 
passion, then as he said in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ‘proof becomes necessary in order 
to command respect from unbelief’. (p.31) For the religious believer, the leap of faith cannot be 
half-hearted, because it lies at the heart of all life.  
 
Diametrically opposed to the strong rationalist who holds that no religious belief is 
justified without conclusive logical or scientific proof that the belief in question is factually true, 
Kierkegaard saw religious beliefs as beyond the reach of analytical methods such as logic and 
science, and that such beliefs therefore cannot and should not be challenged by them. As Walsh 
(2005) notes: 
 
‘As Kierkegaard / Anti-Climacus sees it...the possibility of offense is precisely what 
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think they are defending Christianity by removing the possibility of offense and 
making Christianity commensurable with human conceptions and expectations. 
Substituting doubt in place of offense, they convert the problem of entry into faith 
into a matter of overcoming one’s intellectual reservations about Christianity 
rather than offense at its incommensurability. Then they propose to do away with 
this supposed obstacle to faith by showing the reasonableness of Christianity and 
providing proofs of its truth. In Kierkegaard’s view, however, this procedure 
compromises and abrogates Christianity. The more one tries to defend 
Christianity by making it reasonable, mundane and worldly, the more one distorts 
and finally abolishes it.’ (p.53)   
 
I agree with Walsh that when the speculative philosophers remove the element of 
offense from Christianity, they inevitably also eliminate what they set out to defend and preserve, 
which is Christianity itself. In Kierkegaard’s estimation, whatever leads one to reject Christianity 
is ‘precisely what preserves its qualitative peculiarity, and the factors in Christianity that raise the 
possibility of offense are in turn preserved by it.’ (Ibid) For Kierkegaard, then, complete freedom 
and selfhood are realisable in Christ. Even though one could not know God, he has to act as if he 
is absolutely certain of his existence, in an intimately personal relationship. One has to believe 
that God is totally familiar and immediately present. On the last page of Either/Or, Kierkegaard 
wrote that ‘only the truth that builds up is the truth for thee’. In the final analysis, even if the 
fideist is unable to specify what counts as his justification for saying he believes because he wants 
to believe, this should not be perceived as meaning he is irrational. I have pointed out amply that 
few come to embrace the Christian faith through a process of logical proof. We may believe very 
sincerely that God exists, but producing proof is quite another matter. The believer’s faith is 
different from his scientific beliefs about the world. The believer’s faith allows him to make sense 
of the world he lives in and gives meaning to his life. I feel the Kierkegaardian view that genuine 
religious knowledge is grounded in faith beyond reason is defensible. Christian faith is not and has 
never been about articulating church dogma. Nor is it simply a set of ideas to be logically 
constructed and evaluated. Its truth is not contingent on human reason, even though it is through 106 
 
our minds that we recognise its truth. It is the highest virtue one can reach, a matter of 
subjectivity and individual passion that is unmediated by the clergy or human artifacts.  
 
To conclude, in this chapter we have considered at length the justifications for the 
fideistic standpoint. Those who do not see the significance, as Kierkegaard does, of the 
intensification of subjectivity, the achievement of radical individuality and the attainment of an 
enduring happiness, will remain unconvinced by his evaluation of the different modes of existence 
in his phenomenology of spiritual development. Given how his examination of these modes in 
terms of these factors is crucial to his arranging them in order, rejecting his criteria of evaluation 
would also mean not seeing them as ordered stages of spiritual development, and the whole 
pattern of spiritual development as Kierkegaard envisages it. Even if Kierkegaard’s criteria of 
evaluation are rejected, it seems to me that his discussion of the various modes of existence is 
still significant, as there are many insights to be drawn concerning arranging our lives in coherent 
ways. For this reason, his writings have exerted such great influence upon subsequent 
existentialist philosophers, although few have embraced his particular form of Christianity. In 
closing, it is worthwhile pointing out that in any attempt to justify one’s religious belief, we can 
only be assured of partial success. It may well be that radical fideism remains unable to stand up 
to deeper scrutiny; but absolute success is never a guarantee when the issue concerns the realms 
of the fundamentally mysterious.  
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Chapter Five: How One Believes is as Important as What One Believes 
 
There are those find the idea of accepting religious faith without any proof or evidence 
intimidating or at least uncomfortable, but for a true fideist there is no problem with the absence 
of proof, and he may well revel in this fact. The important point worth noting is that for a sincere 
religious believer, the most fundamental assumptions are found in the religious belief-system 
itself. Religious faith itself is the foundation of one’s life, and, in Paul Tillich’s words, one’s 
‘ultimate concern’. (Peterson et al, 2003:45) This being the case, it comes across to the believer 
as a terrible mistake that we should be testing or evaluating our faith by means of an external, 
rational standard. For the believer, evaluating the Word of God by logic or science amounts not 
only to the absence of true faith, it also reflects that it is essentially science or logic we are 
worshipping instead of God. Rather than turning  to arguments and evidence that support a belief 
in God, the answer to how one can come to have faith is through committing oneself, taking the 
leap of faith and believing without having or wanting any reasons (or evidence) for demonstrating 
the truth of one’s belief. (ibid) As pointed out in the previous chapter, it is important to note that 
although Kierkegaard insists that philosophical concepts are unable to do justice to the meaning 
of Christianity, this does not lead him to altogether dismiss philosophy, but rather, to expand it. 
(Carlisle, 2006:153) 
 
There will always be those who claim that because the matter of faith is tinged with 
sacredness, critical inquiry into it stirs undesirable doubt and almost seems disrespectful. 
Certainly, the decision to believe or disbelieve in God is of deep personal significance and in fact, 
I began this thesis by saying that one of the traditional philosophical questions has been whether 
it is reasonable to believe that God exists; what exactly does it mean for us to believe or not to 
believe in God? I have also pointed out that from the scientific perspective, such penetrating 
questions about God's existence afford no ready answer, and are plainly not answerable. Religion 
does not pose us problems analysable (or solvable) with the instruments of observation and logic, 
because these questions are simply too subjective and personal for us to reach a collective 
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towards appreciating the importance of such issues as being in a dynamic relationship with God, 
something argued for at length by Kierkegaard. 
 
For thousands of years, great thinkers of every generation have advanced both proofs of 
the existence of God and valid refutations of these proofs. We discussed earlier that if God does 
exist, a momentous set of consequences ensues, particularly if we do enter another life once this 
one ceases. Given that this life becomes a mere preparation for Eternity, we must then aim to 
live our lives throughout with this future in view. In this concluding chapter, we consider a few 
final arguments against fideism to see if some sort of defense could be mounted against them. 
Throughout this thesis, I have maintained that God is beyond human comprehension and that 
between what we think and say about God and what He is in Himself, there will always be a clear 
disproportion. In these final paragraphs, I remain mindful aware of this disproportion. I feel that in 
any attempt to justify the believer’s faith and God’s ways to Man, the greatness of the Divine 
Being will not be able to be fully grasped by finite human minds. It may also well be the case that 
even after we are done with our utmost thinking, God’s thoughts still remain higher than ours.  
 
Antony Flew (1984) once asked if there are events that would qualify as sufficient 
evidence against the existence of God to compel the believer to stop believing. Flew opines that 
for believers, nothing would, and that believers will continue to believe in God regardless of how 
circumstances on Earth unfold. (p.72) Whatever arguments advanced against theistic belief, 
believers will persist in believing just as before; God will still be viewed as a loving Father even if a 
believer were to witness, say, a plane crashing into a skyscraper and killing thousands. Flew is 
right in the observation that adverse circumstances or outright evil will not be viewed by the 
Christian theist as falsifying faith. This is so because there is a non-evidentialist sense in the way 
he believes that God exists. As Thompson (2007) says, the believer is ‘not necessarily being 
difficult or illogical, it is just that the basic belief lies below the level of logical argument and 
touches an experience that is independent of subsequent interpretation’. (p.67) It is also likely 
that Christians will cite a personal answer when called upon to justify their faith in an Entity that 
defies logical justification. They will declare independent grounds for belief in God’s goodness, 
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comfort, experienced a lifting of their burdens, and felt an enduring, sustaining presence. In fact, 
to the question of why believe that there is a God at all, the fideist response seems likely to be 
that presupposing God exists offers an explanation of the purpose behind our world; why there 
is the opportunity to shape our character and the environment in which we live; why a well-
authenticated account of Christ’s life, death and resurrection exists; why laws of science exist; 
why throughout the ages men have had the apparent experience of God’s guidance and so on. 
(ibid) Hence it is the case that the hypothesis of God’s existence helps the believer make sense of 
his whole experience more effectively than any other explanation that can be propounded, and 
for him this alone is sufficient justification for believing it to be true.  
 
Empiricism says that properly inferred or deduced knowledge must ultimately be derived 
from one's sense-based experience. Hence it does not hold that we automatically have empirical 
knowledge. For those who advocate that there is no God, this belief that our physical senses can 
experience all that is knowable, is a very ‘scientific’ and liberating philosophy. For the religious, 
faith’s affirmations are seen as more encompassing, more fundamental and self-grounding than 
others and do not need validation by rational insight or argument. For the faith believer, even 
though we do not experience God through any of our five physical senses, his assurance is 
derived from knowing, believing, and following a God who is true, not from assiduously working 
out logical arguments. In that respect, religion is to be understood in a non-cognitive way. Indeed, 
the merit of faith is seen as diminished if belief steps in only if reasons are offered. The fideist’s 
quest for God calls for passion and inwardness, and in turning to faith, he concedes the non-
rationality of his belief, and further to this, faith would be unnecessary if he had evidence strong 
enough to eradicate reasonable doubt of God’s existence. The assurance of the believer also 
stems from the awareness and conclusion that a loving God does exist who can be known in an 
intimate, personal way. Thus faith affirms a living God’s presence and accessibility to the believer 
by means of direct prayer, demanding no proof that can establish that He cannot be conceived of 
as such. The fideist would also say that even if we grant that one may have reasons based stoutly 
on the demonstrations of God’s existence, he should be willing to believe on God’s authority 
alone.  
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Fideistic approaches to religion give the believer a justification for viewing philosophical 
analysis and metaphysical ambiguities as mere intellectual endeavours that do not cultivate or 
deepen a belief in or relationship with God. The fideist’s belief in God is a choice, and his faith in 
God is an active trust firstly in life’s underlying goodness and secondly in the fact that God stays 
with the believers even if empirical evidence points to the contrary. Christian belief is hence 
based on hope and love because this is the example lived supremely by Christ. It is worth noting 
too that there is equal validity in the choice of unbelief, and refusing the choice also constitutes 
unbelief. Atheism and nihilism are in that respect also real choices. Since faith entails belief in the 
absence of rational demonstration, all propositions of faith, regardless of their specific content, 
are, as mentioned previously, non-rational. It is also true that the more we come to know God, 
the less we are able to ‘grasp’ Him with our reason. The critic can object by saying that if God is 
a caring, faithful Father who reveals Himself to humanity, it seems almost a paradox that God is 
present while at the same time seems not to be. His hiddenness can be seen as baffling. In fact, 
Christians are sometimes ridiculed for believing in a Being they have never seen, and atheists 
often liken faith in God to believing in Santa Claus, a belief that is acceptable in the case 
of children, but surely not in the case of mature, rational adults.  
 
In New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955), Anthony Flew presented a story 
(originally devised by John Wisdom) to examine ‘the limits to which one could go in qualifying a 
statement whilst claiming that it was true’. (Thompson, 2007:45) In this story, two explorers 
stumble upon a jungle clearing that has a mixture of flowers and weeds. One explorer claims 
there is a gardener who comes to tend it, while the other says there is no such gardener. Since 
no gardener appears, they devise different tests to check for this invisible gardener’s presence. In 
the end, one explorer still thinks there is an invisible, intangible, silent gardener who is 
undetectable by any means. (ibid) The other, in frustration and unable to draw any distinction 
between such a gardener and an imaginary gardener or no gardener at all, asks, ‘Just how does 
what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener 
or even from no gardener at all? (Flew, 1984:74) Indeed, what difference does it make if your 
mysterious gardener exists? You have qualified him out of existence. All we can say about him is 
that he is unlike any gardener we have ever encountered. He has no body, uses no tools, is seen 111 
 
by no one, acts without being physically present, and the like. In fact, we do not know what he is 
like; and you do not even have the right, without some sort of test, to claim he is a gardener or 
has any specific qualities at all. Therefore, you cannot use your belief in this gardener to explain 
anything that goes on in the garden. So why not forget about him?’ Hence the claim that there is 
a gardener ‘dies the death of a thousand qualifications’. (Thompson, 2007:45) From this parable 
of the Skeptic and Believer, some dominant themes and discussions have emerged. In it, we see 
how what begins as an assertion that something exists or that there is some analogy between 
certain complexes of phenomena, ‘may be reduced step by step to an altogether different status, 
to an expression perhaps of a picture preference’. (Flew, 1984:72) Firstly, insofar as one explorer 
interprets the clearing as a garden while the other does not, we can say experience involves 
interpretation. Facts alone do not determine how something is interpreted. Secondly, one’s 
interpretation leads to commitment; one explorer chooses to view the world in a particular way, 
and he commits to that view. This has a bearing on the manner by which subsequent evidence is 
assessed. The other explorer is unwilling to abandon the claim that there is a gardener because 
this is not just a hypothesis for him, but a matter of faith. (Thompson, 2007:45) 
  
The above story is undoubtedly a potent objection to religious faith. If there are no 
possible tests for God’s existence, how does believing in God differ from, say, believing that there 
is an invisible creature clinging on to me at this very instant? Also, we cannot conclude if a claim 
is true unless and until we know what we mean by a concept contained in the claim. For instance, 
how can I go hunting for say, ‘wisywigs’, unless I knew what they looked like or what properties 
they are supposed to have? And if I cannot even describe the properties of ‘wisywigs’, then 
besides my not being able to find one (given that I could not recognise something as a ‘wisywig’ 
even if one was right before me at this instant, I would not know what it is that I am looking for. 
In the same vein, if we do not know what we mean by God, or what it means to be infinite and 
eternal, how would we know what it would be like to encounter such a Being? Kierkegaard 
speaks of the leap of faith in which we embrace a Being that is infinite and eternal. Yet if we do 
not know what these terms mean, might our leap not be tantamount to a leap in the dark?  
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The fideist, in reply to the above, can say something like this: The story suggests we can 
describe literally what is ‘real’, since, as Thompson (2007) says, the ‘gardener’ in question dies the 
death of becoming gradually less literally a gardener. (p.45) However, where it concerns God, 
many believers would readily say that a God who literally exists would certainly not be the sort 
of God they are referring to. For example, God could be described as ‘Being itself’ rather than as 
‘a being’. Reason seeks knowledge that encompasses logical processes, intuition, insight and the 
psychological elements within the process of knowing. Religious faith, in contrast, is opposed to 
reason as an authority that is superior and independent. Even though God is beyond rational 
explanation, the believer’s belief in Him is what enables him to make sense of the world around 
him and offers meaning to the evidence of a cause, a purpose and the moral values he finds 
surrounding him. And this belief does seem to respond to his questions differently from other 
forms of belief system. The believer can also add that the personal transformation he witnesses in 
his own life and the lives of many others who have placed their faith in God is what eventually 
(and sufficiently) convinces him that his faith in God is real. This, I feel, would already be good 
justification for religious belief. The believer can further add that if belief in God makes a 
difference in the life of the person who believes in him (as Kierkegaard advocated), then this 
alone adequately justifies faith. Faith does not eliminate contradictions and absurdities. Rather, 
through faith one believes in spite of contradictions and absurdities. One’s faith in God as a 
believer is an active trust that God exists for him even if evidence points against that. And when 
one takes a leap of faith, he embraces the religious message passionately, unconditionally, 
absolutely, without reservation or doubt, even if this message is absurd and cannot be 
understood by mere human intellect. In one’s leap of faith, he is making this message his own, and 
starts to live as though he is eternally standing in God’s presence. The religious message is hence 
true for the believer not simply in the way any plain fact about the world is true. 
 
In witnessing how this world is fraught with needless pain and suffering, at times we do 
feel an overwhelming sense that life is meaningless. In our despair we often question the purpose 
of behind this and the reason for our being here. The believer’s faith in God could be said 
therefore to constitute a stand against this world's reality. It is a belief that there is a purpose to 
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Himself. This fundamental Christian belief in a deeper reality, a purpose and meaning to all life, 
can never be based on absolute certainty, appearances and reason, but on trust in the goodness 
that underlies life in the plain face of opposing evidence. As pointed out in the earlier paragraphs, 
it is equally based on hope and love because this is the example lived by Jesus Christ.  
 
Opponents to the above view might still insist that since God cannot be seen or 
touched, and His existence can neither be proved nor disproved by scientific or philosophical 
study, it seems strange for the believer to put his trust in Him. One might even ask is there is 
indeed any point in attempting to make sense of something that is beyond sense by definition. 
However, from the faith believer’s perspective, it seems difficult to dispense with or dispose of 
God as a ‘useless’ concept, like the ether in physics. While we lack hard evidence supporting 
God's existence, many have opted to have faith in Him anyway perhaps because they understand 
that believing in God has a positive effect on their lives. Believing in God seems to offer 
significance and assign value to human life, despite its fragility. It is in this sense that we note how 
religion has an appeal as it offers values by which to live and hence a basis for morality. This also 
explains why it continues to flourish despite abundant problems and criticisms. As Thompson 
(2007) rightly puts, religious beliefs continue not because there is some intellectual conclusion 
reached about their validity, but because people benefit from them. People draw comfort from it 
in times of difficulty and loss, and turn to it for guidance in moments of indecision. (p.150) One 
could say (as William James would) that ‘beliefs do not work because they are true, but that they 
are true because they work’. (ibid, p.31) Also, besides the changes the believer witnesses in his 
own life and the lives of others, the believer is open to saying that the Bible offers more spiritual 
guidance and ‘makes more sense’ than ignoring it would. Faith, then, can be said to be inspiring, 
positive and motivational. All too often we speak of faith almost as if it is about compelling 
ourselves either to be blind or to gnash our teeth and ‘see’ something that is not there. I feel that 
faith should be seen instead as the place where knowledge, action, and happiness originate. There 
is no need to conceive of faith as if it were our goal instead of starting point. 
 
I argued from the fideist standpoint that if amassing arguments and evidence in favour of 
belief in God is a fruitless endeavour, then a person can only come to have faith through a leap of 114 
 
faith. The fideist says we know from experience that applying reason to problems and challenges 
can be very helpful in mathematics, logic and science. Over this last century, the realisation has 
become more acute that there are many fundamental things that reason simply cannot do. In fact, 
as Geisler (1980) believes, a possible conclusion that can be drawn concerning the relation of 
fideism to present-day concepts of truth would be that few people think reason (including 
science) affords us certain (or definitive) answers to anything. Faith renders it possible for one to 
have religious belief, and must simply step in to plug the gaps in our intellectual and ideological 
life. Where religious beliefs are concerned, there are no adequate rationalistic or probabilistic 
grounds upon which we base them.  
 
John Macquarie once expressed the view that faith in God is a total attitude of the self. 
Indeed, I am of the view that genuine Christian faith is a matter of subjectivity and one’s individual 
passion. Unconditional commitment is essential to faith, and it definitely is not about blind 
adherence to church dogma, or logically evaluating a set of ideas. I feel the Kierkegaardian view 
that genuine religious knowledge is grounded in faith beyond reason is defensible. Kierkegaard is 
right in saying that true faith not only calls for passionate commitment but also commitment in 
the face of objective uncertainty. As the leap of faith lies at the core of the believer’s life, his leap 
therefore cannot be half-hearted, and since only on the basis of faith does the believer have a 
chance to become a true self, it follows that faith is the most significant task of all for the 
believer. God judges this self for eternity. While God is the great Unknown, the believer 
nevertheless has to believe that He is immediately present and completely familiar. We cannot 
know God, but must conduct ourselves as if we are absolutely certain of His existence, in an 
intimate and personal relationship (like one between a son and his father, or even between two 
lovers).  
 
For the strong rationalist, religious belief is never justifiable unless there is conclusive 
logical or scientific proof pointing to the belief being factually true. In diametric opposition to the 
strong rationalist, Kierkegaard saw religious beliefs as beyond the reach of analytical methods 
such as logic and science. While we may believe very sincerely that God exists, offering proof is 
another matter altogether. Nevertheless, many people will continue to demand some form of 115 
 
intellectual support in order to persist in their beliefs. To the rationalist statement that one can 
believe only in those things that can be scientifically proven, the faith believer can reply that there 
are many things in life that undeniably exist but that cannot be scientifically proven. In addition, 
for certain, few come to embrace the Christian faith through a process of logical proof. Where 
the matter concerns one’s salvation, the attempt to understand God (or His actions) runs 
counter to believing in Him, and rationality, I feel, will only hinder faith. This thesis has maintained 
throughout that religious believers will claim that a belief in God is never the result of 
considering a heap of arguments. The religious believer’s leap of faith, which falls outside of the 
whole enterprise of providing justification, is for him weighted and real, definitely demanding an 
act of will, commitment and preparedness. This passionately held faith, other than being very 
different from his scientific beliefs about the world around him, offers him assurance of God’s 
presence, gives his life meaning and hope as well as helps him know God. Seen in this light, I find 
Kierkegaard’s radical faith a defensible justification for religious belief. 
 
For any individual, the highest virtue is the radical trust of faith, as Kierkegaard rightly 
put. His philosophy calls a personal response from the individual, demanding a willingness to turn 
inwards and uncover truths about himself, to exercise choice and most crucial of all, to become 
an authentic human being. (Carlisle, 2006:153) In responding to Kierkegaard one also responds to 
his own condition, and it is in responding to his own condition that he takes total responsibility 
for his life. In order to take responsibility for one’s own life, one has to acknowledge his 
limitations, capability of making mistakes and above all, the necessity for forgiveness. In The Point 
of View for My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard claimed that his philosophy involves attempting 
to communicate the truth about Christianity, clarifying its purpose and meaning. Specifically 
Christian concepts hence underpin his meticulous and earnest analysis of human existence. 
Critics thus at times question the helpfulness of Kierkegaard’s works for the person who is not 
even engaged in the task of becoming a Christian. Indeed, to other religious traditions, are 
Kierkegaard’s views on faith applicable? Also, to people who have a non-religious outlook, how 
would his philosophy be significant or mean anything at all? I feel we can offer a defense here by 
saying that because Kierkegaard discussed religious questions not from the start point of 
dogmatic theological claims but rather from that of an existing individual, some of his ideas can 116 
 
still be of relevance and significance to illuminating other forms of religious life. After all, in most 
religious traditions, themes such as faith, love, suffering and freedom are important and dominant 
as well.  
 
In a large integrated system of philosophy or theology, the individual becomes 
insignificant, and Kierkegaard found this unacceptable particularly as his vision was that of an 
individual of responsibility who must make profound decisions that determine his life. His views 
on God’s unconditional grace, in contrast to all ecclesiastical formalism, have come to influence 
many, and his work is relevant not just to Christians although he wrote from a Christian 
standpoint. (McEnhill & Newlands, 2004:173) For Kierkegaard, faith becomes possible only 
through an awareness that we are always in sin. However, he must not be taken as having an 
unrealistic view of what faith engenders, because he was definitely not brazenly suggesting that 
the Christian simply casts aside his worldly concerns upon making the leap. Rather, he was saying 
that the believer continues to hope for happiness in his life. The critic may say that this attitude is 
contradictory or absurd, but for Kierkegaard, to harbour hope in this way constitutes the 
clearest expression of faith and passion. It is by means of this faith that a person continues to be 
open to God’s grace, and comes to perceive as God’s gift all circumstances in life, whether 
adverse or otherwise. In this connection, Solomon (2001) sums it up clearly: 
 
‘The acceptance of Christianity is in fact an acceptance of a way of life, a life of 
suffering, but suffering from a secular third person standpoint for no reason 
whatsoever. At the basis of this suffering is the doctrine of one’s relationship 
before God, as signified by Christ. This doctrine is not something true or known, 
or even literally believed. It is a feeling one has of constant guilt and despair, but 
whose object (one’s sin before God) must forever remain, not only a ‘mystery’, 
but forever incomprehensible. To be a Christian, therefore, is to embark upon 
this ‘irrational’ way of life.’ (p.75)  
 
Further, any genuine gift from God must come to the believer as unexpected, and yet, as 
Carlisle (2006) rightly says, ‘a certain expectation is required in order to be ready and open to 117 
 
receive it’. (p.81) In the final analysis, the subjective approach to justifying Christian belief, which 
is the focal point of this thesis, takes as its focal point the uniqueness of the Christian experience. 
In the believer’s faith lies the real proof of God’s existence - he demands no further proof or 
evidence because his faith alone is already deemed as tangible proof of God. For those who 
advocate this approach, the experience of religion is self-validating to the extent that it stands as 
its own proof.  
 
It is difficult to expect unanimity of opinion concerning the issue of the existence and 
nature of the Ultimate Reality. Thompson (2007) writes, 
 
‘We have seen that a religious believer, faced with a logical argument about the 
existence of God, is going to be inclined to consider only those elements that 
favour the conclusion that God exists. But it is equally true that the atheist will 
equally come to religious arguments with the intention of dismissing any 
conclusion that does not fit his or her perspective. It is therefore very difficult 
to consider arguments in the philosophy of religion in a completely objective or 
unbiased way.’ (p.109) 
 
If science is about the soluble, we can say religious faith lies outside of the soluble, because God's 
existence is simply beyond our human competence to ‘solve’ as a ‘problem’. Besides, it seems 
that for every proof of His existence we come up with, a plausible refutation would surface. And 
a theist can never claim certainty over what God’s reasons are for the things He does. Likewise 
at the intellectual level we cannot suppose that we can ‘solve’ this issue called ‘God’. Even if 
historically, the Christian position has been that it is God’s Ultimate Divine Plan to restore Man 
to a vital personal relationship with Him, it remains patently the case that we cannot know 
scientifically whether there is an Ultimate Divine Plan. Therefore we are left to concede at some 
point that knowledge ends and faith must be allowed to step in. Religious belief simply ‘engages 
the whole person and not just the intellect’. (Hannay, 2003:60) However, one should not hastily 
draw the conclusion that theism is hence incoherent, inconsistent, or worse, a deluded or 
irrational belief. By the same token, even if the Kierkegaardian fideist is unable to specify what his 118 
 
justifications are for saying he believes because he wants to believe, this must not be perceived as 
meaning he is irrational or delusional.  
 
In any argument, one sees the attempt to offer some support for a belief, and people can 
advance arguments of all kinds when it comes to demonstrating they believe something. Also, in 
ordinary life, our certainty about something usually depends on the assessment of the available 
evidence. Many theologians have reasoned that Man is unable to find any ultimate answers to his 
life (including his salvation) through either evidence or argument, hence the need to base his 
commitment ultimately on faith alone. It is perhaps in this sense that Paul Kurtz (1986) means 
when he describes fideism as a ‘transcendental temptation’. According to  the fideist, the 
transcendental argument of Cornelius Van Til, William Paley’s Design argument, Norman 
Geisler’s Cosmological argument or for that matter, all arguments, neither inspire nor lead one 
to faith. Thinkers like Martin Gardner belong to this group of philosophers who do not try to 
rationally justify their belief. And when confronted with the absence of rational support for the 
existence of God, religious believers are perfectly at ease with believing anyway. Kierkegaard’s 
account of truth melds with his analysis of religious faith: Abraham is the Father of Faith simply 
because he staunchly remained true to his love for his son. Faith is the opposite of sin, the latter 
of which is seen as that which distances the believer from God, towards what Kierkegaard 
termed as ‘untruth’. It is in this way that he unites ‘a philosophical notion of truth and a 
theological notion of salvation’. (Carlisle, 2006:153) A philosophy of the religious life is what he 
still produced even though in his works he argued that faith and philosophy fall under different 
spheres of existence. This philosophy presents a possibility that becomes real for the individual 
only if ‘it is accepted, committed to and lived out from moment to moment’. (ibid)  
 
Kierkegaard argued rightly that what is of significance is one’s relationship to a religious 
truth. What is believed is not as important as the way (or how) it is believed. (Thompson, 
2007:157) He welcomed the paradoxical nature of some religious claims, emphasising that one 
can only have the absurd as an object of faith. There is plausibility in Kierkegaard’s view that 
religious truth cannot be analysed in an objective, detached way via evidence and argument. I feel 
this plausibility is deepened all the more when we consider that our existence as human beings is 119 
 
what is at stake. In the ‘approximation-process’ that is characteristic of objective, rational inquiry, 
where one inches ever closer to the ultimate answer, but remains unable to reach it as there is 
(lamentably)‘always one more bit of evidence to consider, one more book or article to read and 
evaluate’. (Peterson et al, 2003:45) Consequently, we defer indefinitely the decision for or against 
believing in God, but for someone whose grave concern is with his soul ‘every moment is wasted 
in which he does not have God’. (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.178) In fact, our aim of 
coming to know God would in no way be achieved even if our inquiry were successful, because a 
situation where we could prove God’s existence and love for us would render it impossible for 
us to have faith in Him altogether. (ibid, p.46) Hence Kierkegaard is right in saying that 
knowledge does not, as Socrates claimed, reside in Man, waiting to be uncovered. Instead, it is 
beyond Man and finding the real truth requires a teacher, who can only be God.  
 
As Strathern (1997) says, Kierkegaard’s tearing away of the layers of self-delusion shows 
one the way out of the aesthetic condition. (p.40) Even if one does not totally agree with his 
ultimate conclusion, which was inevitably Christianity, we have to note that most importantly, he 
was paving the way for us to emerge from the darkness of despair, into ‘a life where we take full 
responsibility for what we make of that life’. (ibid) And what makes his philosophy still applicable 
today would be the fact that the despair he described remains a condition increasingly 
widespread in contemporary times. His ‘delineations of this despair – the forms it takes, the 
psychological fallacies behind which it shelters – were highly prescient’. (ibid, p.41) His radical 
solution to this is for one to take full possession of one’s existence and accept responsibility for it 
by willing deeply and sincerely. This approach of self creation through conscious choice was 
advocated by Kierkegaard as the only way out of despair. We can say this was Kierkegaard’s 
most significant contribution, since this message remains as important today as it was in his time 
(and perhaps even more so) given the loss of faith in God by many, the threat to one’s existence 
posed by determinist psychology, ‘mass culture’, totalitarianism and the complexities of science. 
(ibid)  As Hannay (2003) observes, it is ‘not that faith comes in where normal epistemic reasoning 
will no longer allay one’s anxiety; rather, wherever normal epistemic reasoning is in place, we are 
no longer talking about faith. What is wrong in the question of faith is to start looking at history’. 
(p.44) I agree with Kierkegaard that Christianity is not a set of doctrines that can be proved to be 120 
 
true or made reasonable. The God-relationship is something the inner-man has to work on, and 
the ‘problem’ of Christianity is the relation of the individual to Christianity, the concern of the 
‘infinitely interested individual’, and not the truth of Christianity. Ultimately, becoming a Christian 
is a matter of deep personal involvement or faith, and not the result of philosophical or scientific 
inquiry: 
 
‘Faith does not result simply from scientific inquiry; it does not come directly at 
all. On the contrary, in that objectivity, one tends to lose that infinite personal 
interestness which is the condition of faith.’ (Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
p.30) 
 
In the end, faith continues to remain a complex thing, one that influences a person in 
every aspect of his life. And Kierkegaard is right in his understanding that to have faith is to hold 
fast to an existential attitude - it is to exist in fear and trembling. For the radical fideist, more 
than merely believing in something beyond what evidence allows, faith is also (importantly) about 
having and giving hope. There will be those who press the point further that certain aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s radical fideism still do not fit snugly into their conception of what constitutes good 
justification for one’s belief in God. I feel this nevertheless does no injury to an apologetic that 
aims merely to be a satisfactory and not foolproof justification for belief in an inexplicable God. 
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